Why is Trump now attacking Zelensky? Fear of a drubbing at the polls and the ultimate goal: “A three-way deal with Putin and Xi”

The central shift is political and diplomatic. Trump is presenting Zelensky as an obstacle to negotiations and suggesting that Ukraine needs a new president. The headlines also describe Trump as breaking again with Zelensky and backing initiatives linked to Russia. This matters because pressure from Washington could weaken Kyiv’s negotiating position while giving Moscow more influence.

A concrete example is Trump’s statement that Ukraine should hold elections. Another is the reported proposal for Ukraine to stop attacking Russian refineries if Moscow stops striking energy sites. The mechanism is conditional pressure: each side would halt selected attacks in exchange for reciprocal restraint. The headlines also mention a possible three-way understanding involving the United States, Russia, and China.

The current reality is contested. Zelensky has rejected the idea that elections should simply be imposed during wartime, while Kyiv has discussed limits on refinery attacks only alongside Russian restraint. Future diplomacy may therefore turn on elections, energy strikes, and whether Trump treats Russia as a negotiating partner or Ukraine as the main obstacle.

Midterm elections choose members of the United States Congress, rather than choosing the president. They occur about two years after a presidential election and include all seats in the House of Representatives, plus some Senate seats. The president remains in office, but Congress controls legislation, funding, oversight, and confirmation of many officials. That makes midterms a major test of political strength.

The supplied headlines connect Trump’s Russia policy to his fear of a poor midterm result. The mechanism is congressional control. If Trump’s party loses either chamber, opposition lawmakers can block laws, investigate administration decisions, and make spending or foreign-policy initiatives harder to carry out. Even a narrow majority can determine whether his proposals move forward.

The outcome could therefore affect how much freedom Trump has to pursue an agreement involving Russia, Ukraine, or China. A strong result could reinforce his authority inside the Republican Party. A weak result could encourage rivals to challenge his approach, especially if voters dislike concessions to Moscow or pressure on Zelensky.

The scale is three countries, not two: the United States, Russia, and China. The Corriere della Sera headline describes Trump’s final objective as an “intesa a tre,” or three-way understanding, with Putin and Xi. That makes the proposal broader than a direct Washington–Moscow settlement over Ukraine.

The source does not provide a formal division of duties. It names Trump, Putin, and Xi as the political figures connected to the proposed arrangement, but it does not say that one country would guarantee security, another would end the war, or the third would supervise implementation. Assigning those roles would go beyond the supplied text.

What can be stated safely is that the United States, Russia, and China would be the three participants in the proposed framework. Ukraine is central to the surrounding dispute, especially over elections and energy attacks, but the headline does not describe Ukraine as one of the three parties to that specific arrangement. Its practical effect would depend on Kyiv’s acceptance and on the agreement’s missing details.

Ukraine has not held a national presidential election during the war because martial law remains in force. Ukrainian law does not permit national elections while martial law operates. The rule reflects practical and security problems as well as legal limits: occupied territories cannot vote normally, millions of people are displaced, and campaigning and polling could be disrupted by attacks.

The dispute became sharper after Trump said Ukraine should hold elections. Zelensky and Kyiv have resisted pressure to treat an election as an immediate condition for negotiations. The mechanism is institutional: changing the government requires a lawful vote, but holding that vote requires ending or changing the wartime legal framework and creating workable conditions across the country.

This does not mean Ukraine has permanently abandoned elections. It means the normal electoral timetable has been interrupted by war and martial law. If security conditions improve and martial law ends, a presidential vote could be organized. Until then, calls for an election directly affect questions of legitimacy, representation, and who would negotiate with Russia.

Pressure for an election could change who speaks for Ukraine and what goals guide negotiations. A new president might continue Zelensky’s policy, seek tougher conditions, or favor faster talks with Moscow. The result would matter because presidential authority shapes military priorities, diplomacy, and the terms Ukraine is prepared to accept.

The mechanism is political legitimacy. A wartime election could give a new government a fresh mandate, but it could also expose divisions over territory, security guarantees, and relations with Russia. Campaigning during attacks, displacement, and occupation could make participation uneven. If the process were disputed, negotiations could become harder rather than easier.

The headlines show why this issue is urgent. Trump is calling for a new Ukrainian president, while Zelensky remains involved in proposals over refinery and energy attacks. Any change of government could alter Kyiv’s negotiating team and war policy. It could also affect the balance between American pressure for an agreement and Ukraine’s own conditions for ending the conflict.

Oil refineries and energy facilities matter because they support transport, industry, electricity, and military operations. Damaging them can reduce fuel supplies or disrupt power. The attacks therefore carry both battlefield and economic effects. They also create wider risks for civilians, since energy damage can affect heating, transport, and daily life.

The clearest mechanism in the source is a conditional exchange. Zelensky says Ukraine would stop raids on Russian refineries if Moscow stopped striking Ukrainian energy sites. Each side would suspend a category of attack in return for matching restraint. That turns energy infrastructure into both a military target and a bargaining tool.

The proposal does not amount to a complete peace agreement. It concerns selected attacks and depends on Russia’s compliance. If both sides accepted and followed it, energy damage might fall and a channel for wider talks could open. If either side continued strikes, the arrangement could collapse and reinforce arguments that negotiations cannot be trusted.

A country’s ability to choose its government is part of political self-determination and sovereignty. In international law, people are generally entitled to determine their political status and select representatives through genuine elections. For Ukraine, that principle matters because the war involves pressure from a much larger neighboring power and now pressure from an influential ally.

The mechanism is consent. A government chosen through a lawful, credible process can claim authority to make military and diplomatic decisions. A government installed or selected under external pressure may be challenged as lacking legitimacy. That could weaken public support at home and make any agreement with Russia less durable, even if foreign leaders endorse it.

The headlines place this principle beside Trump’s call for a new Ukrainian president and the proposed understanding involving Washington, Moscow, and Beijing. The key question is whether Ukraine participates as an equal decision-maker or becomes the subject of decisions by larger countries. Any future settlement will therefore involve not only territory and security, but also who has the right to decide.