US’ transactional Taiwan policy puts Indo-Pacific at risk, ex-US officials warn

What does a “transactional” US policy toward Taiwan mean?

A transactional policy links Taiwan decisions to immediate bargains with China or demands on Taiwan. Instead of treating arms sales and security support as steady parts of US policy, Washington may use them to gain trade concessions, encourage higher defence spending, or secure investment.

The article’s clearest example is President Trump’s description of a US$14 billion weapons package as a “very good negotiating chip” for maintaining a trade truce. Former official Laura Rosenberger called that approach a “fundamental departure” from the traditional policy framework. She was especially concerned because the package had been pre-notified to Congress but did not move forward.

The security relationship remains robust, and two F-16V fighters were transferred after the September summit. However, former officials say the broader approach is now more leverage-focused. That could make Taiwan question how dependable US support is and make Beijing watch for opportunities to pressure or test Washington.

What changes in US policy toward Taiwan are former officials warning about, including arms sales, defence spending, and technology investment?

Former officials describe a shift from a relatively separate Taiwan policy toward one more closely tied to relations with Beijing. Brent Christensen said this was a policy “discontinuity” and that Washington’s approach had become “less independent” from its China policy. The change matters because Taiwan’s security support could become part of broader bargaining.

The demands on Taiwan have also grown. Christensen cited pressure for Taiwan to produce more weapons itself and increase defence spending. He also noted a major increase in demands for Taiwan’s high-technology investment in the United States. Rosenberger highlighted another change: arms sales being discussed as negotiating tools with Beijing.

The administration says broader policy remains unchanged, and Taiwan’s envoy called relations robust. Yet the US$14 billion sale has not moved forward, while a separate US$11 billion sale announced in December triggered Beijing’s anger. Together, these actions suggest a more transactional and leverage-focused approach.

How large are the weapons packages involved, and what has happened to them?

The article identifies two major Taiwan arms packages with a combined value of US$25 billion. One package is worth US$14 billion. The other is worth US$11 billion. Their scale shows how central weapons sales are to the security relationship and to the political dispute surrounding Taiwan.

The US$14 billion package was pre-notified to Congress but did not move forward. President Trump described it in May as a “very good negotiating chip” for helping maintain a trade truce with China. Laura Rosenberger said there was no sign of approval progressing and called the delay a deep concern.

The administration had announced the separate US$11 billion sale in December. Beijing responded strongly to that announcement. At the same time, the United States transferred two F-16V fighter jets approved during Trump’s first term. The mixed record combines completed transfers with delayed or politically leveraged sales.

Why does using arms sales as leverage conflict with the Six Assurances, especially the promise not to consult Beijing before selling weapons to Taiwan?

The Six Assurances are six US foreign-policy guidelines given to Taiwan in July 1982. One pledge says Washington will not consult Beijing before deciding whether to sell weapons to Taipei. The purpose, as described in the article, is to keep arms decisions from becoming subject to China’s approval or influence.

Calling weapons a negotiating chip creates a direct tension with that promise. President Trump held up the US$14 billion package while describing it as useful for maintaining a trade truce. Rosenberger said this was not merely rhetorical because the sale had already been pre-notified to Congress but still did not move forward.

That approach concerns former officials because it suggests Taiwan’s security support may depend on negotiations with Beijing. The United States continues to oppose force in the Taiwan Strait and remains committed to supplying Taiwan with arms. Yet delaying a sale for leverage raises questions about the reliability of that commitment.

What happens to US military readiness in the western Pacific when aircraft carriers, munitions, and missile-defence systems are moved to the Middle East?

The military consequence is reduced US capacity to respond quickly in the western Pacific. Mark Montgomery said the United States had not been in a weaker regional position than now. Carrier strike groups moved from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East, while critical munitions and missile-defence systems were also transferred.

Montgomery said no US destroyers or aircraft carriers were actively operating in the western Pacific. The USS Abraham Lincoln and USS George Washington had been scheduled for Indo-Pacific deployment but were sent to the Middle East instead. He warned that the resulting gap could become a “readiness bathtub,” meaning a steep decline in available combat forces.

He estimated the effect could last 18 months or longer. If the mission continued until the following spring or early summer, he said readiness could be affected through late 2028, 2029, and 2030. Beijing could interpret the reduced presence as an opportunity for action against Taiwan.

Why is Taiwan strategically important to the United States and the world economy beyond its location near China?

Beyond its position near China, the article presents Taiwan as important because of its security relationship with the United States and its high-technology capacity. Washington is demanding more Taiwanese high-technology investment in the United States. That shows Taiwan’s economic and technological resources matter in the relationship, although the article does not identify specific industries or explain global supply chains.

The island also matters because the Taiwan Strait is a major point of friction between Washington and Beijing. The United States opposes any use of force there and is committed to supplying Taiwan with arms. Beijing sees Taiwan as part of China and says it should be reunited, by force if necessary.

The current policy debate therefore connects Taiwan’s security, technology, and economic ties with US-China negotiations. Former officials worry that treating support as leverage could weaken confidence in the relationship. The article does not state further economic consequences beyond these facts.

How does deterrence work in the Taiwan Strait, and why might uncertainty about US support affect China’s calculations about using force?

Deterrence works by shaping an opponent’s expectations. In the Taiwan Strait, the United States signals that it opposes force and supports Taiwan’s security through arms sales and a robust relationship. China must then consider the possible costs and risks of military action before deciding whether to use force.

Uncertainty can weaken that calculation. The article says Washington has treated the US$14 billion arms package as a negotiating chip, while US carriers and other critical systems were moved to the Middle East. Former officials also warned that Taiwan policy is becoming more tied to broader US-China relations. These signals could make the strength and timing of US support less predictable.

The article does not state that China has decided to act. It reports that the war in Iran created possible “illusions” of military action against Taiwan for Beijing. A weaker regional presence and unclear commitments could therefore encourage miscalculation, while continued arms transfers and clear opposition to force support deterrence.

Key Facts:

📌 A transactional policy uses Taiwan-related decisions as leverage in wider negotiations.

📌 Trump called the US$14 billion weapons package a negotiating chip.

📌 Former officials described this as a departure from traditional policy.

📌 Washington’s Taiwan policy has become less independent from its China policy.

📌 US officials want Taiwan to increase defence spending and weapons production.

📌 Washington is also demanding more Taiwanese high-technology investment.

📌 The article describes arms packages worth US$14 billion and US$11 billion.