Hostages freed, but Gaza ceasefire’s biggest promises remain unmet

The October 10, 2025 ceasefire promised more than a pause in fighting. It aimed to return the remaining hostages, create calm, reduce Israeli control in Gaza, move Gaza toward administration by a new technocratic committee, disarm Hamas, and begin reconstruction. These promises mattered because the war had devastated Gaza and left Israeli families waiting for captives’ return.

The hostage promise was fulfilled three days after the agreement, when Hamas freed all 20 remaining living hostages. Israel also experienced a year without rocket attacks from Hamas. However, Israel did not fully withdraw. Its forces later controlled about 70 per cent of Gaza, up from 53 per cent allowed under the agreement. Hamas also did not disarm.

The political and rebuilding promises have largely stalled. Ali Shaath’s National Committee for the Administration of Gaza was announced, but Hamas remains security authority. A proposed US$2.45 billion recovery plan exists, yet no reconstruction funding is known to have reached Gaza. The ceasefire delivered limited calm, not its broader settlement.

The ceasefire produced one major humanitarian result: Hamas released the 20 remaining living hostages seized during the October 7, 2023 attack. Their return had been a central Israeli demand, and it happened three days after the agreement was announced. Israel also saw no Hamas rocket attacks from Gaza for a year.

The human cost in Gaza continued. Gaza’s health ministry reports that Israeli strikes killed about 1,450 Palestinians since the ceasefire. The ministry operates under Hamas, but the article notes that the United Nations considers its figures accurate. Israel reduced its attacks, yet continued striking Gaza on a near-daily basis.

Israeli territorial control also expanded. The ceasefire allowed Israeli forces to remain in 53 per cent of Gaza. A year later, official accounts put Israeli control at about 70 per cent. Together, these figures show an uneven outcome: hostage release and relative calm in Israel, alongside continued deaths and expanded military control in Gaza.

The absence of rocket attacks did not resolve Israel’s wider security demands. Hamas’s missile inventory was heavily depleted by Israeli bombardment, and Gaza remained badly damaged. Yet Israel continued to view Hamas as an armed threat. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also vowed to kill everyone involved in the October 7 attack, saying 4,000 of 6,000 alleged Hamas fighters had been killed.

The central mechanism is a failed reciprocal bargain. Hamas was expected to give up its weapons, while Israel was expected to begin withdrawing its forces. Hamas announced that it would disarm, but did not carry out that step. Netanyahu demanded verifiable decommissioning of every weapon, down to individual guns. Israel then refused to reciprocate with a withdrawal.

As a result, the truce reduced the level of violence without removing the conflict’s security dispute. Israel kept striking Gaza on a near-daily basis and expanded its control from 53 per cent to about 70 per cent. Lasting calm therefore remains tied to disarmament and withdrawal.

A ceasefire can stop or reduce fighting without resolving who controls territory or who keeps weapons. In this case, the agreement linked two major steps: Hamas would disarm, and Israel would withdraw its forces. Those steps were meant to build trust and enable a political transition away from Hamas.

The mechanism broke down because neither side completed its part. Hamas announced it would give up its weapons but did not proceed with disarmament. Israel demanded verifiable decommissioning of all weapons, including individual guns, and refused to begin withdrawing while Hamas remained armed. Israeli forces therefore stayed in Gaza, while strikes continued at a lower level.

The result is an unstable ceasefire rather than a settled peace. Hamas remains in charge of security, Israel controls about 70 per cent of Gaza, and roughly 1,450 Palestinians have been killed since the truce began. Reconstruction and political change are also delayed. The agreement can move forward only if disarmament and withdrawal become credible, reciprocal actions.

Hamas is described as a Palestinian Islamist movement that governed Gaza and carried out the October 7, 2023 attack. After the ceasefire, it remained in charge of security, even though it announced that it was disbanding its governing body. Israel is represented by its government and military forces. It reduced attacks but kept striking Gaza and retained troops across much of the territory.

The proposed National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, or NCAG, was designed to provide a political alternative. Technocrat Ali Shaath was appointed to lead it. The second phase of the agreement was supposed to move Gaza away from Hamas rule, with the NCAG taking over administration. Hamas later said it would hand administration to the US-blessed committee.

That transition has not happened in practice. Shaath has kept a low profile, while Hamas remains responsible for security. Israel has also refused to withdraw because Hamas has not disarmed. Thus, the intended division was civil administration by the NCAG, security change through disarmament, and Israeli withdrawal, but the necessary steps remain incomplete.

Moving Gaza away from Hamas rule requires the political transition promised in the ceasefire’s second phase. The National Committee for the Administration of Gaza would need to take over administration, while Hamas would have to stop governing and surrender its weapons. This matters because the current arrangement leaves Hamas in charge of security and Israel unwilling to withdraw.

The key mechanism is reciprocal verification. Hamas has announced disarmament, but Israel demands proof covering every weapon, down to individual guns. Israel would then need to reciprocate by withdrawing forces from Gaza. A credible handover would also require the NCAG, led by technocrat Ali Shaath, to operate rather than remain mostly inactive.

Reconstruction would need money and an operating political framework. Trump’s Board of Peace proposed a US$2.45 billion recovery plan for six months, while the United States and Gulf allies pledged support. Yet no funds are known to have reached Gaza. Disarmament, withdrawal, administrative transfer, and financing must therefore move together.

A ceasefire is an arrangement in which opposing sides stop or reduce attacks for an agreed period or under agreed conditions. It can create calm, enable hostage releases, and allow negotiations or aid. It does not automatically decide who governs, whether armed groups disarm, where forces withdraw, or how the underlying conflict ends.

The Gaza agreement illustrates that difference. Hamas released the 20 remaining living hostages, and Israel experienced a year without Hamas rocket attacks. Yet Israel continued near-daily strikes, Hamas remained in charge of security, and Israeli forces expanded their control to about 70 per cent of Gaza. Those facts show that reduced fighting did not settle the central disputes.

A peace agreement would normally address those disputes more permanently. In this case, it would need credible arrangements for Hamas’s weapons, Israeli withdrawal, Gaza’s administration, and reconstruction. The article does not report such a settlement. Instead, it describes a ceasefire whose broader promises remain incomplete and whose future depends on reciprocal steps.