Three years since October 7, Gaza has faded from headlines. All eyes are now on Israel’s elections

Israel’s parliamentary election chooses the lawmakers who determine which parties can form a governing coalition. That coalition controls national policy, including military strategy, negotiations, reconstruction rules, Palestinian statehood, and settlement policy. Its result therefore matters far beyond Israel’s borders.

The article describes an election on October 27 during a fragile Gaza peace process. Israel’s government insists Gaza cannot be rebuilt until Hamas fully disarms. Hamas rejects disarmament on the plan’s terms. The Israeli government has also remained in campaign mode, giving it incentives to spoil progress rather than compromise.

A less extreme government could change Israel’s approach, but the article does not guarantee that outcome. It might be more willing to support reconstruction, negotiations, or international involvement. It could also affect pressure over West Bank settler violence and Palestinian political rights. A harder-line coalition could prolong the deadlock.

The attack and ensuing war produced enormous losses on both sides. Hamas killed about 1,200 people on October 7, 2023, most of them Israeli civilians, and took 251 hostages. The war that followed caused more than 74,000 Palestinian deaths, according to the article, with thousands more believed buried under rubble.

Displacement was also immense. Hundreds of thousands of displaced Palestinians later moved back to northern Gaza after the ceasefire and Israeli military pullback. That figure describes people returning, not everyone displaced during the war. The article does not provide a complete total for all people forced from their homes.

These numbers show why the conflict remains a regional and international crisis. The human cost did not end when the ceasefire began. Nearly 1,400 more Gazans were reportedly killed during the year after the ceasefire, while many families remained in tents or damaged buildings.

The ceasefire and first phase of Donald Trump’s 20-point plan delivered several concrete gains. The remaining living Israeli hostages returned in exchange for nearly 2,000 Palestinian prisoners and detainees. The remains of deceased hostages followed. Hundreds of thousands of displaced Gazans returned north, Israeli forces pulled back to a yellow line, and the UN Security Council endorsed the plan.

But the agreement did not produce lasting peace. Israeli attacks continued, and the Gaza Health Ministry reported nearly 1,400 deaths during the year after the ceasefire. Aid remained restricted. Reconstruction had not meaningfully begun, and families faced another winter in tents or damaged buildings.

The unresolved second phase is even more difficult. Hamas has not disarmed. The proposed Palestinian committee has not taken control, and the international security force has not deployed. Reconstruction also depends on an agreement that neither side currently accepts.

The second phase requires several linked steps. Hamas must surrender its weapons. A technocratic Palestinian committee must take over Gaza’s administration. An International Stabilisation Force must provide security. Reconstruction must then expand. Each step depends on political agreement that has not been reached.

The key mechanism is mutual refusal. Israel will not permit reconstruction before full Hamas disarmament. Hamas will not disarm under the plan’s terms. Meanwhile, the planned security force has not deployed, even though a US commander was appointed in January. The Palestinian committee also has not taken control on the ground.

The result is a cycle of delay. Without disarmament, Israel blocks major rebuilding. Without rebuilding and a credible administration, Gaza’s conditions remain desperate. The Board of Peace recently proposed a six-month, $2.45 billion rebuilding plan, but that is far below the estimated $71.4 billion needed over a decade. Political pressure could either unlock or further freeze the process.

Israel’s governing coalition sets the country’s position on Gaza, Palestinian statehood, and settlements. A less extreme coalition could bring different priorities to negotiations and international cooperation. That matters because the current right-wing government has strong reasons to maintain hard-line policies while campaigning.

The article links Israel’s political incentives directly to the stalled peace process. Israel refuses reconstruction before Hamas disarms, while Hamas rejects that condition. The government’s campaign posture may encourage it to spoil fragile progress instead of making politically risky compromises. In the West Bank, continued settler violence shows how domestic politics affects Palestinians beyond Gaza.

A coalition change could therefore reduce opposition to reconstruction, support a different negotiating framework, or ease pressure against Palestinian political recognition. It might also restrain settlement-related violence. However, the article does not promise these outcomes. It asks whether a less extreme government would preserve attention and pressure, rather than proving that an election will produce a settlement.

International attention often peaks during the most shocking violence and falls when suffering becomes prolonged. Gaza followed that pattern. Mass-casualty bombardments generated intense coverage, but near-daily lower-intensity attacks produced fewer headlines. Once another crisis dominates, audiences and governments often move on.

The article identifies several competing pressures. The US–Israeli war with Iran absorbed much of the world’s attention. Ukraine and, at times, Lebanon also competed for coverage. Domestic concerns such as health care, jobs, and living costs ranked higher for many people. The Strait of Hormuz crisis affected petrol prices directly, making it more immediate for foreign audiences than Gaza.

This decline has consequences. International pressure helped produce the ceasefire but proved harder to sustain afterward. Aid stayed restricted, nearly 1,400 Gazans were reportedly killed during the following year, and settler violence continued in the West Bank. Attention did not disappear entirely: committed activists, some officials, legislators, and commentators kept Gaza visible.

Media attention determines which crises remain visible to broad audiences. It usually rises with extreme violence and falls when suffering becomes chronic or another emergency dominates. Public attention also competes with domestic priorities. Health care, jobs, living costs, and petrol prices often feel more urgent than distant conflicts.

Organized campaigns can extend pressure beyond the news cycle. The article describes a Palestinian solidarity movement built over decades. Its activists turned outrage into a sustained global campaign. Some rhetoric and tactics deepened polarization, but the movement helped keep Gaza present among committed citizens. Some legislators, officials, and commentators also maintained attention after mass opinion moved on.

Political pressure lasts when media coverage, organized citizens, and influential decision-makers reinforce one another. It weakens when crises become less visible or governments face stronger domestic incentives. Gaza shows both outcomes: attention declined, yet did not disappear. Future pressure on Israel, Hamas, and other actors will depend on whether these networks keep the humanitarian crisis politically salient.