Analysis: Relations between Trump and Zelensky have flared up again – how can the United States pressure Ukraine?

The reported pressure concerns Ukraine’s attacks on Russian oil refineries, which produce diesel and other fuel. Trump has blamed Zelenskyi for high fuel prices and demanded that Ukraine stop striking the facilities. The dispute matters because these attacks affect Russia’s war capacity, while Washington wants to influence Ukraine’s battlefield decisions.

According to Axios and the Financial Times, U.S. representatives Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner raised the possibility of stopping intelligence sharing at a meeting in Miami. American intelligence helps Ukraine plan attacks deep inside Russia. The United States has also used this threat before, suspending intelligence cooperation for eight days last March.

Washington has another reported lever: arms sales. In September, the State Department announced $2.7 billion in weapons sales to improve Ukraine’s air defenses. The article does not say whether either measure has been imposed now. It shows, however, that U.S. support can directly shape Ukraine’s military choices.

Martial law is a state of emergency in which wartime conditions change how a country is governed. Authorities can impose special restrictions to manage the conflict and protect national security. In Ukraine, the key political consequence is that presidential elections cannot be organized while martial law remains in force.

This explains why Trump’s demand for immediate Ukrainian elections conflicts with Ukraine’s current legal situation. Trump again called for elections, while Zelenskyi said he would be ready to hold them if Putin accepted a complete 60-day ceasefire. The proposal links elections to a temporary end to fighting.

The issue is also part of a wider legitimacy dispute. Russian politicians have repeatedly questioned Zelenskyi’s right to remain president because elections were not held on schedule. The article says Putin is unlikely to accept the ceasefire offer, so the legal and security barriers to elections remain in place.

U.S. support includes weapons, intelligence, and military assistance, but the article quantifies only one weapons package. In September, the State Department announced $2.7 billion in arms sales to strengthen Ukraine’s air defenses. The article gives no dollar figure, volume, or frequency for intelligence sharing.

These resources serve different purposes. Air-defense weapons help Ukraine counter Russian attacks, especially ballistic missiles. Intelligence helps Ukrainian forces plan operations and strikes deep inside Russia. The article says Ukraine needs American intelligence for those long-range attacks, making information support operationally important.

The support is not guaranteed. Trump’s administration has reportedly threatened to halt intelligence sharing and could also stop arms sales. Ukraine is already struggling to obtain enough Patriot interceptor missiles against Russian ballistic missiles. Cutting either resource would therefore increase pressure on a country facing destructive Russian attacks on its infrastructure.

Stopping intelligence sharing could reduce Ukraine’s ability to identify, plan, and conduct attacks deep inside Russia. The article specifically says American intelligence is necessary for Ukraine’s strikes against distant Russian targets. Losing it would not automatically end those attacks, but it would remove an important support channel.

Stopping arms sales could damage Ukraine’s defensive capacity over time. The United States announced $2.7 billion in sales for air-defense improvements, while Ukraine has struggled to obtain enough Patriot missiles to counter Russian ballistic missiles. Fewer weapons would make replacing or expanding those defenses harder.

The combined effect could be greater vulnerability and less freedom to strike Russian military infrastructure. The article does not predict a precise outcome or say that all U.S. support has ended. It does show that Washington can influence both Ukraine’s protection from Russian attacks and its ability to hit targets far behind the front.

Starlink provides satellite connections that Ukraine’s military relies on for communications. The article calls Ukraine’s wartime operations highly dependent on SpaceX’s network. That makes access to the system a possible pressure point for Trump and Elon Musk, whose relationship with the U.S. administration has recently improved.

The network’s geography creates an important distinction. Starlink does not work over Russian territory, so removing Ukrainian access would not directly disable attacks deep inside Russia. It would nevertheless affect Ukraine’s own communications and battlefield coordination. The article says Musk previously closed Starlink access for Russian use at Ukraine’s request, immediately complicating Russian military operations.

Ukraine is more dependent because the network is far more important to its military than to Russia’s, according to the article. Ukraine and supporters such as Finland have repeatedly asked Musk to enable Starlink over Russia. Musk has recently echoed Trump’s criticism of Zelenskyi, increasing concern about possible restrictions.

The article does not specify what Ukraine would use instead if U.S. weapons, intelligence, or Starlink were restricted. It does show that Ukraine has supporters, including Finland, and that European countries are involved in supporting its war effort. Any replacement would need to cover air-defense missiles, battlefield information, and secure communications.

Possible alternatives, based on established military practice, include buying weapons from European partners, expanding Ukrainian defense production, and using other satellite or radio communication systems. Intelligence could also come from European governments, commercial satellite imagery, or Ukraine’s own reconnaissance. These are general options, not measures named in the article.

The main difficulty would be speed, scale, and integration. Ukraine already cannot obtain enough Patriot interceptors, and its military relies heavily on Starlink. A substitute might therefore reduce the immediate gap without fully matching American weapons, intelligence, or satellite coverage. The article leaves the actual contingency plan unstated.

Information networks and satellite communications connect military units, sensors, commanders, and weapons. They help forces share information quickly and coordinate operations across long distances. If access is disrupted, decisions can slow and battlefield coordination can suffer. The article presents Ukraine’s dependence on Starlink and U.S. intelligence as examples.

High-volume drone production adds a different advantage. Large numbers can attack, observe, or test defenses repeatedly. The article says Ukraine developed interceptor drones against Russian Shahed swarms, after which Russia adapted by building faster, jet-powered Shahed drones. Production and innovation therefore create an ongoing contest between attack and defense.

Control of these systems can influence both daily fighting and long-term endurance. A side with stronger communications can use forces more effectively, while a side that produces and adapts drones faster can pressure defenses. The article warns that Ukraine’s advantage in military innovation is narrowing rapidly, even as Russian attacks on infrastructure intensify.