Modi and Xi can’t bridge the India-China divide by themselves

Xi Jinping’s visit to New Delhi created a positive opening. He and Narendra Modi held an in-depth conversation about shared interests, including using open-weight artificial intelligence for mutual benefit. Their meeting mattered because it offered a senior-level signal that relations could improve after years of strain.

Yet leader-level reassurance does not automatically change policy. China sees the border dispute as one part of a wider relationship. India treats it as the main negotiating priority. That strategic mismatch keeps officials apart. Trade tensions, territorial claims and public suspicion add further obstacles.

The article describes a broader trust problem. The 2020 Galwan Valley clashes damaged public attitudes, while suspended flights, visa restrictions and hostile propaganda reduced contact. Summits helped create a detente, but bureaucratic mistrust remains. The proposed answer is gradual trust-building through travel, journalism, business dialogue, market access and technology cooperation.

The Line of Actual Control, or LAC, is the disputed boundary between the areas controlled by India and China. It is not a settled international border. Both countries therefore interpret territory and control differently, making incidents especially difficult to manage. The article identifies the LAC as a heavily contested area near Ladakh.

This dispute matters because India places it at the forefront of negotiations with China. China instead treats the border as one issue among several. That difference means the same event can carry different diplomatic weight. Delhi’s renaming of 28 sites in Ladakh shows how territorial claims remain politically active.

The risks are serious because border tension shapes public opinion and wider policy. The 2020 Galwan Valley clashes intensified mistrust in both countries. In a 2024 survey, 89 per cent of urban youth in India called border conflict with China their greatest foreign-policy challenge. That makes compromise harder.

The article portrays a major economic imbalance, especially in manufacturing. It says China’s manufacturing dwarfs India’s and describes a widening bilateral trade deficit in China’s favour. However, it provides no numerical value for the manufacturing gap or the deficit. The scale is therefore presented comparatively, not statistically.

This imbalance matters beyond economics. A stronger manufacturing position gives China greater commercial weight and can make India feel exposed to supply restrictions. The article warns that prolonged weaponisation of economic chokepoints could trigger an unwarranted push for decoupling. Trade therefore affects strategic trust and public perceptions.

The proposed response is managed engagement rather than abrupt separation. Working groups between commerce and technology ministries could address market access. China could encourage technology exchange in automobiles, solar panels and lithium batteries. Reviving industrial estates in Gujarat and Maharashtra could also help create visible benefits for India while preserving cooperation.

The combined effect has been a severe reduction in contact and confidence. The 2020 Galwan Valley clashes became a powerful symbol of danger. The article says mistrust is now mirrored by the wider public, not confined to officials. Hostile narratives have made rebuilding confidence more difficult.

Practical connections also weakened. Direct flights were suspended for five years during the Covid-19 pandemic. Visa restrictions made it hard for scholars and students to study each other’s societies. Ultra-nationalist propaganda amplified stereotypes. These barriers removed everyday opportunities to test assumptions and correct inaccurate claims.

Public opinion shows the consequences. A 2024 survey found that 89 per cent of surveyed urban youth viewed border conflict with China as India’s greatest foreign-policy challenge. More than 50 per cent of Chinese respondents in a 2023 Tsinghua poll held an unfavourable view of India. The article calls for reciprocal travel, journalist access and student exchange.

The two governments begin negotiations from different strategic frameworks. Chinese leaders view the border dispute as one dimension among several, which can be set aside while other cooperation continues. Indian leaders view the border as the central issue. For Delhi, territorial security comes before broader economic or diplomatic progress.

This difference changes the meaning of engagement. China may support summits, trade discussions or technology talks without first resolving the frontier. India is more likely to judge those efforts through the condition of the border relationship. Delhi’s renaming of 28 sites in Ladakh illustrates how territorial questions remain immediate and politically sensitive.

The result is a persistent gap between positive signals and policy implementation. Brics and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summits have helped create a detente, but bureaucratic mistrust remains. The article suggests that small, provable steps could gradually narrow the gap. Better travel, journalism, business dialogue and market access may build confidence without pretending the core dispute has disappeared.

The article’s alternative is patient, reciprocal trust-building. Officials, companies, journalists, students and tourists need regular contact so cooperation becomes measurable. Small steps matter because leadership assurances can take time to reach bureaucracies. Direct experience can also challenge stereotypes strengthened by propaganda and the pandemic-era information vacuum.

Suggested measures are concrete. India could resume tourist and conference e-visas, while China could ease restrictions on Indian journalists. China could streamline business visas and join working groups modelled on proposed Boards of Trade and Investment. Both sides could expand student and scholarly exchanges. Industrial estates in Gujarat and Maharashtra could support technology and investment links.

The article recommends sequencing these measures. Hong Kong arrangements could provide an initial test because its passport rules differ from mainland China’s. If that works, India could resume e-visas for Chinese applicants. Better market access could be paired with technology exchange in automobiles, solar panels and lithium batteries, creating practical gains before larger political breakthroughs.

Forms of cooperation can become leverage when one side controls something the other needs. A trade deficit may create dependence on foreign manufacturing. Technology restrictions can slow industries. Visa barriers can block scholars, tourists and executives. Limits on journalists can shape what the public knows. These tools affect both material capacity and political confidence.

The article gives several examples. It warns that prolonged weaponisation of economic chokepoints could spark an Indian push for decoupling. Suspended flights and visa restrictions froze people-to-people contact. Restrictions on Indian journalists created an information vacuum, which the article says can encourage vitriolic speculation. Economic ties therefore carry security and reputational consequences.

The proposed solution is not to abandon cooperation, but to make it more balanced and dependable. China could improve access for Indian businesses and encourage technology exchange in less sensitive sectors. Both governments could ease travel and reporting barriers. Clearer rules would reduce the risk that ordinary connections become sudden political pressure points.