Netanyahu's government is stalling Trump's Gaza plan, US general warns

The Trump administration’s Gaza plan includes postwar arrangements designed to replace Hamas with new Palestinian political and security mechanisms. These plans matter because Gaza would need governing and security structures that do not depend on Hamas after the war.

The article highlights training a new Palestinian police force as a key example. It also refers more broadly to plans involving the Palestinian Authority and security coordination. U.S. officials accuse Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of delaying these parts of the plan, rather than moving them forward.

Netanyahu had opposed planning for a Gaza “Day After” for three years. Even after signing onto the October 2025 Trump ceasefire plan, he was accused of delaying its political and security elements. The dispute reflects a wider disagreement: Netanyahu has emphasized military force against Hamas, while U.S. officials argue that governance and policing are also essential.

The Palestinian Authority, or PA, is the Palestinian governing body established to administer parts of the Palestinian territories. The source does not define it in detail. It presents the PA mainly as a possible Palestinian political and security partner for Gaza after the war.

Its potential role would include helping create a replacement for Hamas, supporting governance, and taking part in security coordination. The article specifically discusses training a new Palestinian police force. Such a force could help provide local order while the PA supplies a political framework for administration.

The proposal remains contested. Netanyahu has resisted planning for Gaza’s “Day After,” and U.S. officials accuse his government of delaying PA-related mechanisms. The article also says security coordination requires respecting what already exists and not getting in the way. The PA’s future role therefore depends on political agreement and practical cooperation.

Lt.-Gen. Sean M. Salene said that only 16 serving officers in the United States military focus on the West Bank problem set. The figure is striking because the West Bank is a central part of the security and political questions discussed in the speech.

Salene raised the number while arguing that counterterrorism requires more than military action. He connected the West Bank to wider questions involving ideology, education, social conditions, governance, and security coordination. His point was that these issues require specialized attention, not only battlefield operations.

The figure also suggests a gap between the scale of the problem and the number of U.S. officers assigned to focus on it. Salene did not propose a new number in the remarks quoted. He used the statistic to underline the need for a broader and more informed understanding of the West Bank environment.

Salene’s core argument is that terrorism is not only a military problem. Force can target fighters and infrastructure, but it may not remove the beliefs, education systems, or social conditions that help a terrorist organization develop and recruit. Counterterrorism therefore needs several connected tools.

He said effective action must address ideology, education, and societal conditions. These areas shape how people understand violence and whether organizations can gain support. The article also describes Hamas as an ecosystem spread across places and relationships, rather than as forces confined to Gaza or the West Bank.

This approach challenges Netanyahu’s heavy emphasis on military force against Hamas. It does not reject military action. Instead, it argues that military operations alone cannot defeat a movement with ideas, networks, financiers, and social roots. The forward challenge is building political, educational, and security policies alongside battlefield pressure.

The article does not explicitly explain what happens if Israeli-Palestinian security coordination collapses, nor does it directly discuss Jordan’s stability. It does say coordination is important and quotes Salene asking how the United States can support it. He says the first step is to respect what exists and not get in the way.

In established security practice, a breakdown would likely reduce information sharing and joint ability to prevent attacks. It could also weaken Palestinian security institutions, create more space for armed groups, and increase violence in the West Bank. These consequences are an inference beyond the article’s explicit wording.

Jordan could be affected because instability in the West Bank can create cross-border security pressure and strengthen networks operating in the wider region. The article identifies Hamas activity in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Florida, and Europe. It does not state that Jordan is currently destabilized or predict a specific outcome.

Treating Hamas as a global ecosystem means viewing it as more than an armed force operating in Gaza. Salene described it as a movement, idea, and network of relationships. This matters because military pressure in one territory may not remove the wider structures that sustain the organization.

He named Hamas activity in Judea and Samaria, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. He also referred to financiers in Florida and Europe. A government using the ecosystem approach would therefore combine military action with counterterrorism, financial disruption, intelligence work, political measures, and efforts addressing ideology and social conditions.

The article does not list a complete policy program. It does make clear that Gaza and the West Bank alone are insufficient targets. The implication is that governments need cooperation across borders and institutions. Otherwise, Hamas could retain networks and support even if its immediate forces are weakened.

The military idea that threat equals capability plus intent separates ability from purpose. Capability asks what an adversary can do. Intent asks whether it is likely to use that ability. A serious assessment considers both before deciding how urgent or dangerous a threat is.

Salene said many Israeli security professionals now appear to view capability as equal to threat. For example, they may focus on what an enemy could do without weighing evidence about what the enemy intends to do. That can make every potential danger appear immediate and severe.

The result can be excessive risk-aversion. Israeli society, Salene said, has very low or nonexistent risk tolerance because of open fronts and the unresolved question of Iran. Such caution may encourage worst-case thinking, delay political or security initiatives, and discourage measured risk-taking. Salene suggested that policy guidance and social pressure may be shaping professional assessments.