SC & HC judges being appointed by Modi, not collegium, says ex-judge

K Chandru’s central claim was that the formal collegium system does not fully describe how judges are chosen. He said judges of the Supreme Court and high courts were, in effect, being appointed directly by Prime Minister Narendra Modi. This matters because appointment power can shape perceptions of judicial independence and political influence.

Chandru linked his claim to events after 2014. He said the Modi government introduced the National Judicial Appointments Commission, or NJAC, but the Supreme Court struck down the law. He then argued that the government had made no serious effort to revive the NJAC because it had found more profitable ways to influence appointments.

The statement was a criticism made at an ACJ colloquium, not a court finding. The article gives no evidence that Modi personally selected each judge. It reports Chandru’s allegation and his broader concerns about secrecy, constitutional recognition, and the balance between the government and the collegium.

The collegium system is the established judicial process in which senior judges recommend candidates for appointment or elevation to the Supreme Court and high courts. It matters because these recommendations influence who will exercise constitutional judicial power, while the system is not expressly named in the Constitution. The article highlights that gap and calls the process insufficiently transparent.

Under established practice, the Supreme Court collegium is led by the Chief Justice of India and includes senior Supreme Court judges. A high-court collegium is led by that court’s chief justice and senior judges. It proposes candidates, and the Supreme Court collegium considers high-court recommendations before sending them through the government for processing and formal appointment by the President.

The article does not explain this membership or sequence in detail. It reports Chandru’s criticism that appointments occur without public knowledge. That secrecy remains the central issue: supporters stress judicial input, while critics seek clearer criteria, records, and accountability.

The article states that India’s Supreme Court has 38 judges. It also says the country’s high courts have about 1,000 judges. Together, those figures show the scale of the appointment system discussed at the ACJ colloquium. They also explain why questions about selection affect more than a small group of officeholders.

K Chandru used these numbers while criticising the collegium. He said appointments take place without anyone knowing anything about the process. His point was not that every appointment has the same outcome, but that the system operates with little public visibility despite its reach across the country’s highest courts.

The figures describe the article’s stated numbers, not necessarily current sanctioned strength or vacancies. The broader implication is clear within the discussion: when hundreds of judges are selected through an opaque process, concerns about consistency, representation, independence, and public confidence become more significant.

The National Judicial Appointments Commission, or NJAC, was created by legislation backed by a constitutional amendment after the Modi government came to power in 2014. It was intended to change how judges of the Supreme Court and high courts were selected, reducing the collegium’s exclusive control. The issue mattered because it placed judicial independence and democratic oversight in direct tension.

The article states only that the Supreme Court struck down the NJAC legislation. Established legal history adds that the Court found the arrangement inconsistent with the Constitution’s basic structure, especially judicial independence. The proposed commission gave non-judicial members a role in appointments, which the Court viewed as permitting excessive political influence.

The judgment restored the collegium system, though it did not end criticism of that system’s secrecy. Chandru said the government did not try to revive the NJAC and instead found other ways to influence appointments. The article presents this as his assessment, not as a proven judicial finding.

Judicial appointments affect independence because judges must be able to decide cases without fearing political retaliation or favouring the people who selected them. They also affect transparency and public trust. If citizens cannot understand who was considered, why a candidate was chosen, or how objections were handled, suspicion can grow even without proof of wrongdoing.

The article gives a concrete concern through Chandru’s criticism of the collegium. He said about 1,000 high-court judges and 38 Supreme Court judges are appointed through a process in which “no one” knows what happens. Muralidhar added that diversity, especially women’s representation, was inadequate. These criticisms connect procedure with both legitimacy and representation.

A process dominated by elected officials may threaten independence, while a process dominated by judges may lack accountability. The practical challenge is balance. Clear criteria, recorded reasons, meaningful scrutiny, and safeguards against political pressure could strengthen confidence, although the article does not propose a specific reform plan.

The Supreme Court collegium’s role is to recommend candidates for appointment or elevation to the Supreme Court and high courts. High-court collegiums begin recommendations for their own courts, while the Supreme Court collegium considers appointments to the Supreme Court and reviews high-court proposals. This judicial role is intended to protect professional independence.

The central government receives and processes recommendations. In practice, it may seek clarification, return names, or accept them, subject to constitutional and judicial rules. The President then makes the formal appointment under the constitutional process. The article does not describe these detailed steps; it reports Chandru’s claim that the Prime Minister effectively controls the outcome.

That distinction matters. Formal authority and practical influence may differ. If the government’s role becomes dominant, critics may fear political control. If judges alone control selections, critics may fear secrecy and weak accountability. The continuing debate concerns how to protect independence while making appointments open and credible.

Judicial independence protects courts from pressure by governments, legislatures, wealthy interests, and temporary political majorities. Courts must be able to interpret law and review state action without fearing removal for unpopular decisions. This separation supports the rule of law and helps protect rights, including the rights of minorities and political opponents.

Accountability is still necessary. Judges exercise major public power, so systems need lawful ways to address corruption, incapacity, conflicts of interest, or serious misconduct. The article’s discussion of “Why Impeachments Fail” shows that removal is part of this wider concern. Its speakers also questioned appointment secrecy, leadership, preparation, and diversity.

The balance is difficult. Political actors should not be able to punish judges for rulings they dislike, but judges should not be beyond scrutiny. Strong safeguards can separate criticism of judgments from proven misconduct. Transparent appointments, clear ethical standards, independent investigation, and carefully designed removal procedures can protect both accountability and independence, though the article does not prescribe these reforms.