News · Defence & Security
Medellín records five homicides in September, the lowest number in half a century
Medellín recorded five homicides in September. Official city figures described this as the lowest monthly total in half a century. The result matters because Medellín once had a global reputation for extreme violence. It also shows how sharply lethal violence has fallen over time. The comparison with the previous year is striking. September 2025 had 27 homicides, so September 2026 recorded 22 fewer. The city also logged 148 murder-free days during the year. Mayor Federico Gutiérrez presented the result as evidence that coordinated police, prosecution and military work can reduce killings. The decline does not have one settled explanation. Researcher Santiago Tobón says homicide rates have fallen systematically since 2013. He points to stronger state institutions, social investment and youth programs, while also warning that gangs remain active. Lower killings may therefore reflect both improved public security and criminal groups’ efforts to avoid attention.
Based on reporting by El Pais English
What happened to Medellín’s homicide total in September?
Medellín recorded five homicides in September. Official city figures described this as the lowest monthly total in half a century. The result matters because Medellín once had a global reputation for extreme violence. It also shows how sharply lethal violence has fallen over time.
The comparison with the previous year is striking. September 2025 had 27 homicides, so September 2026 recorded 22 fewer. The city also logged 148 murder-free days during the year. Mayor Federico Gutiérrez presented the result as evidence that coordinated police, prosecution and military work can reduce killings.
The decline does not have one settled explanation. Researcher Santiago Tobón says homicide rates have fallen systematically since 2013. He points to stronger state institutions, social investment and youth programs, while also warning that gangs remain active. Lower killings may therefore reflect both improved public security and criminal groups’ efforts to avoid attention.
How significant is five homicides for a city of 2.5 million people, and how does it compare with Medellín’s past?
Five homicides in a city of 2.5 million people is an exceptionally small monthly total. It signals that lethal violence has become far less common than during Medellín’s most violent eras. The figure is especially significant because the city was once known as the world’s most violent, making the turnaround historically important.
The month also broke recent records. September 2026 had 22 fewer homicides than September 2025. Medellín had already recorded 148 murder-free days that year. If the trend continued, the article projected an annual homicide rate of 9.24 per 100,000 inhabitants, below rates reported for Bogotá, Philadelphia and Chicago the previous year.
The number is encouraging, but it does not prove that all crime has declined. Medellín still has about 350 gangs grouped into roughly 20 larger organizations. Those groups remain involved in drug trafficking and extortion. Experts therefore see the five homicides as evidence of reduced killing, not the disappearance of organized crime.
What is a homicide rate, and why is it usually measured per 100,000 inhabitants?
A homicide rate is the number of homicides divided by the population, then expressed for every 100,000 inhabitants. It measures the frequency of lethal violence relative to population size. This matters because a raw total can mislead: a larger city may record more killings simply because it has more residents.
For example, Medellín’s projected 2026 rate was 9.24 per 100,000 inhabitants. The article compares that figure with last year’s rates in Bogotá, Philadelphia and Chicago: 14.1 and 14.6. The common unit allows readers to compare cities even when their populations differ greatly.
The rate is usually standardized at 100,000 people because that unit is large enough to produce useful numbers while remaining easy to understand. A city can have few homicides but a high rate if its population is small, or many homicides but a lower rate if its population is large. The article uses both totals and rates to show Medellín’s change.
Who or what do officials and experts identify as the main reasons for Medellín’s long-term decline in killings?
Officials and experts offer overlapping but different explanations for Medellín’s long decline in killings. Mayor Federico Gutiérrez credits coordinated work by police, prosecutors and the military. Researcher Santiago Tobón agrees that the state has become better able to sanction crime, especially through stronger police and prosecutorial capabilities.
Tobón also points to long-term social investment. Cable cars and outdoor escalators improved access to formal work in marginalized neighborhoods. Buen Comienzo supported early childhood development, while Parceros gave young people cognitive behavioral therapy and emotional-management skills. Tobón says Parceros has been shown to reduce violent behavior.
The decline began before the current administration, dating systematically from 2013. Gangs have not disappeared: Tobón estimates around 350 gangs operate within about 20 larger organizations. Their possible decision to limit killings may also explain the improvement. The evidence therefore points to stronger institutions and social programs, combined with organized crime adapting to pressure.
Why can a falling homicide rate coexist with powerful gangs, drug trafficking, and extortion?
A falling homicide rate measures fewer killings, not the disappearance of every criminal activity. Medellín’s organized networks remain involved in drug trafficking and extortion. They can keep earning money through those activities while reducing shootings, murders and other attention-grabbing violence.
Santiago Tobón explains the mechanism through a neighborhood cocaine business. If a gang depends on avoiding authorities, fewer murders help protect its customers, territory and profits. Violence becomes something to manage, not something to use constantly. Stronger policing and prosecution may therefore push criminal groups toward quieter forms of control rather than eliminate them.
This creates an important warning for Medellín. Five homicides in September and 148 murder-free days show real progress against lethal violence. But they cannot establish that overall crime has fallen. Luis Fernando Quijano argues that gangs may be using the calm to demonstrate their power and signal that dialogue with them is possible. The city must therefore track extortion, trafficking and other crimes as well as killings.
How might stronger police and prosecutors, social investment, and youth programs have contributed to lower violence since 2013?
Medellín’s lower violence may reflect several changes working together. Stronger police and prosecutors improve the state’s ability to investigate and sanction crime. That can raise the risks for people who use violence. Social investment can also reduce the conditions that help gangs recruit, especially in marginalized neighborhoods.
The article gives concrete examples. Cable cars and outdoor escalators helped more residents enter the formal workforce. Buen Comienzo supported early childhood development. Parceros offered cognitive behavioral therapy and taught young people to manage emotions; researcher Santiago Tobón says it has been shown to reduce violent behavior. These programs address opportunity and behavior, not only policing.
The timing is important. Tobón says homicide had been declining systematically since 2013, before the current administration. The evidence is limited for some social programs, so they cannot be credited alone. Still, stronger institutions and long-term investment may have reduced recruitment and violent conduct. Continued evaluation matters because gangs remain active and may also be limiting violence strategically.
Why might organized-crime groups deliberately reduce killings, and what does that reveal about how criminal markets respond to state pressure?
Organized-crime groups may deliberately reduce killings when violence threatens their profits. Public murders attract police, prosecutors and political attention. By keeping disputes quieter, gangs can continue selling drugs and collecting extortion while lowering the pressure directed at their businesses. Violence can therefore fall even while criminal power remains strong.
Santiago Tobón describes this logic through a gang selling cocaine in a neighborhood. If its business depends on avoiding authorities, fewer murders are better for business. Luis Fernando Quijano offers another explanation: criminal organizations may be sending the government a message about their power. A truce can show that they can influence violence and that dialogue with them is possible.
This reveals that criminal markets adapt to state pressure. Stronger enforcement may not immediately destroy gangs; it may change how they operate. Medellín’s five homicides in September are therefore a major reduction in lethal violence, but not proof that organized crime has weakened. Authorities must distinguish peaceful streets from hidden control, extortion and trafficking.
Key Facts:
📌 Medellín recorded five homicides in September.
📌 The total was 22 lower than in September 2025.
📌 September had Medellín’s lowest homicide total in 50 years.
📌 Medellín has 2.5 million inhabitants.
📌 September’s five homicides were the city’s lowest total in 50 years.
📌 The projected 2026 rate was 9.24 per 100,000 inhabitants.
📌 A homicide rate expresses killings per 100,000 inhabitants.