Parl panel seeks public tech strategy, new coordination body

The committee asked the Ministry of External Affairs to prepare a public technology vision and strategy document. It said India needs one national plan linking technology with foreign policy, instead of a fragmentary, piecemeal and ad hoc approach. The document should explain India’s goals, priorities and institutional responsibilities.

The MEA should prepare it with MeitY and other departments. The process should include consultations with academia, research institutions and industry. The committee also wants the MEA to publish a separate technology diplomacy strategy, with both documents reviewed periodically.

To make the strategy work, the panel proposed a formal inter-ministerial body chaired by the MEA. It would include the IT, science, space and commerce ministries. The aim is regular coordination, rather than handling technology diplomacy case by case. The recommendations appeared in the committee’s 17th report, adopted on September 22 and presented on September 25.

Technology diplomacy is the use of foreign-policy tools to pursue national interests in technology. It connects domestic decisions about areas such as AI, data, chips and digital infrastructure with international partnerships, rules, investment and cooperation. The article does not provide a formal definition, but this established meaning explains the committee’s concern.

For India, the proposed approach would give the MEA a clear role in technology policy. It could help align the work of the MEA, MeitY, science, space and commerce ministries. A public technology strategy would set national goals, while a separate diplomacy strategy would explain how India should pursue them abroad.

The committee said India’s current approach is fragmentary, piecemeal and ad hoc. It wants regular coordination through a formal body, rather than separate decisions made case by case. Both strategies would be public and reviewed periodically, helping guide international technology partnerships and investment discussions.

The proposed technology-diplomacy body would be chaired by the Ministry of External Affairs. Its core membership would include the ministries responsible for IT, science, space and commerce. This structure reflects the fact that technology diplomacy involves foreign policy, digital systems, research, space capabilities and trade.

The committee separately recommended that the MEA work with the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology and other departments to draft the public technology vision and strategy. It also called for consultations with academia, research institutions and industry. These participants would provide expertise while government departments define roles and priorities.

The body’s main mechanism would be regular inter-ministerial coordination. The committee wants to move away from a case-by-case approach, which it described as fragmented. A standing forum could help align national technology goals, diplomatic engagement, technology partnerships and international investment decisions across the relevant institutions.

The committee acknowledged that India has significant AI strengths but identified several serious gaps. These include insufficient computing power, limited data-centre capacity, restricted access to advanced chips and inadequate private investment in large AI models. Together, these weaknesses can limit the country’s ability to develop and deploy advanced AI systems.

The committee also pointed to an outdated policy foundation. NITI Aayog’s national AI strategy was drafted before the emergence of large language models. It recommended that NITI Aayog and MeitY revise the strategy in consultation with the MEA, so that AI policy reflects the newer technology landscape.

India ranked third globally, up from seventh, on Stanford’s AI Vibrancy Tool. Yet the committee warned that the gap with the United States and China remains substantial. It called this a difference of kind, not only degree. MeitY was also preparing an AI regulation consultation paper focused on safety, humanity, skilling, inclusivity and harm mitigation.

Industry estimates cited by the committee suggest India’s data-centre capacity may need to expand sharply. Capacity could rise from around 1.5 gigawatts in 2025 to between 5 and 10 gigawatts by 2030. The estimate shows the scale of infrastructure growth considered necessary for India’s future technology ambitions.

Data centres provide the computing infrastructure used to store and process large volumes of information. They are also important for training and running AI systems. In the article, their expansion is discussed alongside gaps in computing power, advanced chips and investment in large AI models.

The committee did not present these figures as officially verified capacity requirements. It cited them as industry estimates and separately questioned unverified claims about India’s global share of data. It recommended that the MEA coordinate with MeitY and other ministries to collect and publish verified data. Better evidence could guide international investment and technology partnerships.

Uncertain data can make it harder for international investors and technology partners to judge India’s needs and opportunities. The committee questioned claims that India holds about 20% of the world’s data but has only 3% of global data-centre capacity. MeitY told the panel that neither figure had been officially verified.

Without reliable figures, decisions about data-centre investment, technology cooperation and infrastructure planning may rest on inconsistent assumptions. Partners may struggle to assess the scale of India’s data ecosystem or the capacity gap that future projects should address. This could weaken the evidence behind international negotiations and investment choices.

The committee recommended that the MEA coordinate with MeitY and other ministries to collect and publish verified data. It specifically linked this work to guiding international investments and technology partnerships. The article does not state that investment has already been harmed, but it identifies uncertainty as a problem that better official data could address.

Computing power is needed to train and run large AI models. Data centres provide the physical facilities, electricity, storage and networking for that work. Advanced chips perform the specialised calculations efficiently. Without enough of these resources, organisations may face limits on model size, training speed, reliability and access.

The committee identified all four areas as gaps in India’s AI ecosystem: computing power, data-centre capacity, advanced chips and private investment in large AI models. These weaknesses are connected. More investment can help build facilities and secure chips, while adequate infrastructure can make it more attractive for companies to develop and operate major models.

India has risen to third place from seventh on Stanford’s AI Vibrancy Tool, but the committee said its gap with the United States and China remains substantial. The article does not quantify how much infrastructure India specifically needs for model development. It does show that closing these foundational gaps is central to competing internationally.