News · Defence & Security
Polish man suspected of helping Russian plot to assassinate Zelensky sentenced to 5.5 years
The court found Paweł K. guilty of espionage and illegal possession of ammunition. Investigators said he offered to cooperate with Russian intelligence and contacted Russians involved in military operations against Ukraine. His assignments included gathering information about security at Rzeszów-Jasionka airport. A district court in Zamość originally sentenced him to three and a half years in prison. Prosecutors appealed, seeking seven and a half years. The Lublin appeals court increased the punishment by two years, to five and a half years, and made the ruling final. Judge Artur Achrymowicz said the lower sentence was “grossly lenient.” He stressed that offering to work for the intelligence service of a country at war with a state bordering Poland, while making unfriendly gestures toward Poland, could not be treated lightly. The court therefore viewed the conduct as a serious national-security threat.
Based on reporting by Notes from Poland
What exactly did the Polish court find the man guilty of, and why was his sentence increased to five and a half years?
The court found Paweł K. guilty of espionage and illegal possession of ammunition. Investigators said he offered to cooperate with Russian intelligence and contacted Russians involved in military operations against Ukraine. His assignments included gathering information about security at Rzeszów-Jasionka airport.
A district court in Zamość originally sentenced him to three and a half years in prison. Prosecutors appealed, seeking seven and a half years. The Lublin appeals court increased the punishment by two years, to five and a half years, and made the ruling final.
Judge Artur Achrymowicz said the lower sentence was “grossly lenient.” He stressed that offering to work for the intelligence service of a country at war with a state bordering Poland, while making unfriendly gestures toward Poland, could not be treated lightly. The court therefore viewed the conduct as a serious national-security threat.
What is espionage, and how is it different from ordinary contact with people from another country?
Espionage means secretly collecting, sharing, or attempting to obtain information for a foreign intelligence service. The information may concern security, military activity, infrastructure, or other matters useful to another state. The key issue is the hidden purpose and relationship with an intelligence service, not simply someone’s nationality or foreign contacts.
People can email, message, or meet foreigners without committing espionage. In this case, prosecutors said Paweł K. declared his willingness to cooperate with Russian intelligence and communicated with Russians involved in military operations against Ukraine. They said he also accepted assignments involving airport security.
That combination separated his conduct from ordinary contact. The alleged relationship involved a foreign intelligence purpose, assigned tasks, and transmission of information. The court convicted him of espionage, although he denied the accusations and claimed he was deceiving Russians to help capture war criminals. The court’s final ruling rejected that defence.
Why is Rzeszów-Jasionka airport strategically important to Poland, Ukraine, and Russia?
Rzeszów-Jasionka airport is strategically important because it is the main hub for goods and people being transported in and out of Ukraine. It is in Poland, which directly borders Ukraine, and supports movement connected with the war. Information about the airport can therefore concern both Polish security and Ukraine-related transport.
According to prosecutors, Paweł K. was assigned to gather and transmit information about the airport’s security. The airport’s role made it a focus for reconnaissance. The National Prosecutor’s Office said such activity could have been used by Russian intelligence in planning a possible assassination attempt against Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.
The article does not establish that an attack was carried out or that Paweł K. possessed a complete operational plan. It does show why the airport matters to all three sides: Poland must protect a critical site, Ukraine depends on the transport hub, and Russia could seek intelligence about it for hostile operations. That makes reconnaissance there especially sensitive.
How much has espionage-related activity increased in Poland, according to the article?
The article describes a sharp rise in espionage-related activity in Poland. The Internal Security Agency, known as the ABW, launched 48 investigations related to espionage last year. That was more than twice as many as it opened in 2024.
The increase is even more striking over a longer period. The article says that, across those two years, Poland recorded more espionage investigations than during the previous three decades combined. It presents this as evidence of a changed security environment, not as an isolated case involving Paweł K.
The article also says Poland has become a primary target for Russian espionage, sabotage, and disinformation. An International Centre for Counter-Terrorism report called Poland the “primary focus” of Russia’s sabotage operations in Europe. The figures measure investigations, not proven crimes or successful attacks, but they show that Polish authorities are devoting substantially more attention to suspected espionage.
How could information about airport security be used in an assassination attempt or other sabotage operation?
Security information can help an intelligence service understand how a sensitive site operates. Details about protections, access, movements, or procedures may show where an operation could face obstacles or where attackers might try to exploit weaknesses. Even incomplete information can help build a broader picture.
Paweł K. was accused of gathering and transmitting information about Rzeszów-Jasionka airport. The airport is the main hub for people and goods moving in and out of Ukraine. Poland’s National Prosecutor’s Office said this activity could have been used in planning a possible assassination attempt against President Volodymyr Zelensky.
The article does not say that the information directly enabled an attack. It says the information could have been used by Russian intelligence, including in that context. The same kind of reconnaissance could also support sabotage or disruption at a strategically important transport site. This is why the court treated the alleged cooperation as a serious security matter, even though his defence called the information trivial and publicly available.
Who are “disposable agents,” and why might an intelligence service use local amateurs instead of professional spies?
“Disposable agents” are people already present in the target country who perform tasks for a foreign intelligence service. The article says they are often amateurs, recruited and paid through messaging apps such as Telegram. They are contrasted with professional spies or soldiers.
In Poland, the article connects this model with suspected Russian espionage, sabotage, and disinformation. A local agent may be able to observe places, communicate in the local environment, or carry out simple assignments without arriving as an identifiable foreign operative. The article specifically describes Paweł K. as a former Polish soldier accused of reconnaissance.
Using local amateurs can give an intelligence service a large pool of people on the ground while keeping individual operations separate from senior handlers. However, the article does not claim that every local recruit succeeds or that all such agents are amateurs. It reports a broader pattern, including people hired through messaging apps and paid to perform tasks linked to Russian operations.
What makes information strategically useful to an intelligence service, even when some of it is publicly available?
Information does not need to be secret to have strategic value. Small facts can help an intelligence service map a site, understand routines, identify security arrangements, or compare public details with other intelligence. The value often comes from the purpose and combination, not from one fact alone.
Paweł K.’s defence argued that the airport information he transmitted was “trivial and publicly available.” Prosecutors nevertheless said he had been assigned to gather and send information about security at Rzeszów-Jasionka. They considered the activity potentially useful to Russian intelligence in the context of a possible assassination attempt.
The case shows why investigators examine intent, contacts, and the target together. Paweł K. had communicated with Russians involved in military operations and had declared willingness to cooperate with Russian intelligence, according to prosecutors. Those surrounding facts gave the airport information a different significance from ordinary public research. The final conviction included espionage.
Key Facts:
📌 Paweł K. was convicted of espionage and illegal ammunition possession.
📌 The appeals court increased his sentence to five and a half years.
📌 The original sentence was deemed “grossly lenient.”
📌 Espionage involves secret cooperation with a foreign intelligence service.
📌 Paweł K. communicated with Russians involved in military operations.
📌 He denied spying and claimed he was deceiving Russian contacts.
📌 Rzeszów-Jasionka is the main hub for goods and people entering Ukraine.