Tesla leaned on Dutch regulator to ease its FSD review, emails show

What did Tesla ask the Dutch regulator to change or ease in its review of FSD?

Tesla asked the Dutch regulator, RDW, to make its review of Full Self-Driving (Supervised) less demanding and less expensive. This mattered because RDW’s decision became the basis for Tesla’s European approval campaign.

The clearest example involved a €365,000 invoice for five months of work. Tesla demanded an hour-by-hour accounting and objected to paying for five RDW staffers to visit Giga Berlin. It also argued that its test reports should replace witnessed testing, leading RDW to offer remote monitoring for some tests. Tesla resisted a detailed meeting about over-the-air updates, and requested advance notice of tests and safety-driver names.

The emails show RDW responding with several accommodations. A week after Tesla challenged the invoice, an RDW staffer asked how the regulator could reduce its effort. RDW said its independence remained intact, but it has not published its FSD test data because of Tesla trade secrets.

What is Tesla’s “Full Self-Driving (Supervised)” system, and why does it still require a human driver?

Full Self-Driving (Supervised) is Tesla’s name for a driving system that assists with vehicle operation while a human remains responsible for supervising it. The article does not describe every technical function, but the word “Supervised” captures the central limitation: the system is not treated as an independent driver.

That human role is visible in the review process. Tesla’s testing involved safety drivers, and it asked RDW to identify those drivers in advance. Tesla also compared FSD driving with manual Tesla driving, showing that the system was being assessed as a mode used inside cars, not as a separate driver without human oversight.

The distinction matters for regulation and safety claims. Approval allows the system in more countries, but it does not establish that the technology prevents crashes or saves lives. The article says Tesla’s evidence measured driving surrogates rather than crashes, while its own fine print rejected causal conclusions.

What is RDW, and what role does its approval play in Tesla’s European expansion?

RDW is the Netherlands’ vehicle regulator. In this story, it reviewed Tesla’s Full Self-Driving (Supervised) system and later approved it. That makes RDW the key regulatory actor in Tesla’s European expansion, because its approval became the foundation of the company’s wider push.

The emails show Tesla pressing RDW over the scope, cost, and method of the review. Tesla challenged a €365,000 invoice, sought remote monitoring for some tests, resisted deeper discussion of software updates, and requested advance information about testing. RDW made several concessions while saying that its assessment remained independent and thorough.

The approval now has consequences beyond the Netherlands. Eight EU countries allow the system, and RDW is asking the European Union to approve it more broadly. The regulator has not released its own FSD test data, citing Tesla trade secrets. That leaves other countries weighing an approval built partly on evidence the public cannot inspect.

How large could the regulatory decision become: how many countries currently allow FSD, and what EU support is needed for bloc-wide approval?

The decision could affect Tesla’s market across the European Union, not just the Netherlands. The article says eight EU countries now allow Full Self-Driving (Supervised), while RDW is asking the EU to approve the system for the bloc more broadly.

The Dutch decision is the mechanism driving that expansion. RDW’s review and approval provide the regulatory foundation Tesla is presenting to other European authorities. Tesla has also shared an evidence dashboard with EU member states and sent its European safety study to regulators. The company argues that approval is being held back by bureaucracy.

A bloc-wide vote could happen as early as December. However, the article does not specify the number of votes needed, the exact EU procedure, or the support threshold for approval. The outcome therefore remains open. It may determine whether the system’s current country-by-country availability becomes a much wider European authorization.

What consequences could follow if regulators approve FSD based on reviews or safety data that the public cannot independently examine?

If regulators approve FSD using private reviews or incomplete public evidence, the public may be unable to judge whether the system is genuinely safe. That matters because approval affects millions of road users, while independent researchers and citizens need enough information to test the claims behind it.

The article gives a concrete example: RDW is asking other countries to trust its review but has withheld its own FSD test data, citing Tesla trade secrets. Tesla’s study also used small samples, surrogate measures, and professional test drivers. Researchers said it could not establish that FSD prevents crashes or deaths, despite Tesla’s public “lives saved” messaging.

The likely consequence is a gap between regulatory permission and public understanding. Other countries may rely on a decision they cannot fully examine, while Tesla’s strongest safety claims remain difficult to verify. That could complicate accountability, public trust, and future assessments if safety concerns emerge.

Why do Tesla’s comparisons of honking, braking, and other driving behaviors not prove that FSD prevents crashes or saves lives?

Tesla’s European study measured driving behaviors that might relate to safety, including honking, blinker use, hard braking, and hard cornering. These are “surrogates,” meaning indirect indicators. They are not the same as measuring actual crashes, injuries, or deaths.

The study also had major comparison limits. Researchers told Reuters that the FSD sample covered only tens or hundreds of thousands of miles, while the manual-driving comparison involved hundreds of millions of miles. FSD cars were driven by Tesla’s professional test drivers, not ordinary owners. Those differences make a direct safety comparison difficult.

Most importantly, Tesla’s own fine print said the results could not be read as causal estimates. That means the study did not show that FSD caused safer outcomes. Yet Tesla used it to support claims that technology could prevent Europe’s road deaths. The evidence therefore cannot establish that FSD prevents crashes or saves lives.

Why must automated-driving systems be tested and overseen independently, rather than relying mainly on claims from the company that develops them?

Automated-driving systems affect people beyond the company developing them, so their safety cannot rest mainly on corporate claims. Independent oversight helps regulators examine whether testing is complete, fair, and relevant to ordinary drivers rather than designed to produce favorable results.

The article shows why this matters. Tesla used professional test drivers, compared a relatively small FSD sample with much larger manual-driving data, and measured behaviors such as honking and hard braking instead of crashes. Seven researchers said the methodology could not prove that FSD prevents crashes. Tesla’s own fine print also rejected causal conclusions.

Independent review does not automatically make a system safe, but it can challenge unsupported claims before approvals spread. Here, RDW approved FSD while withholding its test data because of trade secrets, then asked other countries to rely on that review. Independent evidence would give regulators and the public a stronger basis for judging the system.

Key Facts:

📌 Tesla disputed RDW’s €365,000 invoice for five months of review work.

📌 RDW offered to monitor some Tesla tests remotely.

📌 Tesla requested advance details about tests and safety drivers.

📌 The system’s name includes “Supervised,” signaling continued human oversight.

📌 Tesla’s FSD tests used the company’s professional test drivers.

📌 The article says Tesla’s study did not prove crash prevention.

📌 RDW is the Dutch vehicle regulator.