Attacks on Tankers in Hormuz Hit Highest of Any Week Since Start of Iran War, Sources Say

What happened to tankers traveling through the Strait of Hormuz during the week of September 28 to October 5?

During September 28 to October 5, tankers near the Strait of Hormuz faced an unusually intense wave of attacks and related incidents. Maritime security sources recorded at least 12 attacks involving oil, liquefied natural gas and liquefied petroleum gas tankers. The incidents showed that shipping risks remained high even as Gulf producers increased exports.

The attacks were part of wider activity attributed to Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. This included attempted attacks, drone overflights, surveillance and radio hailing. The Joint Maritime Information Center said these actions demonstrated Iran’s intent to maintain pressure on vessels using key transit lanes.

The weekly total was the highest recorded since the US war with Iran began on February 28. Separate International Maritime Organization data recorded nine incidents, because the UN agency takes longer to verify reports. The elevated danger threatens reliable energy flows and complicates plans for sustained higher exports.

What is the Strait of Hormuz, and why is it an important shipping route?

The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow sea passage between Iran and Oman that connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman. It is a major gateway for energy shipments from Gulf producers. Because oil, liquefied natural gas and liquefied petroleum gas tankers use the route, threats there can affect exporters, ship operators and energy buyers.

The article illustrates its importance through the concentration of incidents around the strait. At least 12 attacks affected energy tankers during one week. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards also used drone overflights, surveillance and VHF radio hailing. The Joint Maritime Information Center said these actions targeted key transit lanes and pressured transiting vessels.

The strait’s importance means security problems can spread beyond individual ships. Attacks may delay cargoes, raise insurance and operating costs, and make exporters reconsider shipment plans. The article reports that Gulf exports exceeded pre-war levels for about half of September, but attacks and logistical constraints cloud the outlook for maintaining those flows.

How many attacks, attempted attacks, or harassment incidents were reported that week, and how does that compare with earlier weeks of the war?

Maritime security sources counted at least 12 attacks on oil, liquefied natural gas and liquefied petroleum gas tankers around the Strait of Hormuz during September 28 to October 5. The figure included incidents identified through information received from the area. It marked the most attacks in any week since the US war with Iran began on February 28.

The sources’ total was higher than the International Maritime Organization’s count. The IMO recorded nine incidents involving vessels during the same week. Maritime sources explained that the UN shipping agency generally takes longer to verify and officially record reports. The difference reflects reporting and verification timing, not necessarily different events.

The closest earlier comparison was the week of July 13, when separate IMO data showed eight incidents. The new weekly figures therefore indicate a sharp rise in recorded activity. Continued attacks, attempted attacks and harassment could further disrupt tanker movements and weaken confidence in sustained export growth.

What kinds of actions by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards count as harassment of ships, and how can they put crews and vessels at risk?

The article defines harassment broadly rather than limiting it to weapons fired at ships. It includes drone overflights, surveillance and hailing vessels over VHF radio by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. The same security picture also includes attempted attacks. These actions matter because they create pressure and uncertainty for crews moving through a vital transit lane.

A drone flying over a tanker can alarm the crew and force extra watchkeeping or defensive procedures. Surveillance may expose a vessel’s location, route or activity. Radio hailing can interrupt operations and create confusion about who is directing a ship. If these encounters intensify, crews may face risks from miscommunication, evasive maneuvers or a transition from harassment to direct attack.

The Joint Maritime Information Center said the actions demonstrate Iran’s intent to assert a presence and maintain pressure on transiting vessels. The article also reports at least 12 attacks that week. India said 12 crew members were injured after an unknown projectile struck the tanker On Peace.

What could happen to oil and gas exports, shipping costs, and energy prices if attacks in the strait continue?

If attacks continue, oil and gas shipments through the Strait of Hormuz could become slower, riskier and more expensive. Shipowners may face higher insurance, security and operating costs. Exporters could also encounter delays or logistical constraints. Those costs can eventually reach energy buyers through higher freight rates and fuel prices.

The article already identifies warning signs. Gulf oil exporters exceeded pre-war levels for about half of September, but attacks on tankers and logistical constraints cloud the outlook for sustained higher flows. A dangerous route could make companies hesitate to send vessels, postpone cargoes or reduce the pace of exports. The injury to 12 crew members aboard On Peace shows that the risk is not only financial.

The exact effect on prices would depend on how many shipments were disrupted and how long the attacks lasted. The article gives no price forecast. It does show that rising incident levels threaten reliable energy movement at a time when Gulf producers are trying to increase exports.

Why are Gulf countries increasing exports through a route that has become more dangerous?

Gulf countries are increasing exports because the Strait of Hormuz remains central to their tanker movements, even during a period of heightened danger. The article reports a bigger export push and says Gulf oil exporters were above pre-war levels for about half of September. It does not identify one specific motive or explain each country’s decision.

The practical mechanism is clear. Exporters use tankers to move oil, liquefied natural gas and liquefied petroleum gas through the strait. Increasing shipments requires vessels to keep transiting the route. That creates exposure to attacks, attempted attacks, drone activity, surveillance and radio hailing by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards.

The strategy carries an obvious trade-off. Higher exports can maintain sales and supply, but attacks and logistical constraints can undermine reliable delivery. The article says these dangers cloud the outlook for sustained higher flows. It does not say Gulf producers will stop exporting or describe a replacement route they could use instead.

Why is the Strait of Hormuz so difficult to replace with alternative routes for transporting oil and liquefied gas?

The Strait of Hormuz is difficult to replace because it directly connects Gulf energy producers with open waters used by international shipping. Oil, liquefied natural gas and liquefied petroleum gas tankers are built around maritime transport, while alternative routes would require different infrastructure, longer journeys or both. The article identifies the strait as a key transit lane but does not list replacement routes.

Pipelines can carry some oil, but they cannot easily replace all tanker traffic or transport liquefied gas in the same way. Land routes also need suitable terminals, storage and connections to overseas buyers. Building or expanding these systems takes time and large investment. Tankers using another sea route could face longer distances and higher costs.

That dependence makes disruption especially serious. During September 28 to October 5, security sources counted at least 12 tanker attacks around the strait. Gulf exports had exceeded pre-war levels for part of September, but attacks and logistical constraints now cloud the prospects for keeping flows high.

Key Facts:

📌 At least 12 tanker attacks occurred around the Strait of Hormuz.

📌 The incidents occurred during September 28 to October 5.

📌 It was the highest weekly total since February 28.

📌 The strait links the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman.

📌 Energy tankers use it to carry Gulf exports.

📌 Security incidents can threaten international energy flows.

📌 Security sources counted at least 12 attacks that week.