Kremlin launches hunt for top executives at European defense companies — FT

The GRU is Russia’s military intelligence agency. In this report, it is identified as the organization largely responsible for operations targeting European defense-industry figures. That matters because the alleged campaign reaches beyond traditional intelligence work and into personal security, business decisions, and civilian life.

The targets include executives and senior officials at defense companies. Smaller firms making drones or drone components are also included. European intelligence officials told the Financial Times that the campaign can involve threats to people and property. The article does not describe each operation or establish that every reported threat came directly from the GRU.

The reported purpose is largely psychological. Russia may not need to carry out an assassination attempt to influence behavior. Making executives feel vulnerable could lead them to increase security, avoid travel, or reconsider business connected with Ukraine. The GRU’s reported role therefore matters both for immediate safety and for pressure on Europe’s defense industry.

The reported targets are executives and other senior officials at European defense companies. Moscow has also focused on leaders of smaller businesses, especially firms making drones or drone components. This broadens the danger beyond famous weapons manufacturers and places attention on parts of the defense supply chain.

The article gives a clear example of the categories involved but does not explain a separate motive for each target. Drone makers and component companies are included because they are connected to defense production. Their leaders can therefore become visible symbols or pressure points in the wider effort to affect businesses linked to Ukraine.

The threat reportedly extends to both people and property. That means an executive could face personal security concerns, while a company could worry about damage or disruption. European intelligence officials said the campaign is meant to produce fear. Its effect could reach even firms that are smaller, less publicly known, or not directly involved in battlefield operations.

The warning came from representatives of five European intelligence agencies. They described a campaign aimed at defense-company executives and other senior officials. The reported scope is significant because it includes both people and property, rather than focusing only on military or government facilities.

The potential targets range from major defense companies to smaller firms making drones or their components. The Financial Times also reported that plots against civilian sites in Europe are becoming part of these plans. Such sites were previously considered off-limits even for Russian intelligence services, according to the report.

The campaign’s exact size is not quantified beyond the five agencies that raised the warning. Still, the categories described are broad. Companies, executives, civilian locations, and property could all face risk. The warning suggests that European businesses connected to defense production may need to consider threats even when they are not large or famous organizations.

Several defense-industry executives increased their personal security during the past six months. They said government security services gave them specific recommendations. The response shows that the warnings have changed daily precautions, even though the article does not list every measure adopted.

Other executives told the Financial Times that they used such precautions only when traveling abroad. This suggests that security responses vary according to a person’s assessment of risk, location, or official advice. The article does not identify the executives or describe specific equipment, guards, or routines.

The measures reflect a wider concern about threats to individuals and property. They also demonstrate the psychological effect described by intelligence officials: people alter their behavior because they believe they could become targets. Whether precautions expand further may depend on future warnings or incidents, but the reported campaign has already prompted changes among some defense leaders.

Intimidating defense executives can influence decisions without stopping a company by force. If leaders believe they or their property could be targeted, they may question whether supporting Ukraine is worth the personal and business risk. The pressure can therefore extend beyond the immediate target.

A European intelligence official told the Financial Times that Russia’s main objective remained psychological. The campaign did not necessarily require an actual assassination attempt. Making people feel that they could become targets might be enough to change their choices. The article specifically says Russia wanted people to think twice before doing business with Ukraine.

This creates uncertainty for companies and individuals connected to defense work. Executives may increase security, limit travel, or reconsider commercial relationships. The article does not say that any company actually withdrew from Ukraine-related business. It reports the intended effect: fear could discourage participation even when no physical attack occurs.

The article reports that the United States and Germany thwarted a Russian plot in 2024 to assassinate the chief executive of Rheinmetall. This is presented as an earlier example of the danger now described by European intelligence agencies. It connects the broader warning to a specific reported case involving a major defense company.

The source provides only the basic facts. It identifies the intended victim as Rheinmetall’s chief executive and says the United States and Germany stopped the plot. It does not name the executive, describe the planned method, identify suspects, or explain which intelligence or law-enforcement steps prevented the attack.

That missing detail matters when assessing exactly what happened. The confirmed information in the article is limited to the alleged assassination plan and its disruption by the two countries. The case nevertheless illustrates why defense leaders have reportedly strengthened personal security and why officials view threats to executives as part of a wider campaign.

Psychological warfare seeks to change how people think and act by creating fear, uncertainty, or pressure. In this case, the reported campaign does not need to produce a successful attack to have an effect. The possibility of becoming a target can itself influence choices.

European intelligence officials said Russia’s campaign could threaten people and property. They also said that actual assassination attempts were not always necessary. If executives believe their safety is at risk, they may increase security or behave more cautiously. The article gives no evidence that every threatened person changed business plans.

The intended wider effect is to make people think twice before doing business with Ukraine. That could affect executives, smaller drone companies, and other defense firms connected to Ukraine-related work. The current reality is that some leaders have already adopted extra precautions. The reported implication is that fear can create disruption even when no attack takes place.