3 years later, Netanyahu faces reckoning over Oct. 7 in Israeli election

What is the Knesset, and how does an Israeli election determine who becomes prime minister?

The Knesset is Israel’s 120-seat parliament. Its members are elected through national party lists, with seats distributed according to each party’s share of the vote. This makes coalition-building central to Israeli politics. A party can win the most seats without being able to govern.

After the election, Israel’s president asks the politician most likely to form a government to try. That leader negotiates with other parties and combines their seats into a coalition. The coalition needs at least 61 Knesset members to hold a majority and pass laws. The prime minister is therefore the coalition’s leader, not necessarily the leader of the largest party.

The article shows why this system matters for Netanyahu. Polls give his Likud party roughly 20 to 22 seats, while his broader right-wing bloc has about 50 to 54. That falls short of 61, leaving coalition deals, Arab-Israeli parties, or another election potentially decisive.

How large was the Oct. 7 security failure and its political impact, including the approximately 1,200 people killed and the loss of support for Likud?

Oct. 7 was a massive security and political shock. Hamas attacks killed around 1,200 people, making the episode Israel’s worst-ever security failure. The disaster raised questions about how warning signs were missed and why the country was unprepared. It also placed direct pressure on the leaders responsible for national security.

The political damage is visible in Likud’s numbers. The party won 32 Knesset seats previously, but most polls now project only 20 to 22. Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition is projected to hold 50 to 54 seats, below the 61 needed for a majority. Those figures show a serious loss of support, even if they do not guarantee his defeat.

Netanyahu has partly recovered by presenting himself as a strong wartime leader. Three years of fighting, hostage releases, attacks on Hezbollah, and wars involving Iran have reshaped public opinion. The result is an election in which his survival remains possible despite the scale of Oct. 7.

Why is Netanyahu being held politically responsible for Oct. 7 even though Israel's military and intelligence agencies also received warning signs?

Netanyahu is being held politically responsible because he was prime minister when Israel suffered its worst-ever security failure. The opposition says he has refused to accept responsibility and has blocked an independent inquiry. That makes leadership, oversight, and decision-making central political issues, even though military and intelligence agencies also failed.

The article notes that every other senior national security official serving during the attacks has resigned. Netanyahu has not. He instead blames the “deep state” and says security chiefs kept him uninformed. His allies have promoted claims that Israel was betrayed internally. These arguments shift attention toward agencies, but also invite scrutiny of whether the prime minister properly supervised them.

Reported warnings make the dispute sharper, not simpler. If leaders received advance information, voters may ask who saw it, who acted, and who failed to coordinate. Netanyahu denies receiving warnings from the UAE and Egypt. The election will test whether Israelis accept his defense or hold him ultimately accountable.

What warnings did Israeli leaders reportedly receive from the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, and why do those reports matter to the question of Netanyahu's responsibility?

The reported warnings matter because they could show that Israel received advance notice of danger. Haaretz said UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed warned Netanyahu days before Oct. 7 that Hamas was planning a major operation. Three sources told Axios that UAE intelligence gave Israeli counterparts a general warning and that MBZ spoke directly with Netanyahu.

Other reports describe a similar warning from Egypt. The Atlantic and Wall Street Journal said Egyptian intelligence chief Abbas Kamel also warned Netanyahu before the attacks. A former U.S. official said MBZ later told CIA Director Bill Burns that he had warned Netanyahu. These accounts concern both the existence of warnings and whether they reached the prime minister.

Their political importance remains contested because Netanyahu denies receiving warnings from the UAE or Egypt. He sued media outlets and journalists that reported them. If the reports are confirmed, they could strengthen arguments that senior leaders failed to act. If not, Netanyahu’s claim that he was kept uninformed becomes more credible, though agency failures would still remain.

How could the Arab-Israeli parties, projected to hold 12 to 14 seats, determine whether either major bloc can reach the 61 seats needed to form a government?

Arab-Israeli parties could become kingmakers because neither major bloc is projected to reach 61 seats alone. Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition is expected to win 50 to 54 seats. The opposition also appears unlikely to form a majority without Arab-Israeli parties, which are projected to win a combined 12 to 14 seats.

The mechanism is straightforward. If a bloc wins around 50 seats, support from enough Arab-Israeli lawmakers could carry it past the 61-seat threshold. That support might involve joining a coalition or backing a government from outside it. The article says opposition leader Gadi Eisenkot could otherwise try to form a minority government, but that would be politically fragile.

Netanyahu is trying to prevent this outcome by pressuring his main opposition to rule out a coalition with Arab-Israeli parties. That taboo could block Eisenkot even if the opposition has more potential partners. The election may therefore turn less on the largest party than on whether Arab-Israeli support is considered acceptable.

What could happen after the election if no bloc wins 61 seats, and why might Israel end up with a caretaker government or another election?

A hung parliament means no political bloc can assemble the 61 seats needed to govern. In Israel’s system, winning the most seats is not enough. A leader must find coalition partners willing to support a government. If those negotiations fail, the country can remain politically stuck after the vote.

The article offers one possible outcome: Netanyahu could stay on as caretaker prime minister while parties try to find a governing arrangement. This would preserve continuity during negotiations but would not resolve the underlying lack of a majority. An opposition leader such as Eisenkot might attempt a minority government, yet the article describes that route as difficult.

If no coalition becomes viable, another election could follow. Netanyahu’s opponents may reject cooperation with Arab-Israeli parties, while Netanyahu may lack enough natural allies to reach 61. That combination creates a deadlock. The election could therefore produce neither a clear winner nor a stable government, extending Israel’s political uncertainty.

Why can losing political power affect Netanyahu's corruption trial, and what does this reveal about the relationship between elected office, legal accountability, and executive power?

Netanyahu’s election prospects are tied to more than governing. The article says losing power would mean losing “levers” to delay or influence his ongoing corruption trial. That does not mean an election decides the legal case. It means political office can provide influence, authority, and allies that may affect how aggressively he can challenge the proceedings.

The contrast is stark. If Netanyahu loses, a successor government could allow the trial to proceed without his control over the executive branch. If he wins, he could argue that Israel’s voters effectively acquitted him politically. The article says he might then take stronger action to thwart the proceedings. That claim would be political, not a formal court judgment.

The situation shows why elections can affect legal accountability even when courts remain separate from politics. Executive power does not erase a trial, but it can shape the surrounding political environment. Netanyahu’s legal future therefore gives the election unusually high stakes, alongside the questions raised by Oct. 7.

Key Facts:

📌 The Knesset is Israel’s 120-seat parliament.

📌 Israelis elect parties, not the prime minister directly.

📌 A governing coalition needs at least 61 seats.

📌 Around 1,200 people were killed in the Oct. 7 attacks.

📌 Likud fell from 32 seats to roughly 20–22 in most polls.

📌 Netanyahu’s coalition remains below the 61-seat majority threshold.

📌 Netanyahu was prime minister during Israel’s worst-ever security failure.