One year on, Palestinians say ceasefire has not brought peace

A ceasefire is an agreement intended to stop or reduce fighting between opposing sides. It matters because civilians expect safety, aid, and a path toward recovery once active combat declines. But declaring one does not automatically end every military action, especially when its terms are not fully implemented or enforced.

In Gaza, Israel reduced the intensity of its attacks but continued strikes. Residents described shelling, injuries, deaths, and the constant buzzing of drones. Doctor Ahmed Shawan said the ceasefire existed “only on paper.” These details show the difference between an announced truce and conditions on the ground.

The result is an incomplete and fragile halt rather than promised peace. People remain in displacement camps, while Israel controls about 70 per cent of Gaza and limits aid entering the territory. Unless attacks stop and the agreement’s political, aid, and reconstruction measures begin, civilians are unlikely to experience meaningful security.

The year since the ceasefire brought a reduction in the intensity of Israeli attacks, but not the peace residents expected. Israel now controls about 70 per cent of Gaza, and reconstruction of the devastated territory has not materialised. The agreement’s broader promise was therefore left largely unrealised.

Much remained unchanged. Residents still live in tents or makeshift shelters, and Israeli strikes continue. Aid remains limited because Israel controls all entry points. Hamas effectively remains in charge of security, while the appointed head of the proposed Gaza administration, Ali Shaath, has kept a low profile.

The humanitarian situation has worsened for many families. People still lack potable water, food, financial assistance, and safe homes. The ceasefire also failed to produce the planned political transition or deploy the proposed stabilisation force. The year’s central change was lower attack intensity, not a functioning peace process.

Gaza’s crisis is enormous in both scale and duration. Almost all of its more than two million residents were displaced at least once after the war began on 7 October 2023. By mid-2026, the UN reported that 82 per cent of standing structures had been damaged or destroyed, leaving many people without proper homes.

The article records 1,221 deaths in the 7 October attack, based on an AFP tally using official Israeli figures. It does not provide a total death toll for the entire war. In Gaza, continuing strikes still cause deaths and injuries, while overcrowded, unhygienic shelters have contributed to disease outbreaks.

Access to necessities remains severely restricted. Israel controls all entry points and allows in only limited aid. Residents identify potable water, food, and financial assistance among the main shortages. These conditions combine destruction, displacement, insecurity, and high prices, making recovery difficult even after the ceasefire announcement.

Destroying most homes and infrastructure forces civilians into displacement camps instead of allowing them to return home. Families lose privacy, safety, income, and access to normal services at the same time. The crisis becomes long-term because damaged communities cannot quickly rebuild without security, materials, and adequate aid.

Gaza City residents described rows of tents beside cleared rubble and people sleeping on makeshift mats. Overcrowding and poor hygiene have led to disease outbreaks. Limited aid also pushes up prices, while residents report shortages of potable water, food, and financial assistance. Children and adults must keep seeking essentials instead of rebuilding their lives.

The immediate consequence is continuing dependence and insecurity. The article reports that reconstruction has not begun as promised, and strikes continue despite the ceasefire. Unless aid access expands, homes are rebuilt, and fighting stops, displacement camps may remain the main living environment for many residents.

The agreement was designed as a post-war framework, not only a promise to reduce violence. It called for reconstruction across the devastated Gaza Strip and a political transition away from Hamas rule. That broader design matters because ending attacks without restoring homes, services, and governance would leave civilians trapped in crisis.

The second phase was supposed to create a new National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, led by technocrat Ali Shaath. It also included an International Stabilisation Force to prepare for the post-war period. Five countries, including Morocco, agreed to join, but troops had not begun operating in Gaza.

These plans remain largely unfulfilled. Reconstruction has not materialised, Hamas effectively still controls security, and Shaath has kept a low profile. Israel continues controlling entry points and restricting aid. The ceasefire therefore has not yet produced the political transition, rebuilding, or stabilisation envisioned by its second phase.

The United States brokered the ceasefire, making it the deal’s principal diplomatic sponsor. Israel is the military power described in the article: it continues strikes, controls about 70 per cent of Gaza, controls every entry point, and restricts aid. Hamas remains effectively responsible for security inside Gaza, despite the planned transition away from its rule.

The proposed Palestinian administration is the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza. Technocrat Ali Shaath was appointed to lead it, but he has kept a low profile. This limited public role contrasts with Hamas’s continuing security position. The arrangement therefore has not yet transferred practical authority as planned.

The International Stabilisation Force was meant to prepare Gaza for the post-war period. Five countries, including Morocco, agreed to participate, but its troops had not started operating. Together, these stalled roles explain why the ceasefire has not become a functioning political settlement: military control, security authority, administration, and international support remain unresolved.

Borders, security, aid, and political authority matter because they shape whether people can move, receive essentials, live safely, and know who governs them. In Gaza, these powers are divided and contested. The ceasefire plan tried to address that problem through a political transition, reconstruction, and an international stabilisation force.

The article gives concrete examples. Israel controls every entry point and permits only limited aid, leaving water and food scarce and prices high. Hamas effectively remains in charge of security. Meanwhile, Ali Shaath’s proposed National Committee has not visibly taken control, and the international force has not deployed. These gaps leave the planned system incomplete.

That unresolved structure keeps the wider conflict active beyond battlefield attacks. Civilians cannot rely on the ceasefire for safety or recovery while access, security, and governance remain unsettled. The article indicates that progress would require implementing the agreement’s political transition, expanding aid, beginning reconstruction, and making the stabilisation force operational.