IAF at 94: Capable, but stretched

What does it mean for the IAF to be capable but short on strategic capacity?

Being capable means the IAF has trained personnel, combat experience, advanced platforms and the skills to conduct difficult missions. Strategic capacity means having enough aircraft, weapons, support systems and reserves to sustain those missions. The distinction matters because strong individual performance cannot replace insufficient numbers.

The article points to about 30 fighter squadrons against a sanctioned strength of 42. Air Marshal Diptendu Choudhury says a short conflict would probably be manageable. A full-fledged war, even on one front, would be difficult because aircraft and other resources must last for an uncertain period.

The concern is therefore endurance and deterrence, not a lack of professional ability. Choudhury says the IAF’s capacity must be restored during the next decade. Faster deliveries, fleet expansion and better long-term planning would help turn proven capability into credible strategic strength.

How many fighter squadrons does the IAF have, and how many does it consider necessary?

The IAF currently has about 30 fighter squadrons. Its sanctioned strength is 42. The difference is roughly 12 squadrons, showing the scale of the force’s numbers problem.

Squadrons are central to sustained air operations because they provide groups of combat aircraft and crews that can rotate, deploy and continue missions. A smaller force may still perform effectively in a limited operation, but it has less room to absorb losses, maintenance demands or a prolonged tempo.

The article presents this gap as a strategic concern rather than merely an administrative shortfall. Air Marshal Diptendu Choudhury says India could probably manage a short conflict, but a full-fledged war would be difficult. He calls a two-front war with the present capacity an incredibly difficult task.

Why would a shortage of squadrons make a prolonged one-front or two-front war especially difficult for India?

A prolonged war is difficult because its end cannot be predicted. The IAF must distribute aircraft, crews, weapons and support capacity for the entire conflict, rather than concentrating everything in a short opening operation. A numerical shortfall reduces that flexibility.

Choudhury says a short conflict would probably be manageable. But even a full-fledged one-front war would leave the IAF hard-pressed. A two-front war would be an incredibly difficult task because the same limited capacity would need to cover separate threats and continue operating over time.

The article links the problem directly to deterrence. If an adversary believes India cannot sustain serious operations, its calculation may change. Restoring strategic capacity is therefore the IAF’s top priority for the next decade, alongside aerospace awareness and defence.

Why does the IAF argue that striking an enemy's air bases, fuel depots, and other systems can deter future attacks?

Deterrence depends on convincing an adversary that aggression will bring unacceptable costs. The article contrasts defending against drones and missiles with striking the opposing air force after it attacks. Defensive success protects India, but offensive reach can alter the adversary’s decision to continue.

Choudhury uses Operation Sindoor as an example. He argues that Pakistan’s ceasefire followed the IAF’s attacks on the Pakistan Air Force, not simply India’s ability to intercept drones and missiles. He says even 10% damage in peacetime over 88 hours would be an enormous shock for an air force.

This logic makes capacity crucial. India needs enough aircraft and support to hit important systems and sustain pressure. Deep strikes can target an enemy’s wider military structure, including fuel infrastructure. That creates strategic effects beyond a single defensive engagement.

What did the 1971 war reveal about the value of attacking an opponent's wider military and fuel-supply system?

Choudhury calls the 1971 war the IAF’s defining war because it demonstrated the value of attacking an opponent as a complete system. The aim was not only to destroy individual aircraft or frontline positions. It was to disrupt the resources that allowed the wider military effort to function.

He credits Air Chief Marshal PC Lal’s strategy of attacking fuel depots at Karachi, the Sui gas plant and the Attock refinery. These targets were connected to Pakistan’s ability to supply and sustain its forces. The campaign nearly choked Pakistan’s fuel supply.

The lesson, as presented in the article, is that deep attacks can create strategic capability. They can impose pressure throughout an adversary’s system and make continued aggression harder. Choudhury says this kind of capability is what deters an adversary.

How could faster Rafale purchases, upgraded Sukhois, and reliable Tejas deliveries help address the IAF's numbers shortfall?

The IAF’s numbers problem requires aircraft that arrive on time and remain useful in sustained operations. Faster Rafale purchases could add a proven combat platform. Upgrading and expanding the Sukhoi fleet could increase the value and availability of aircraft already in service. Reliable Tejas deliveries could add indigenous fighters to the force.

The article says the IAF operates two Rafale squadrons, with 36 jets, while a deal for 114 more remains under negotiation. Choudhury wants that deal concluded quickly, ideally by year-end. He also wants the Sukhoi fleet upgraded and expanded, while warning that Tejas Mk-1A aircraft ordered by the IAF have not yet reached the force.

These steps would not instantly solve the gap, but they could rebuild capacity over time. Their impact depends on timely production, fewer concessions and dependable supply chains, including engines.

What is deterrence, and why does it depend not only on defending against attacks but also on having the capacity to impose serious costs on an adversary?

Deterrence means discouraging an adversary from attacking by demonstrating that aggression will bring serious consequences. Defence is one part of that calculation. It can protect people, aircraft and infrastructure from drones, missiles or other attacks. But protection alone may not convince an adversary to stop or avoid escalation.

The article’s example is Operation Sindoor. Choudhury argues that Pakistan’s ceasefire followed the IAF’s strikes on the Pakistan Air Force after attacks, rather than only India’s defensive response. He also points to the 1971 attacks on fuel depots and other systems, which nearly choked Pakistan’s fuel supply.

This requires strategic capacity: enough aircraft, weapons and support to sustain operations and impose costs. With about 30 squadrons against 42 sanctioned, the IAF worries that prolonged conflicts could strain that capacity. Restoring it is therefore central to credible deterrence.

Key Facts:

📌 The IAF has proven combat skills but lacks sufficient strategic capacity.

📌 About 30 fighter squadrons serve against a sanctioned 42.

📌 Long wars require capacity to be spread across an uncertain period.

📌 The IAF has about 30 fighter squadrons.

📌 The sanctioned requirement is 42 fighter squadrons.

📌 The shortfall is roughly 12 squadrons.

📌 The IAF would be hard-pressed in a full-fledged one-front war.