With or without Hamas

The phrase describes a debate over Gaza’s political future after the war. Some proposals demand that Hamas surrender administrative authority and evacuate the Strip. The article argues that removing Hamas alone would not create a viable future. The deeper conflict predates the group and involves displacement, occupation, and denied self-determination.

The article links Hamas to conditions that existed before its creation. Palestinian society was shaped by the 1948 Nakba, Israel’s 1967 occupation, settlement expansion, and decades of hardship. The First Intifada then helped trigger Hamas’s formation in 1987. These forces help explain why Palestinian factions became rooted in national identity and local society.

Therefore, Hamas’s responsibilities must be addressed, but so must the conditions that produced its support and influence. A settlement that changes Gaza’s rulers while leaving those conditions intact could fail. The article rejects treating Palestinian rights as a reward for Hamas and calls for a solution that works with or without the group.

Hamas is presented as both a political and military movement rooted in Palestinian society. It was created in 1987, during the First Intifada, after decades of occupation, displacement, social hardship, and weakening secular nationalist leadership. The article distinguishes it from newer groups such as ISIL, which it describes as lacking deep local roots.

Several founders carried personal memories of displacement. Ibrahim al-Yazouri’s family was expelled to Khan Younis after violence in Bait Daras. Abdulaziz al-Rantisi’s family was expelled from Yibna. Ahmed Yassin fled al-Jura and later lived in al-Shati refugee camp. Their histories connected the movement to the broader Palestinian experience.

Hamas therefore developed political and military wings within a wider national struggle. The article also notes its disastrous decisions, especially the October 7, 2023 assault on Israel. It says Hamas is responsible for its actions, while also describing the group as a symptom of prolonged suffering and failed self-determination.

The article presents Hamas as a later product of a much older conflict. During the 1948 Nakba, Palestinian villages were depopulated and destroyed, and survivors were displaced. Hamas did not yet exist. In 1967, Israel occupied Gaza and the West Bank and annexed East Jerusalem, while the broader settlement project began taking shape.

Occupation changed Palestinian society over the following decades. Religious influence grew as local mosques increased from 200 to 600 between 1967 and 1987. At the same time, secular nationalist leadership weakened. This combination created space for faith-based nationalist factions. The First Intifada, which began in 1987, became the political turning point that directly triggered Hamas’s creation.

The article uses these events to explain, not excuse, Hamas. Its central mechanism is historical continuity: displacement and occupation produced grievances, social change, and political openings. Any postwar plan that ignores those roots may remove an organization without resolving the conflict that helped produce it.

Gaza’s population is young and politically diverse. Nearly 50 percent of its residents are under 18. When Hamas won the 2006 elections, more than half of Gaza’s current residents had not yet been born. This age profile matters because Hamas’s electoral victory cannot automatically represent the views of today’s population.

An Arab Barometer survey conducted in the West Bank and Gaza between late September and early October 2023 found limited confidence in Hamas’s government. Only 29 percent of Gaza respondents said they trusted it. Thirty-one percent directly blamed Hamas authorities for the situation, while a majority blamed poverty on internal factors. Political preferences were also mixed: 54 percent supported two states, and 73 percent favored peace.

Only 20 percent favored military action. These figures show that Gaza is not politically uniform and that Hamas cannot simply be equated with the Palestinian people. They also suggest that future governance and peace efforts must account for diverse views, especially among younger residents.

The article does not excuse Hamas. It highlights the group’s “disastrous decisions,” especially its October 7, 2023 assault on Israel. It also says Hamas’s actions must be judged as its own and should not be equated automatically with the will of the Palestinian people. Survey results support that distinction, showing limited trust in the Hamas-led government.

At the same time, the article attributes broader historical responsibility to the State of Israel. It points to the 1948 depopulation and destruction of Palestinian villages, the 1967 occupation, East Jerusalem’s unilateral annexation, and the settlement project. It also describes the near-total destruction of Gaza and civilian crimes that have led Israeli officials to face accusations of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The article therefore assigns different responsibilities to different actors. Hamas must answer for its decisions and conduct. Israeli officials and the state must answer for occupation, displacement, military actions, and alleged crimes. Neither responsibility cancels the other.

The article’s warning is that changing Gaza’s rulers does not automatically change the conditions governing Palestinian life. Hamas emerged after displacement, occupation, social hardship, and the weakening of secular nationalist leadership. If those forces remain, removing Hamas would address an organization but not the conflict’s underlying causes.

The key mechanism is political continuity. The article describes Palestinian factions as deeply rooted in local society and national identity. That differs from groups it says lack deep local roots. A population still facing occupation, displacement, destruction, and denied self-determination could continue to produce resistance movements or support alternative factions. The article does not name a specific successor.

The forward implication is that postwar governance must combine security and political change with a response to Palestinian rights and grievances. Otherwise, the same conditions could reproduce instability. The article says any proposed solution, with or without Hamas, is bound to fail if it ignores these realities.

National self-determination is the principle that a people may determine its political status and pursue its political, social, and economic future. It belongs to the population as a whole, rather than to whichever organization leads it. That distinction matters because a group’s crimes or political failure do not erase the rights of the people it claims to represent.

The article says Palestinian self-determination was enshrined in international law and supported by an overwhelming majority of nations before Hamas’s October 7 attack. It therefore rejects the idea that granting Palestinians political rights would reward Hamas. It also warns against equating Hamas’s actions with the will of all Palestinians.

This principle shapes the article’s proposed approach to Gaza. Hamas may be removed from administrative or military power, but Palestinian rights should not depend on that outcome. A lasting settlement must address self-determination alongside security, governance, displacement, occupation, and civilian protection.