Can Pakistan help Saudi Arabia defeat Iran-backed Houthis in an all-out war?

What is the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, and what military obligations does it create for Pakistan and Turkey?

The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement is a three-country security pact involving Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey. Its central rule is collective defence: an armed attack on one member is considered an attack on all. The agreement matters because it turns Saudi Arabia’s confrontation with the Houthis into a potential regional military commitment.

The pact was signed in August by Mohammed bin Salman, Shehbaz Sharif and Recep Tayyip Erdogan. After Houthi missiles and drones struck Saudi cities, airports, energy facilities and military sites, the agreement was activated. Pakistan and Turkey would deploy forces and military capabilities in Saudi Arabia.

The governments describe the pact as defensive, not a plan for aggression. It could strengthen Saudi air defence and deterrence. However, it does not guarantee that the allies can destroy Ansar Allah, whose mountain bases, mobile launchers and dispersed command make Yemen’s war difficult.

How large and capable are the military forces that Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey could bring against the Houthis?

The coalition would have a major conventional advantage over the Houthis. Saudi Arabia is one of the world’s biggest military spenders and has advanced aircraft, missiles, drones and air-defence systems. Pakistan adds large, experienced land and air forces. Turkey brings NATO experience and a strong defence industry.

The article describes Turkey as having NATO’s second-largest military and advanced drone, missile and electronic-warfare capabilities. Pakistan’s military is battle-hardened, although it has struggled to end insurgencies and terrorism at home. Saudi Arabia spent about $80 billion on defence in 2025, showing the scale of its resources.

Numbers and technology do not automatically produce victory. Yemen’s terrain favours defenders, while the Houthis use caves, mobile launchers and decentralized units. The coalition could protect Saudi cities and damage Houthi forces. Defeating their military and political organization would be much harder.

What happens to the war if Pakistan and Turkey help Saudi Arabia defend its cities and launch attacks in Yemen?

If Pakistan and Turkey help, Saudi Arabia could improve its protection against drones and missiles. Their forces could strengthen air defence, surveillance and deterrence around cities, airports, energy sites and military bases. They could also support attacks against Houthi positions in Yemen.

The likely mechanism is pressure from several directions. Aircraft and long-range weapons could strike launch sites, while ground or naval forces might support Yemeni partners. Yet analyst Ejaz Haider identified four broad options—ground invasion, stand-off strikes, combined defence and long-range attacks, or blockade—and found no clear path to victory.

The war could therefore become more dangerous without being settled. Coalition attacks might damage Houthi infrastructure or help Yemeni forces recover territory. But mountains, caves, mobile launchers and decentralized command could preserve Houthi attacks. The article’s key distinction is between defending Saudi Arabia and eliminating Ansar Allah.

Who are the Houthis, or Ansar Allah, and how did they become the dominant military and political force in much of northern Yemen?

The Houthis, or Ansar Allah, are Yemen’s Iran-backed armed and political movement. The article identifies them as a major military and political force, but it does not explain their full historical rise. Established background knowledge places their roots in Yemen’s Zaidi revivalist movement and northern grievances against the central government.

The Houthis seized Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, in 2014 and expanded their control across much of northern Yemen. They later fought a Saudi-led coalition that intervened in 2015. Their survival was helped by local networks, battlefield experience, access to missiles and drones, and defensive positions in northern mountains.

Their continued strength matters because they are not simply a group of lightly armed fighters. They combine organized forces, political authority and military infrastructure. That makes destroying them different from defeating a conventional army. Even severe attacks may not remove their ability to govern, recruit or launch strikes.

Why do Yemen's mountains, caves, mobile missile launchers and decentralized command networks make the Houthis difficult to defeat?

Northern Yemen’s mountains and ravines favor defenders who know the ground. Caves and underground facilities can conceal fighters, weapons, command posts and launch equipment. This makes airstrikes less certain and ground attacks more dangerous. The terrain matters because conventional armies need reliable movement, visibility and supply.

The Houthis also use mobile missile launchers. These can fire and relocate before attackers identify or strike them. Their decentralized command structure creates another layer of resilience. Units can continue operating even when communications, leaders or fixed facilities are attacked. A mechanized force entering the mountains would depend on exposed routes carrying fuel, food, water and ammunition.

The result is an uneven battlefield. Superior aircraft and weapons may destroy visible targets, but they cannot easily locate every launcher or underground position. A ground offensive could impose severe costs on the attackers. These features help explain why military superiority does not ensure the Houthis’ defeat.

What did Saudi Arabia's campaign since 2015, and later US and British strikes, achieve—and why did they fail to eliminate Houthi attacks?

Saudi Arabia’s coalition began an intensive air campaign in Yemen in 2015. Its goal was to confront the Houthi movement and support forces opposed to it. Despite the coalition’s advanced weapons and greater resources, the Houthis survived, grew stronger, advanced and gained more territory, according to the article.

The key problem was the gap between damaging targets and ending a resilient movement. Airpower could hit buildings, launch sites or military assets, but the Houthis used mountains, caves, underground facilities and mobile missiles. Their decentralized command structure also reduced the effect of attacks on individual leaders or bases. Aerial strikes did not remove their political organization.

The United States and Britain later bombed Houthi positions as well, yet the article says earlier warfare and subsequent strikes failed to solve the conflict. This suggests that more bombing may impose costs without ending attacks. Military pressure can change battlefield conditions, but eliminating the movement requires more than airpower.

Why can a smaller insurgent force sometimes withstand a much stronger conventional military, and why might negotiation be more effective than trying to destroy it?

Conventional strength measures aircraft, missiles, troops and spending. Insurgents use different advantages: difficult terrain, concealment, mobility, local knowledge and dispersed leadership. The Houthis’ caves, mountains and mobile launchers reduce the value of an opponent’s technological edge. Their command networks can keep operating after strikes on bases or leaders.

The article’s example is Saudi Arabia’s campaign. Despite a large military advantage, the Houthis survived, expanded and gained territory. This shows how a smaller force can turn time, terrain and supply problems against a stronger army. It can also keep attacking without holding conventional front lines.

Negotiation may therefore offer a more practical route than total destruction, especially when the opponent is both political and military. Talks could address power, security and territory, while reducing attacks and civilian costs. This is an analytical implication, not a promise: the article does not report a negotiated settlement or prove that talks would succeed.

Key Facts:

📌 An attack on one member counts as an attack on all.

📌 Pakistan and Turkey would deploy forces and military capabilities in Saudi Arabia.

📌 The three governments describe the pact as defensive.

📌 Saudi Arabia spent about $80 billion on its military in 2025.

📌 Pakistan contributes large, experienced land and air forces.

📌 Turkey adds NATO experience and advanced drone and missile industries.

📌 The coalition could strengthen Saudi air defence and deterrence.