What has Trump’s Board of Peace achieved in a year since Gaza ‘ceasefire’?

Trump proposed the Board of Peace in September 2025 to stabilize Gaza and create lasting peace. Its mission came from a 20-point plan linked to the October 10 ceasefire. The board was meant to guide Gaza through a temporary political and security transition.

The plan made the board Gaza’s transitional governing body until the Palestinian Authority could take over. A National Committee for the Administration of Gaza was created to act as the local authority. The plan also proposed an International Stabilization Force, led by the United States, to replace withdrawing Israeli forces and support security.

The board has struggled to operate on the ground. Israel has not allowed the committee into Gaza, so it works from Cairo. The board secured pledges of $7bn and announced 66 recovery projects worth $2.4bn, but aid remains restricted and Israeli attacks continue. Analysts therefore say it has failed to secure lasting peace.

The 20-point plan made the ceasefire a sequence of obligations. Israel was supposed to withdraw to roughly half of Gaza, stop aerial and artillery attacks, release Palestinian prisoners, and reopen crossings for aid. These steps were intended to create a credible pathway toward Palestinian statehood.

Hamas was required to release all Israeli captives. In a later phase, it was expected to disarm, with members offered amnesty or a safe exit from Gaza. The Board of Peace would govern temporarily, while the Palestinian Authority was expected to take over later. A US-led International Stabilization Force was supposed to handle security after Israeli forces withdrew.

The plan also proposed rebuilding Gaza and allowing essential relief to enter. Some elements occurred: Hamas released all 168 living captives, and Israel freed Palestinian prisoners. But Israeli forces remained in Gaza, attacks continued, aid stayed below the planned level, and the proposed transitional committee could not enter the territory.

The plan achieved its clearest result in the hostage and prisoner exchange. Hamas released all 168 living Israeli captives, and Israel freed Palestinian prisoners. Hamas also announced that it was dissolving its Gaza government, though Israel called that a stunt. These gains did not produce a functioning political transition.

Aid and reconstruction remain far behind the plan’s ambitions. About 227 aid trucks enter Gaza daily, compared with the 600 expected. The board’s members pledged $7bn, and it later announced 66 recovery projects worth $2.4bn. Aid agencies estimate reconstruction will cost closer to $70bn. The National Committee for the Administration of Gaza has been created but cannot enter the Strip.

Security goals remain largely unfinished. Israel now occupies about 60 percent of Gaza, rather than withdrawing to about half. Israeli attacks have continued, and Hamas’s planned disarmament has not been achieved. The gap between promised recovery and conditions on the ground remains enormous.

The National Committee for the Administration of Gaza was created to act as Gaza’s governing authority during the transition. It reports directly to the Board of Peace and is led by Palestinian technocrats, including Chief Commissioner Ali Shaath. Its intended role was to help move Gaza toward administration by the Palestinian Authority.

That mechanism has not operated inside Gaza. Israel has not granted the committee entry into the Strip, so it works from Cairo instead. The article does not identify a formal Israeli reason for blocking it. This is the only explanation provided for the committee’s absence on the ground.

The result is a major gap between political design and practical authority. The board can oversee plans and announce projects, but its appointed Gaza administration cannot govern locally. Until the committee can enter, its ability to coordinate services, recovery, and the planned transition remains severely limited.

The announced ceasefire has not delivered safety or stability. Israeli attacks have continued almost daily, and Israeli forces have expanded their control inside Gaza. Palestinians have continued to be attacked and uprooted rather than receiving sustained relief or a real chance to rebuild.

Since October 10, 2025, more than 1,400 Palestinians, mostly women and children, have been killed. Across the three years since the war began, more than 74,000 Palestinians have been killed, while thousands remain missing and are presumed dead under rubble. Israel says it targets Hamas members, but Hamas denies those claims.

Aid restrictions have deepened the crisis. Only about 227 trucks enter daily instead of 600, and Israel restricts items such as tents and ventilators as dual-use goods. The IPC says about 1.4 million people face hunger until at least December, 200,000 more than in May. The worsening conditions challenge the ceasefire’s purpose.

The peace plan treated Hamas’s disarmament and Israel’s withdrawal as linked parts of a later phase. Hamas was first required to release all Israeli captives, then disarm, with amnesty or a safe exit proposed for its members. Israel was supposed to withdraw to about half of Gaza and stop aerial and artillery attacks.

This sequence was tied to a planned security handoff. A US-led International Stabilization Force was supposed to replace withdrawing Israeli forces. The Board of Peace would provide temporary governance, while the Palestinian Authority could eventually take over. Disarmament and withdrawal therefore connect the armed and governing parts of the transition.

The article does not give a separate explanation for why negotiators linked these conditions. It shows that neither has been completed: Israel occupies about 60 percent of Gaza, and Hamas’s disarmament remains a later, unmet goal. Continued attacks and the blocked Gaza administration leave the next phase stalled.

When the UN Security Council recognized the Board of Peace as a transitional administration in November, it formally acknowledged the board’s intended temporary governing role. The plan placed the board in charge until the Palestinian Authority could take over. Recognition therefore gave the transition an international framework.

It did not automatically give the board access, security forces, or direct control. The National Committee for the Administration of Gaza was created to govern locally, but Israel has not permitted it to enter. The proposed International Stabilization Force was supposed to assume security from withdrawing Israeli forces, yet the article does not report that handover happening.

Ground conditions have limited the recognition’s practical effect. Israel occupies about 60 percent of Gaza, attacks continue, and aid remains restricted. The board can raise funds and announce recovery projects, but it cannot enforce the ceasefire based on recognition alone. Its authority remains constrained until security and access arrangements change.