Flydubai co-pilot who attacked Smit Machchhar, inspired by 9/11 attacks, made two visits to Ben Gurion Airport | Updates

The flight faced an attempted cockpit takeover on 30 September. Co-pilot Hamam al-Hammami attacked Captain Smit Machchhar with a crash axe and allegedly intended to crash the aircraft into Ben Gurion Airport. The incident threatened everyone aboard and required an immediate response.

Machchhar was seriously injured but managed to unlock the cockpit door. Crew members and passengers then subdued Al-Hammami. Two off-duty pilots took over the emergency response and landed the aircraft at a civilian and military base in Tabuk, Saudi Arabia.

The attack failed because the captain regained access control long enough for others to intervene. The aircraft carried over 170 people, mostly Israelis. The UAE investigation continues to examine whether anyone else helped, although Al-Hammami described the plot as a lone-wolf attack.

Ben Gurion Airport is Israel’s main international airport, serving Tel Aviv and the surrounding area. It is a major passenger gateway, so an attack there could affect many travelers and airport workers. The article identifies the alleged target as the airport’s passenger terminal.

According to the UAE Attorney General’s statement, Al-Hammami planned to seize the aircraft and use it for a suicide attack against the terminal. Investigators said he wanted to cause “the greatest possible number of casualties.” He had also taken part in two earlier flights to Ben Gurion to become familiar with the route and airport.

The alleged targeting matters because it combined an aircraft takeover with a planned strike on a crowded civilian facility. The preliminary investigation described the plot as premeditated and terrorist in purpose. The UAE is still investigating whether other people were involved.

The flight was carrying over 170 people, according to the article. Most were Israelis. That number shows why the alleged plan posed a serious threat to passengers, crew members, and people at the intended airport target.

The preliminary investigation said Al-Hammami had already participated in two flights to Ben Gurion Airport before the 30 September flight. Investigators said he used those journeys to become familiar with the route and airport. This suggests preparation rather than an entirely spontaneous act.

The article does not provide a more exact passenger total. It also does not say whether the earlier flights were taken on the same route or under unusual circumstances. It does establish that the suspect had prior exposure to Ben Gurion before the alleged attack, while investigators continued examining possible involvement by others.

When someone inside an aircraft tries to seize the cockpit, control of navigation, communication, and flight decisions can be threatened. The consequences may include injuries, a loss of command, diversion, or deliberate use of the aircraft as a weapon. The danger extends beyond passengers and crew to people on the ground.

Here, Al-Hammami attacked Captain Smit Machchhar with a crash axe and allegedly tried to crash the aircraft into Ben Gurion Airport. Machchhar was seriously injured but opened the cockpit door. Crew members and passengers subdued the attacker, while two off-duty pilots handled an emergency landing in Tabuk.

The case shows why cockpit access and rapid crew coordination matter. It also shows the consequences of an insider threat: the attacker was a co-pilot who had passed required checks. The UAE reviewed the hiring process, while investigators examined whether others were involved.

A lone-wolf attack generally means an act planned and carried out by one individual, rather than by a visible team or command structure. The term describes the suspected organisation of a plot, not the seriousness of its consequences. Authorities still investigate whether hidden assistance existed.

Al-Hammami told investigators that he acted alone. Yet the UAE said it was examining possible involvement by others. The article also says he had developed extremist views, consumed online material praising terrorist groups and suicide attacks, and made two earlier flights to Ben Gurion.

Such plots can be difficult to detect because intentions may not appear in standard records or routine interviews. In this case, he held a pilot’s licence, submitted a good-conduct certificate, and passed required checks. The article says none of those procedures revealed his extremist views or planned attack. This explanation uses general security knowledge alongside the article’s specific findings.

The 9/11 attacks were a coordinated terrorist operation in the United States in which hijacked passenger aircraft were used as weapons. They killed thousands and transformed aviation security. The article says Al-Hammami was inspired by 9/11 and pursued aviation after deciding he wanted to carry out a similar operation.

After 9/11, aviation systems generally introduced or strengthened locked, reinforced cockpit doors and tighter rules for entering flight decks. Airports also expanded passenger and baggage screening. Airlines revised crew training, access controls, communication practices, and responses to attempted hijackings. These measures aim to prevent attackers from gaining control.

The flydubai incident shows that security also depends on insiders and human decisions. Al-Hammami was a co-pilot who met employment requirements, yet investigators allege he prepared for a terrorist plot. The case highlights why aviation security must address both outside threats and trusted personnel. These historical details come from established world knowledge, not the article itself.

Pilot licensing and employment screening test qualifications, records, and available warning signs. They do not provide a guaranteed view of a person’s private beliefs or future decisions. Extremist views may be concealed, develop later, or appear only in private online activity that employers cannot see.

The article says Al-Hammami held a pilot’s licence, submitted a good-conduct certificate, and passed required checks. Investigators found that he fulfilled the employment criteria. However, the UAE said those procedures revealed no indication of extremist views or an intention to carry out a terrorist plot.

The investigation also said he began gravitating toward extremism in 2017 while studying in Australia. He consumed extremist publications and online material, then trained in boxing and prepared psychologically and physically. This case shows that screening can miss changing intentions. Stronger monitoring may help, but no process can guarantee that every future threat will be identified.