Former Biden adviser says Netanyahu made 2024 Gaza deal ‘impossible’

The proposed 2024 deal was a basic framework for releasing Israeli hostages while establishing a ceasefire in Gaza. Hamas had reportedly accepted that framework, including dropping its demand that Israel promise a permanent ceasefire before any hostages were released. That change created an opening for an agreement.

The deal still required negotiation over implementation. After Hamas accepted the framework, Netanyahu added conditions that were not in the original proposal. These included keeping Israeli forces along Gaza’s entire border with Egypt and creating a system to screen Gazans returning north. The added demands made the agreement harder to complete.

The article says the deal then became impossible for another six months. A final agreement was concluded in January 2025, and both added conditions were dropped. During the delay, nearly 9,000 more Palestinians were killed, and more Israeli hostages died, including six executed by Hamas in August.

Netanyahu added conditions that changed the practical and military shape of the proposed deal. The first required Israel to retain forces along Gaza’s entire border with Egypt. The second created a new enforcement mechanism to screen Gazans returning home to the north.

These were not minor technical details. The border demand concerned territory and continued Israeli military control. The screening plan would have required Israeli troops to remain in central Gaza. According to Phil Gordon, both demands were added after Hamas had accepted the basic framework and against the advice of Netanyahu’s own security chiefs.

The conditions helped stall the agreement for six months. They were ultimately dropped in the deal concluded in January 2025. Gordon argues that the delay had grave human consequences, with nearly 9,000 more Palestinians killed and additional Israeli hostages dying, including six executed by Hamas in August.

The article describes a delay of another six months after Netanyahu added conditions to a framework Hamas had accepted. This was not presented as a short diplomatic pause. Gordon said the changes made the deal “impossible” for that period, postponing a possible hostage-ceasefire agreement until January 2025.

The human cost cited is severe. Nearly 9,000 more Palestinians were killed during those six months. The article also says more Israeli hostages died, but it does not provide a total number for those deaths.

It identifies six of the Israeli hostages specifically. Hamas executed those six in August, according to Gordon’s post. The distinction matters: the source gives a precise figure for the six executed hostages, but only says “more” Israeli hostages died overall. It therefore does not support a total count of Israeli hostage deaths during the delay.

A ceasefire deal depends on agreed limits over military movement and control. Requiring Israeli forces to remain along Gaza’s entire border with Egypt would preserve an Israeli military presence in territory central to the negotiations. That could make a ceasefire look incomplete and leave the parties disputing whether hostilities had truly ended.

The return-screening demand created a second obstacle. The mechanism would have required Israeli troops to remain in central Gaza while Gazans returned north. Hamas and Israel would therefore still have needed to settle who controlled movement, how screening worked, and whether troops could operate during the pause.

The article says both conditions were later dropped from the January 2025 deal. Their removal suggests that reducing territorial and operational demands helped make agreement possible. Gordon’s account links the earlier conditions to the six-month delay and the deaths that occurred during it.

Hamas played the role of a negotiating party that accepted the basic framework after dropping its demand for a permanent ceasefire before hostage releases. Netanyahu’s government then sought additional military and enforcement conditions. Gordon says those changes blocked agreement for another six months.

The Biden administration applied diplomatic pressure. Gordon says President Biden called Netanyahu on July 4, 2024, urging him to conclude the deal. Gordon also says pressure had worked after the World Central Kitchen strike. Israeli security officials were not presented as a unified force behind Netanyahu’s changes; Gordon says the additions were made against the advice of Netanyahu’s own security chiefs.

The negotiations therefore involved competing priorities. Hamas held hostages and adjusted its demand. Netanyahu controlled Israel’s negotiating position and military conditions. Biden used American pressure, while Israeli security officials advised against some additions. The final January 2025 deal dropped both disputed conditions.

The article places the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack at the center of the crisis. It says the attack happened on Netanyahu’s watch and then discusses the war in Gaza, the hostages, and efforts to negotiate their release. Because hostages remained in Hamas’s custody, their safety became inseparable from ceasefire talks.

The negotiations sought to connect two urgent goals: bringing hostages home and stopping or pausing the war. Hamas accepted a basic framework after dropping its demand for a permanent ceasefire before releases. Netanyahu then added military conditions, while Biden pressed him to finish the agreement. The article says more hostages died during the delay.

The source does not provide a detailed chronology of the October 7 attack or explain every step by which fighting expanded into war. It does show the lasting political effect: Netanyahu’s conduct, the hostage issue, and the demand for “total victory” remained central to arguments about the war.

Hostage-ceasefire negotiations work by linking separate forms of leverage. One side may hold hostages, while the other controls territory, military access, or the pace of fighting. Each side seeks concessions in exchange for releases, pauses, withdrawals, or humanitarian steps. Political leaders also weigh how an agreement could affect public support and their coalition.

The article gives a clear example. Hamas accepted the basic framework after dropping its demand for a permanent ceasefire before hostage releases. Netanyahu then added demands for forces along Gaza’s Egyptian border and screening of people returning north. The latter would have required troops in central Gaza. Biden applied pressure, while Israeli security chiefs advised against the additions.

Such talks remain fragile because every condition can alter the balance. The article says the changes delayed agreement six months, during which nearly 9,000 Palestinians were killed and more hostages died. The January 2025 deal dropped both disputed conditions.