Atiku questions ballot contract, alleged redeployments at INEC HQ

Atiku is asking INEC to explain changes in departments responsible for election administration and to open up its contracting process. He wants Nigerians to know whether the redeployments followed due process, merit and safeguards against political interference. He also wants full details about who will produce, store and deliver sensitive materials for 2027.

The reported changes include Isa Magaji Gum moving from Electoral Operations to Voter Registry, Oluyemi Titilayo Adeyemi-Showunmi taking charge of Electoral Operations, and Lawrence Bayode heading ICT. Atiku also asks INEC to confirm or deny whether Hitech, or a related company, received a printing contract. He seeks the names of all contractors, assigned materials and states, procurement methods and security clearances.

The article presents these matters as reports requiring official verification, not established facts. Atiku also raises claims that NSPMC may print for only 15 to 17 states, while private firms handle the rest. He says INEC should publish a complete, verifiable chain of custody for every sensitive document.

INEC is Nigeria’s Independent National Electoral Commission, the body responsible for administering national elections. The article focuses on three departments because their work can affect how elections are prepared and delivered. Electoral Operations handles practical election administration, Voter Registry manages voter records, and ICT supports the technology and information systems used by the commission.

The article identifies Isa Magaji Gum as moving from Electoral Operations to Voter Registry. It names Mrs Oluyemi Titilayo Adeyemi-Showunmi as the new head of Electoral Operations and Dr Lawrence Bayode as head of ICT. Atiku says INEC should explain the criteria behind these decisions and demonstrate that they followed due process and merit.

The article does not provide detailed job descriptions for each department. These functions are the standard meaning of the department names and the broader role of an election commission. Because these units affect voters, logistics and technology, unexplained leadership changes could increase public concern.

The most striking allegation is that more than half of INEC’s sensitive election materials may have been allocated to Hitech or a company associated with it. The materials reportedly include presidential ballot assets. The article does not give an exact percentage, so the scale is described as “more than half,” and the company’s identity and credentials are said not to have been publicly disclosed.

Atiku also raises a separate report about the Nigerian Security Printing and Minting Plc, or NSPMC. It may be handling printing for only 15 to 17 states, with private printing companies dividing the remaining work. That would mean the work is spread across multiple suppliers, making clear assignments and safeguards especially important.

These figures are allegations or reports that Atiku wants INEC to confirm or deny. He calls for publication of every company’s name, assigned materials and states, procurement method, security clearances and production, storage and delivery safeguards before the 2027 election.

The concern is about perceived independence, not a proven finding that Hitech or INEC acted improperly. Atiku says Hitech is owned by the Chagoury family and points to publicly reported business ties between that family and the Tinubu family. Because the proposed work involves sensitive election materials, he argues that any connection could create doubts about INEC’s neutrality.

The mechanism is public confidence. If a company linked through reported relationships to people associated with the governing political environment receives a major ballot contract, observers may question whether the award was impartial. Atiku therefore demands that INEC confirm or deny the contract and publish the procurement method, company credentials, security clearances and assigned materials.

The article does not establish that Hitech received the contract or that any relationship affected procurement. It reports Atiku’s allegation and request for disclosure. Transparent evidence could either address the concern or reveal details requiring further scrutiny before 2027.

Public trust depends partly on whether voters can see who is making key decisions and how sensitive materials are controlled. If INEC leaves appointments, contracts and custody arrangements unexplained, citizens may suspect political interference even when wrongdoing has not been proven. Atiku says Nigerians will not accept vague assurances on matters this serious.

The article gives several possible triggers for doubt: reported changes in Electoral Operations, a possible Hitech allocation involving more than half of sensitive materials, and reports that NSPMC may serve only 15 to 17 states. Without public records showing criteria, procurement steps and custody protections, critics may believe the process favours a political interest.

The forward risk is a weakened election result. Atiku says suspicion that the administration is seeking electoral advantage will grow unless INEC provides immediate, verifiable disclosure. He also warns that alleged manipulation could prompt lawful civic action, democratic resistance and demands to hold officials accountable.

The article points to safeguards that would make the process easier to inspect. INEC could publish the names of every company involved, the materials and states assigned to each, the procurement method and the security clearances obtained. It could also explain the protections used during production, storage and delivery. These disclosures would let citizens test the process rather than rely on unnamed sources.

A second safeguard is capacity and control. Atiku calls on INEC to make the fullest use of qualified domestic security-printing capacity, including the Nigerian Security Printing and Minting Plc. Every ballot paper, result sheet and other sensitive document should be counted and protected through a transparent chain of custody. Records should show who handled each item and when.

The article does not prescribe a technical security system beyond these measures. It does make the standard clear: contractors, responsibilities and protections must be publicly identifiable, while materials remain accounted for throughout the election process.

A chain of custody is a continuous record showing where sensitive election materials are, who controls them and when responsibility changes. For ballots and result sheets, it would begin with production, continue through counting and secure storage, and cover transport, delivery and use at the relevant election locations. The article calls for this process to be transparent.

The key mechanism is accountability at every handoff. INEC could record the quantity produced, the assigned state or location, the officials or contractors responsible, the time of each transfer and the condition of the materials. Matching records and physical counts could help identify missing items, unauthorised access or unexplained discrepancies. The article specifically asks for safeguards governing production, storage and delivery.

This matters because sensitive documents influence recorded votes. A visible trail would give citizens and observers evidence about how materials were protected. The article says INEC must prove at every stage that the 2027 election is being prepared fairly and transparently.