Why Kim Jong Un Should Want a 4th Summit With Donald Trump

A fourth summit would serve North Korea’s strategy more than Washington’s expected goal of denuclearization. Earlier meetings centered on improving relations with the United States in exchange for placing Pyongyang’s nuclear program on the negotiating table. The article argues that this focus has changed.

Kim could instead use the meeting to support North Korea’s relationships with China and especially Russia. He could also seek to undermine Washington’s influence and push Trump toward accepting North Korea as a nuclear power. The summit itself would create valuable diplomatic recognition, even without a formal agreement.

The timing would matter greatly. North Korea is delaying its decision while Trump is eager to meet. That delay has already produced concessions, including a shortened South Korea-U.S. exercise and movement away from strict denuclearization. Pyongyang may therefore wait for further U.S. weakness before agreeing.

Trump and Kim held three previous summit-level meetings. The first took place in Singapore. The second was held in Hanoi. The third occurred at the Demilitarized Zone, or DMZ, between North and South Korea.

The article presents these meetings as a sequence from 2018 and 2019, although it does not provide exact dates for each location. It says Kim’s earlier strategy focused on improving relations with Washington. In return, North Korea would put its nuclear program on the negotiating table and create space to modernize its economy.

The source does not describe a detailed outcome for each individual meeting. It does make clear that Pyongyang now views that earlier period as finished. Kim has repeatedly said that the past is gone, suggesting that a new summit would be judged by today’s geopolitical conditions rather than those earlier goals.

Trump and Kim have held three summits. They met in Singapore, then Hanoi, and later at the Demilitarized Zone. These meetings took place during Trump’s first term, in 2018 and 2019, according to the article’s discussion of that period.

The relationship initially centered on improving North Korea-U.S. relations. Kim placed his nuclear program on the negotiating table and sought room to modernize North Korea’s economy. The article does not give separate results for Singapore, Hanoi, and the DMZ, so it cannot establish a distinct change after each meeting.

It does describe the broader change since then. Kim now treats the earlier approach as past. A new summit would instead support ties with Russia and China, challenge U.S. influence, and possibly encourage Trump to accept North Korea’s growing nuclear arsenal. The relationship has therefore shifted from possible normalization toward strategic competition.

North Korea may believe it has greater bargaining power because Kim’s military and economic policies have coincided with major geopolitical shifts. The article highlights Pyongyang’s close relationships with Russia and China. Those relationships give North Korea important international support as it confronts Washington.

The nuclear issue is central. North Korea’s arsenal is growing, while Trump has moved away from Washington’s long-standing pursuit of denuclearization toward possible acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear power. Pyongyang can therefore negotiate from a stronger position than when it offered its nuclear program for discussion.

North Korea also sees weakness on the American side. Trump is eager for another summit, has already shortened one South Korea-U.S. exercise, and faces possible losses in the November congressional elections. Pyongyang may delay talks, expecting Trump to offer further unilateral concessions.

Denuclearization generally means dismantling nuclear weapons and ending the ability to maintain or develop them. In the article, Washington’s long-standing policy is denuclearization. Earlier, Kim put North Korea’s nuclear program on the negotiating table while seeking better relations with the United States and room to modernize the economy.

The source does not give a complete explanation for North Korea’s refusal to surrender its weapons. It does show that Pyongyang now treats its growing arsenal as a source of strength. It also suggests that North Korea wants Trump to accept it as a nuclear power rather than bargain away that capability.

More broadly, nuclear weapons can provide a government with deterrence and bargaining leverage. That is established background, not a fully stated explanation in this article. The current U.S. debate is important because Trump appears more accepting, while the State Department still supports denuclearization.

If Washington accepted North Korea as a nuclear-armed state, its alliance commitments in East Asia could face greater strain. South Korea might question how firmly the United States would oppose North Korean pressure. The article says Trump’s missteps have already created conditions for tensions in the South Korea-U.S. alliance.

Military exercises are a visible part of that alliance. Trump has shortened one South Korea-U.S. exercise and left uncertainty over the rest. Accepting North Korea’s nuclear status could encourage further limits if Washington tried to avoid provoking Pyongyang. That could reduce allied readiness or confidence, though the article does not predict a specific final outcome.

The broader effect would be a policy dispute inside Washington. Trump has moved toward acceptance, while the State Department still backs denuclearization. Conflicting signals could confuse U.S. allies. North Korea would likely view weaker exercises and divided policy as evidence that delaying talks is producing useful concessions.

Nuclear deterrence means using the threat of unacceptable retaliation to discourage an attack or coercion. In this case, North Korea’s growing arsenal can make Washington and its allies more cautious. It also gives Pyongyang a bargaining tool, especially if Trump is moving toward accepting North Korea as a nuclear power.

Great-power rivalry widens that leverage. North Korea’s close relationship with China and especially Russia places it within a broader challenge to Washington’s influence. The article says a new summit could support those friends and undermine the United States internationally. Trump’s warm summit treatment of Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping also reflects this wider competition.

The regional balance is therefore not only North Korea versus the United States. It involves rival partnerships and uncertain alliances. If Washington appears divided on denuclearization or reduces exercises, Pyongyang may gain confidence. The article suggests time is currently working in North Korea’s favor.