US-Iran war: Mohsen Rezaei says Washington accepted some conditions to reopen Hormuz, but ‘response inadequate’

The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow maritime passage at the entrance to the Persian Gulf. It separates Iran on its northern side from Oman and the Musandam Peninsula on its southern side. Ships use it to travel between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, which opens into the Arabian Sea. The article calls it strategic but does not provide its location in detail.

Its importance comes from geography. A large share of energy exports from Gulf countries must pass through this relatively narrow route before reaching international markets. That makes access to the strait important not only for Iran and its neighbours, but also for energy buyers and shipping companies worldwide.

The article reports that Iran has kept the strait closed during escalating tensions with the United States. Tehran has linked reopening it to specific political and economic conditions. Because the waterway connects major producers with global buyers, any change in access can quickly become an international issue.

Iran has linked reopening the Strait of Hormuz and resuming negotiations to seven conditions. Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said these conditions were based on the 14-point June Memorandum of Understanding. The article does not list all seven conditions, so their complete content cannot be stated from the available text.

Two conditions are identified. According to Al Jazeera, Iran wants the United States to end a naval blockade imposed on Iranian ports and remove restrictions on the sale of Iranian oil. Tehran has also said that Washington recently sent proposals through a mediator, but Iran's position remained unchanged.

The issue matters because the strait is being used as leverage in negotiations. Mohsen Rezaei said the United States had accepted some conditions, but called its response inadequate. The disagreement means reopening remains tied to further diplomatic movement, while ceasefire talks are still unresolved.

Control over access to the Strait of Hormuz gives Iran bargaining leverage because the waterway is a major gateway between Gulf energy producers and world markets. Although the article does not quantify the traffic, it describes the strait as strategic. Disrupting access can therefore affect governments, traders, shipping firms, and energy consumers far beyond the region.

The mechanism is straightforward. If tankers cannot pass normally, exporters may struggle to deliver oil and gas, while buyers fear shortages and delays. Those fears can increase market pressure even before supplies are physically exhausted. Iran can connect reopening to demands such as ending the reported naval blockade and oil-sale restrictions.

This leverage does not guarantee that Iran will obtain all its demands. The article says the United States accepted some conditions but that Tehran considered the response inadequate. As tensions continue and no ceasefire deal has been reached, access to the strait remains part of the wider diplomatic contest.

The article does not state how much of the world's seaborne oil or liquefied natural gas passes through the Strait of Hormuz. Based on widely established energy-flow estimates, the strait carries roughly one-fifth of global seaborne oil trade and about one-fifth of global liquefied natural gas trade. Exact shares vary by year and by how analysts define the market.

That scale explains why the waterway attracts worldwide attention. Oil and LNG cargoes move through the strait from Gulf producers to overseas buyers. Even a threatened disruption can make traders worry about delays, reduced availability, insurance costs, and longer journeys.

The article focuses on the political dispute rather than shipment statistics. It reports that Iran has kept the strait closed until Washington meets seven conditions, while the United States has accepted only some of them. If the closure continues, the commercial impact would depend on how long it lasts and how much cargo can be redirected.

If the Strait of Hormuz remains closed, the first major effect could be disruption to energy shipments from the Gulf. Buyers might compete for fewer available cargoes, pushing oil and gas prices higher. Shipping companies could also face delays, rerouting expenses, and higher insurance premiums. These consequences are established risks of a prolonged chokepoint disruption, though the article does not quantify them.

The key mechanism is reduced or delayed supply. Energy exporters may be unable to reach customers on normal routes, while importers may need to purchase replacement supplies elsewhere. Higher fuel costs can then raise transport, electricity, manufacturing, and food expenses. Countries that depend heavily on imported energy would be especially exposed.

The eventual impact would depend on duration, alternative routes, stockpiles, and diplomatic developments. The article reports that Washington and Tehran have not reached a ceasefire deal and that Iran considers the US response inadequate. Continued deadlock could therefore keep markets and governments focused on the strait.

The article does not identify alternative routes or methods for moving energy if tankers cannot cross the Strait of Hormuz. In established energy practice, exporters may use pipelines to ports outside the Gulf, where such systems exist. They may also reroute ships around longer maritime paths, use stored supplies, or seek different buyers and transport arrangements.

The main mechanism is substitution. Pipelines can bypass a maritime chokepoint, but their capacity is limited and cannot instantly replace all tanker traffic. Longer sea routes require more time, fuel, ships, and insurance. LNG is harder to redirect because it needs specialised vessels, receiving terminals, and available capacity at both ends.

These options can reduce disruption but are not perfect replacements. Their usefulness depends on infrastructure, spare capacity, cargo availability, and the length of the closure. Since the article only reports the political dispute, it does not say which alternatives are available to the countries involved or whether they are being used.

A ceasefire is an agreement to stop, reduce, or pause active fighting. It may be temporary and may not settle the political issues that caused the conflict. A temporary diplomatic agreement is broader or more specific in purpose: it can set short-term rules, exchange commitments, or create a path for negotiations without permanently resolving the dispute.

A lasting peace settlement seeks a durable resolution. It normally addresses core political, security, territorial, or economic disputes and establishes commitments intended to prevent renewed conflict. The distinction matters because an agreement can stop immediate confrontation while leaving the underlying disagreement unresolved.

In this article, the United States and Iran have not agreed to a ceasefire deal. Iran has proposed conditions involving reopening the Strait of Hormuz and resuming negotiations, while the United States has accepted some conditions. Those developments would not automatically amount to a lasting peace settlement; they would represent movement in an ongoing dispute.