Iran’s security chief calls US response to deal conditions ‘inadequate’

Iran says the main problem is not that Washington rejected every condition. Instead, the US response accepted some Iranian demands while leaving others unclear. Mohsen Rezaei, Iran’s Supreme National Security Council secretary, called that response “inadequate.” The dispute matters because unclear terms can prevent both sides from knowing what they are agreeing to.

Rezaei said Iran is no longer preparing another response to Washington. He said the United States must clarify the remaining issues. This shifts the next move to Washington. The mechanism is straightforward: Iran wants specific answers before negotiators can settle the terms of a possible agreement.

The talks therefore remain stalled by uncertainty. The article does not list each unclear condition, so their exact content is unknown. It does show that the disagreement follows President Donald Trump’s rejection of Iran’s proposal concerning the Strait of Hormuz and Vice President JD Vance’s demand for a meaningful cut in enrichment capacity.

Iran and the United States are discussing a possible agreement, although the article does not give it a formal name or describe a final draft. The apparent focus is Iran’s nuclear activity, especially uranium enrichment, alongside a dispute over the Strait of Hormuz. Progress matters because both governments must settle conditions before negotiations can advance.

The immediate obstacles are clear. Iran says Washington accepted some Iranian conditions but left others unclear. President Donald Trump rejected an Iranian proposal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz within seven days. Then US Vice President JD Vance demanded a “meaningful” reduction in Iran’s uranium enrichment capacity as a condition for agreement.

The talks are therefore caught between two demands. Iran wants the United States to clarify its position. Washington wants Iran to reduce enrichment capacity. The article does not state whether either side has accepted the other’s central demand, so the agreement remains only a possibility.

Uranium enrichment is the process of increasing the share of uranium-235 in uranium. Most uranium contains very little uranium-235, so special equipment separates the forms. Enriched uranium can be used as fuel for civilian reactors. At much higher levels, it can also support a nuclear weapon, making enrichment a major security concern.

The key mechanism is control over capability. A country with more centrifuges, more enriched material, or higher enrichment levels can potentially produce higher-grade material faster. An agreement can limit these factors and verify the limits through monitoring. The source article does not explain the technical process or set a threshold.

That capacity is central here because JD Vance demanded a “meaningful” reduction in Iran’s uranium enrichment capacity. The article does not say how much reduction Washington wants. Iran, meanwhile, says some US conditions remain unclear, so the disagreement concerns both the substance and the clarity of the proposed terms.

A reduction in enrichment capacity can be measured in several ways. Negotiators may count operating centrifuges, limit the amount of enriched uranium stored, cap the enrichment level, or restrict how quickly new material can be produced. These measures describe different parts of the same capability: the ability to make enriched uranium and increase its concentration.

For example, fewer centrifuges may reduce production speed, while a lower enrichment limit restricts the quality of the material produced. A smaller stockpile limits what is immediately available. Agreements often combine these measures because one limit alone may not capture the full capability. These technical details are not provided in the article.

The US request is also broad rather than numerical. Vice President JD Vance demanded a “meaningful” reduction in Iran’s uranium enrichment capacity as a condition for an agreement. The article does not specify whether Washington wants fewer centrifuges, less material, lower enrichment, or a combination of all three.

Unclear conditions create a basic negotiating problem: neither side can be sure what it must do or what it will receive. That makes it difficult to draft commitments, assess compliance, or decide whether a deal is acceptable. In this case, Iran says the United States accepted some conditions but did not explain others clearly enough.

Mohsen Rezaei said Iran is no longer in the process of responding to Washington. Instead, he said the Americans must clarify the unresolved issues. This means the process pauses while the United States provides more precise answers. Clear wording is especially important when conditions involve security matters, enrichment, or access to a strategic waterway.

The immediate effect is delay. The article says talks cannot advance until Washington clarifies its position. It does not describe a deadline or a new meeting. The next development therefore depends on whether the United States offers explanations that Iran considers sufficient.

The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow maritime passage between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. It connects major oil-producing countries in the Gulf with shipping routes beyond the region. Because vessels carrying crude oil and fuel use this route, disruption can affect energy markets and international supply chains. This geographic background is established knowledge, not information stated in the article.

The article says President Donald Trump rejected an Iranian proposal to reopen the Strait within seven days. That wording indicates the passage was treated as closed or restricted in the dispute described. The mechanism is strategic: control or reopening of a major shipping route can become a bargaining condition in wider negotiations.

About one-fifth of globally traded oil passes through the Strait, although the exact share changes over time. The article does not provide this figure. Its focus is diplomatic: Trump rejected Iran’s proposal, and the disagreement became part of the conditions surrounding a possible agreement.

Nuclear agreements rely on reciprocal commitments because each side usually needs something from the other. One side may limit sensitive nuclear activities, while the other may provide sanctions relief or other benefits. Mutual obligations make the arrangement more durable than a one-sided promise. They also define what each government must deliver and when.

Inspections provide evidence. Monitors can check facilities, equipment, and declared materials against agreed limits. Sanctions relief then creates a practical reward for verified compliance. If only one side acts, it risks giving up leverage without receiving anything. If neither side can verify performance, mistrust can quickly return. These are general principles; the article does not describe an inspection plan or sanctions package.

The current dispute illustrates why precise terms matter. Iran says Washington accepted some conditions but left others unclear. Washington, meanwhile, demands a meaningful reduction in enrichment capacity. A workable agreement would need clear, measurable commitments and benefits that both sides understand.