Removing Russian oligarchs from sanctions list sets 'a very bad precedent', Browder says

What happened to Alisher Usmanov and Mikhail Fridman in the EU's latest sanctions decision?

The EU renewed its sanctions against Russia but removed two prominent businessmen, Alisher Usmanov and Mikhail Fridman, from its list. This means the EU no longer applies those specific listing measures to them, although other countries or legal restrictions could still matter. The decision drew criticism from Bill Browder, a former major investor in Russia.

Browder said sanctions are the "worst thing" for Russian oligarchs. He argued that people still on the list are scheming to find ways off it. Removing Usmanov and Fridman therefore matters beyond two individuals. It may influence how other sanctioned business leaders judge their chances of being delisted.

The article does not explain the EU's detailed reasons for removing either man. It does show the broader dispute: Browder wants more pressure until Russia can no longer afford the war, while delistings can weaken the perceived force of sanctions. The decision may intensify debate over how sanctions are reviewed.

What are economic sanctions, and how are they used against countries or individuals?

Economic sanctions are government measures that restrict financial, commercial, or economic activity. They are used to pressure a country, organization, or person without directly using military force. Their purpose may be to change behavior, punish wrongdoing, or reduce the target's ability to pursue a policy.

For example, a government can freeze a person's assets, ban travel, prohibit banks from handling their money, or restrict exports of valuable technology. Sanctions against a country can limit access to foreign currency, energy markets, shipping, insurance, and imported equipment. Measures can apply to named people and companies or to entire sectors.

Sanctions work through economic pressure and international cooperation. Their effect depends on how many countries enforce them, how important the restricted goods are, and whether the target finds substitutes. In the article, Browder says stronger sanctions could cause enough damage that Russia can no longer afford its war. Sanctions do not automatically produce a political result.

Why were Russian businessmen such as Usmanov and Fridman placed on sanctions lists after Russia's invasion of Ukraine?

After Russia invaded Ukraine, the EU and other governments used sanctions to pressure Russia and people considered connected to its leadership or economy. Targeting wealthy business figures can signal that supporting, benefiting from, or remaining influential within the system carries costs. It also aims to reduce elite access to international money and travel.

In practice, a sanctions listing may freeze assets under the sanctioning jurisdiction and restrict transactions with the listed person. Governments generally rely on legal criteria and evidence when making such decisions. However, the article does not state the specific reasons why Usmanov and Fridman were originally listed, so their individual cases should not be described more precisely from this text.

The decision to remove both men shows that listings can be reviewed and changed. Browder says this encourages other oligarchs to seek delisting. The wider policy question is whether sanctions should focus on individual influence, economic capacity, or both. Their pressure is intended to affect Russia's ability to sustain the war.

How many businessmen were removed in this decision, and how large is the wider group of people and entities still covered by EU sanctions on Russia?

Two businessmen were removed in the decision described: Alisher Usmanov and Mikhail Fridman. The article itself does not state how many people and entities remain covered by EU sanctions. That distinction matters because a two-person delisting does not represent an end to the wider sanctions regime.

EU sanctions on Russia have been broad. They have included named individuals and organizations, as well as restrictions affecting finance, trade, energy, transport, and technology. Recent EU summaries and reporting have put the wider group of listed individuals and entities at more than 2,400, though the exact total can change as names are added, removed, or legally challenged.

The immediate scale of this decision is therefore small compared with the overall regime. Still, Browder argues that even limited removals can create a powerful signal. Russian oligarchs, he says, are trying to find ways off the list. The continuing debate concerns both the number of targets and whether sanctions remain strong enough to affect Russia's ability to finance its war.

What practical consequences can being removed from a sanctions list have for a person's frozen assets, travel, business dealings, and access to financial services?

Being removed from an EU sanctions list can end the specific EU measures attached to that listing. In practical terms, banks and businesses may no longer be automatically prohibited from dealing with the person under the EU asset-freeze and transaction rules. An EU travel ban linked to the listing may also no longer apply.

The consequences are not always immediate or complete. Financial institutions still conduct checks, and assets may remain blocked because of court orders, anti-money-laundering rules, contracts, or sanctions imposed by another country. Banks may also decide that a relationship carries too much legal or reputational risk. Access to accounts, payments, investments, and business partners can therefore return gradually, if at all.

The article does not describe the practical terms of Usmanov's or Fridman's removal. It only confirms that both left the EU list. The broader implication is political: Browder says delisting may encourage other oligarchs to seek similar outcomes, potentially reducing sanctions' deterrent effect even when formal restrictions remain against many others.

How can sanctions reduce a government's ability to pay for imports, raise revenue, and finance a war?

A government pays for war through tax revenue, exports, borrowing, and access to financial reserves. Sanctions can reduce these sources by blocking buyers, limiting banking channels, freezing assets, or restricting access to foreign currency. They can also make imported fuel, machinery, electronics, and replacement parts more expensive or harder to obtain.

The mechanism is cumulative. If energy sales bring in less money, tax receipts and government revenue can fall. If banks cannot make international payments easily, imports become slower and costlier. Export controls can limit military production by denying advanced components. A government may still find alternative buyers, routes, or suppliers, but those workarounds can reduce efficiency and increase costs.

Browder argues that sanctions must inflict enough economic damage for Russia to no longer afford the war. He says Putin is ready to starve the country, so pressure must continue until Russia cannot physically carry on. Sanctions therefore seek long-term financial and industrial strain, not necessarily an immediate collapse.

What other tools, besides sanctions, can governments use to pressure Russia or limit its ability to continue the war?

Sanctions are only one form of pressure. Governments can use diplomacy to negotiate ceasefires, security arrangements, or a political settlement. They can provide Ukraine with military, financial, and humanitarian assistance, strengthening its ability to resist. They can also share intelligence and coordinate international investigations into alleged crimes.

Other economic tools include export controls on advanced technology, limits on energy purchases, price caps, shipping restrictions, and penalties for companies helping sanctions evasion. Countries can reduce dependence on Russian energy by finding other suppliers and expanding renewable power. These measures can lower Russia's future revenue while limiting access to important equipment.

The article specifically calls for more sanctions, but it does not discuss these alternatives. Their effectiveness varies and often depends on coordination among countries. Diplomacy may seek an agreement directly, while military and economic support changes the balance of pressure. Used together, such tools can make continuing the war more difficult, while keeping channels open for negotiation.

Key Facts:

📌 The EU removed Alisher Usmanov and Mikhail Fridman from its sanctions list.

📌 EU sanctions against Russia were renewed at the same time.

📌 Bill Browder called the delistings a bad precedent.

📌 Sanctions restrict economic activity to pressure targets without direct military force.

📌 They can freeze assets, limit trade, and block financial services.

📌 Their effectiveness depends on enforcement, cooperation, and available alternatives.

📌 Sanctions targeted influential Russian business figures after the invasion of Ukraine.