Dealing with the AfD: Deputy CSU leader declares the firewall a failure

Weber was not simply discussing a wall or a single vote. He challenged the political rule that mainstream parties must reject every form of cooperation with the AfD. In his view, the formula “either them or us” had become a burden for the Union and no longer fit parliamentary reality.

The proposed change is strategic. CDU and CSU politicians would still judge individual proposals, but they would not automatically reject them because the AfD supports them. That could include debating, negotiating, or accepting votes on particular measures. It does not automatically mean joining an AfD-led coalition.

The article presents Weber’s intervention as a major break with the established approach. It calls the firewall “failed” and says the old formula must become history. The practical question is whether the Union can cooperate issue by issue without giving the AfD political legitimacy or control.

A political firewall is an agreed boundary around the AfD. Mainstream parties, especially the CDU and CSU, avoid treating it as a normal coalition partner. They therefore reject formal alliances and usually avoid relying on AfD support to govern. The aim is to isolate the party politically.

The firewall works through party decisions rather than a legal ban. A parliamentary majority can still exist without AfD participation, but parties may refuse AfD votes even when those votes would help pass a proposal. The principle is that achieving a majority should not create dependence on the AfD.

In the article, Weber attacks the firewall’s “either them or us” logic. His criticism matters because the AfD has become a large parliamentary force. If the boundary weakens, parties may gain more options for majorities, but they also risk normalising the AfD and provoking serious internal and public opposition.

The firewall normally excludes cooperation that gives the AfD a recognised governing role. That means no coalition with the CDU, CSU, SPD, Greens, or other mainstream parties. It also usually rules out a confidence-and-supply arrangement, where a government survives because the AfD promises regular support.

The boundary can extend further. Mainstream parties may avoid joint motions, coordinated amendments, or negotiations designed to secure AfD votes. They may also refuse to accept an AfD-backed proposal, even when they independently agree with its content. The central issue is deliberate political dependence and public legitimisation.

The article does not list every prohibited form of cooperation. It frames the dispute through Weber’s criticism of a rigid “either them or us” rule. In practice, ending that rule could make occasional issue-based votes possible, while formal coalition participation would remain the most consequential and controversial step.

In the 2025 Bundestag election, the AfD received 10,327,148 second votes, equal to 20.8 percent, and won 152 of the Bundestag’s 630 seats. That made it the second-largest parliamentary force. The CDU/CSU bloc remained first, with 28.5 percent and 208 seats.

The comparison shows why the firewall debate has become harder. The SPD won 16.4 percent and 120 seats. The Greens won 11.6 percent and 85 seats. The Left won 8.8 percent and 64 seats. The AfD is therefore much larger than a minor protest party, although it still lacks a majority.

These figures are election results rather than figures stated in the supplied headline text. They explain the political pressure behind Weber’s intervention. A party with 152 seats can affect parliamentary arithmetic, even when other parties refuse formal cooperation. Any change in strategy would therefore reshape coalition and voting calculations.

The CDU and CSU’s refusal is rooted in more than tactical rivalry. They argue that important AfD positions, rhetoric, and links to far-right currents conflict with liberal democracy, minority protection, and Germany’s constitutional order. The Union therefore treats the AfD as a party that should be opposed, not rewarded with government power.

This stance also protects political boundaries. A coalition would give the AfD ministries, policy influence, and public legitimacy. Depending on AfD votes could similarly make its support appear normal. CDU and CSU leaders have therefore preferred losing or delaying a proposal rather than creating a governing relationship with the party.

The supplied article focuses on Weber’s challenge to this approach, not on a full history of the Union’s reasoning. His comments suggest that the AfD’s parliamentary strength has made exclusion more difficult. Ending the firewall would force the Union to balance governing effectiveness against democratic, strategic, and reputational risks.

Germany’s government formation depends on parliamentary majorities. If mainstream parties cannot assemble one, allowing AfD support could unlock a confidence vote, a coalition arrangement, or individual legislation. The immediate effect would be more possible combinations and fewer automatic dead ends in the Bundestag.

The mechanism could operate in several ways. A governing party might negotiate an explicit coalition with the AfD, seek its support without giving it ministries, or accept AfD votes on separate bills. Each option would change who can pass laws and could give the AfD leverage over policy priorities. It might also weaken discipline inside other parties.

The political costs could be substantial. Mainstream voters, members, and coalition partners might see cooperation as normalisation or betrayal. Governments could become unstable if AfD support were unpredictable. Weber’s proposal therefore concerns not only arithmetic, but also the legitimacy and long-term direction of Germany’s governing system.

Germany’s Bundestag is elected through a mixed-member proportional system. The second vote largely determines each party’s overall share of seats, while constituency winners are fitted into that proportional result. This spreads representation across several parties instead of reliably producing one-party majorities.

A government must normally command more than half the Bundestag’s votes, either through a coalition or dependable outside support. Laws also need parliamentary majorities. Parties may therefore negotiate a coalition agreement, seek support on individual bills, or abstain from opposing a government. The AfD firewall limits which votes can be used.

This structure explains why Weber’s argument matters. The AfD can hold enough seats to affect arithmetic without being able to govern alone. If mainstream parties refuse every AfD vote, they must find majorities elsewhere. If they accept such votes, they gain flexibility but challenge the political boundary described in the article.