Former Biden official: Netanyahu blocked July 2024 hostage deal, prolonged war by six months

The July 2024 framework was a basic proposal for releasing hostages after Hamas dropped its demand for Israel to commit to a permanent ceasefire before any hostages were freed. That change mattered because it removed a major obstacle in the negotiations and created an opening for an agreement.

According to Phil Gordon, President Biden pressed Benjamin Netanyahu on July 4, 2024 to conclude the deal. Gordon said Hamas had accepted the framework, but Netanyahu then added new conditions. The source does not provide the framework’s complete terms, so it cannot establish every part of the proposal.

The negotiations did not produce an agreement at that point. Gordon said Netanyahu’s additions made the deal impossible for another six months. The eventual January 2025 agreement dropped two of those added conditions, suggesting that the earlier obstacles were not permanent requirements for a final deal.

Gordon identified two major additions to the hostage proposal. One required Israel to retain forces along Gaza’s entire border with Egypt. The other created an enforcement mechanism to screen Gazans returning to northern Gaza. These conditions mattered because they tied any agreement to continued Israeli control and military deployment.

The Israeli military had seized the border area only after the original proposal was made. The proposed screening system would have required Israeli troops to remain in central Gaza. Gordon said both additions were made against the advice of Israel’s own security chiefs. Their practical effect was to keep military forces in key areas while negotiations were supposed to move forward.

Gordon said the added conditions made the deal impossible for another six months. Both were later dropped from the agreement concluded in January 2025. He used that outcome to argue that pressure and negotiating choices, rather than only battlefield realities, shaped the delay.

The dispute centers on four people and their roles. Benjamin Netanyahu was Israel’s prime minister and the leader whose wartime decisions Gordon criticized. President Biden led the United States and applied pressure on Israel, including during the July 4, 2024 call. Phil Gordon, a former Biden administration official, challenged claims that Brett McGurk’s account vindicated Netanyahu.

Brett McGurk, another former Biden administration official, wrote a book and gave interviews about the war. Gordon called McGurk’s account valuable but not definitive or broadly shared. Gordon said McGurk described Biden’s response after the World Central Kitchen strike, when U.S. pressure reportedly worked, but omitted the July hostage-deal call.

The disagreement is therefore about both facts and interpretation. Gordon said most of his former colleagues believed Biden should have pressured Israel more to change the war and end it sooner. He also rejected the view that Biden’s biggest mistake was showing disagreement with Israel.

Gordon said the delay lasted another six months after Netanyahu added conditions to the framework. He linked that period to nearly 9,000 additional Palestinians being killed. He also said more Israeli hostages died during the delay, including six whom Hamas executed in August.

The figures are Gordon’s account as presented in the article. They describe the human cost he associates with the failure to complete the deal in July 2024. The article does not provide a separate breakdown of Palestinian deaths or identify the other Israeli hostages who died during that period.

The delay also shaped Gordon’s wider criticism of Netanyahu. He argued that Netanyahu prioritized “total victory” and preserving his governing coalition over a hostage agreement or ending the war. Gordon said the eventual January 2025 agreement dropped the two conditions that had helped block the earlier proposal.

After the July 2024 framework failed, the war and hostage crisis continued rather than moving quickly toward an agreement. Gordon said the delay lasted another six months. He associated that period with nearly 9,000 additional Palestinian deaths and the deaths of more Israeli hostages, including six hostages Hamas executed in August.

The negotiations remained blocked by conditions Netanyahu had reportedly added. These included keeping Israeli forces along Gaza’s entire border with Egypt and creating a screening mechanism for Gazans returning to northern Gaza. Gordon said the conditions had been introduced against the advice of Israel’s security chiefs and required continued troop deployments.

An agreement was ultimately concluded in January 2025. Gordon emphasized that both disputed conditions were dropped from the final deal. The article presents this as evidence that the earlier terms had contributed to the prolonged impasse, while also noting the continuing disagreement over responsibility for the delay.

Control of Gaza’s border with Egypt mattered because Netanyahu reportedly wanted Israel to retain forces along the entire border. Gordon said the IDF had seized that area after the original proposal was made. Keeping troops there would preserve a military position that Israel considered important while negotiations continued.

The proposed screening mechanism addressed Gazans returning to the north. Gordon said it would have required Israeli troops to remain in central Gaza, making the return process part of the military arrangement. Together, the conditions linked hostage negotiations to Israel’s control of territory, troop positions, and movement inside Gaza.

For Israel, these demands reflected a strategy of maintaining military leverage and oversight during any agreement. For the negotiations, however, they created additional barriers. Both conditions were ultimately dropped from the January 2025 deal, showing that the final arrangement did not retain those specific requirements.

Hostage negotiations during war require opposing sides to exchange commitments while fighting, territorial control, and civilian suffering continue. A possible deal may involve releasing captives, changing military deployments, allowing people to move, and setting political or security guarantees. These goals can conflict because each side fears giving up leverage before receiving what it wants.

The article gives a concrete example. Hamas dropped its demand for a permanent ceasefire before any release, but Netanyahu reportedly added requirements about troops at Gaza’s Egyptian border and screening people returning north. Those conditions protected military control but made agreement harder. Gordon also said Netanyahu prioritized “total victory” and coalition maintenance over a deal.

The broader implication is that pressure can change decisions. Gordon said U.S. pressure after the World Central Kitchen strike worked, while arguing Biden should have applied more pressure earlier. The account presents negotiations as a balance among military aims, civilian access, political survival, and saving hostages.