Saudi Arabia, Israel have shared interests at stake, Houthi escalation highlights - editorial

A Houthi strike on Riyadh’s international airport exposed the central problem facing Saudi Arabia. The kingdom is building security partnerships, but it must show they can protect airports, cities, and energy facilities. At the same time, it wants to avoid expanding the Yemen war and increasing risks for its partners.

The October 10 attack was the airport’s third strike that week. Earlier attacks killed three people, including a Saudi pilot. The Houthis then warned airlines, passengers, and airport workers to avoid Saudi airports and airspace. Those threats immediately challenged the practical value of Saudi Arabia’s new defense relationships.

The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement with Turkey and Pakistan was signed in August. Its joint committee said on October 5 that collective-defense commitments would begin implementation, but it gave no force size or timetable. Saudi Arabia must decide whether restraint weakens deterrence or a deeper campaign creates a broader war.

The strike caused both a deadly human toll and immediate disruption to Saudi air travel. Saudi civil aviation authorities reported 12 deaths and 309 injuries. The attack also showed that the Houthis could threaten a major civilian airport, not only battlefields in Yemen.

Riyadh’s airport remained closed on Sunday after the October 10 strike. Airlines canceled or suspended flights after the Houthis warned airlines, passengers, and airport workers to stay away from Saudi airports and airspace. The attack was the third at the airport that week, following earlier strikes that killed three people, including a Saudi pilot.

The disruption raised pressure on Saudi Arabia to restore safe air travel while preventing further attacks. It also turned airport security into a test of the kingdom’s partnerships. Continued threats could undermine confidence in Saudi aviation and expose wider weaknesses in protecting civilian and economic infrastructure.

The article identifies the Houthis as the force opposing Yemen’s internationally recognized government and the forces fighting on its behalf. Saudi Arabia supports that government with air power and other military backing. The conflict matters because Houthi battlefield gains now threaten Saudi cities, airports, energy facilities, and nearby shipping routes.

A 2022 truce between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia largely held until fighting resumed in July. Since then, the Houthis have advanced along Yemen’s Red Sea coast. Government forces later launched a counteroffensive, supported by Saudi air power and other military assistance. Both sides dispute the battlefield picture.

The government claims it retook strategic positions near Bab el-Mandeb, while the Houthis claim control of territory and islands, including Perim Island. The article does not establish the full extent of either side’s gains. The fighting is therefore both a Yemeni power struggle and a direct Saudi security challenge.

Bab el-Mandeb is a strategic maritime strait connecting the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. Its location makes it important for ships traveling between those waters. Any threat there can affect commercial routes far beyond Yemen, including connections tied to Israeli and international trade.

The Houthis have claimed territory and islands near the strait, including Perim Island. Government forces say they have pushed back. Positions near Bab el-Mandeb give the Houthis greater ability to monitor and threaten shipping. However, the article makes clear that they do not control the passage in a way that lets them stop all traffic.

That partial leverage is still significant. Riyadh is supporting a campaign to regain ground along the maritime route while defending its cities and energy infrastructure. Continued fighting could keep shipping companies cautious and sustain pressure on ports and economies that depend on Red Sea access.

If Houthi attacks continue, Saudi Arabia could face repeated disruption to civilian air travel and threats against energy facilities. The kingdom would also remain under pressure to defend its territory and support forces fighting in Yemen. A stronger military response might protect key sites, but it could prolong the conflict and increase risks for Saudi forces and partners.

The article links the danger to Red Sea shipping as well. Houthi positions near Bab el-Mandeb allow greater monitoring and threats, though they do not enable the Houthis to stop all traffic. Shipping lines have already avoided regular direct sailings to Israel’s Eilat port. Some cargo activity continues through Aqaba, Jordan, rather than the direct route.

The result could be a wider regional economic problem. Saudi airports and energy infrastructure could suffer further interruptions. Israel could see continued pressure on Eilat’s recovery. International trade would face less reliable Red Sea routes, even without a complete closure.

The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement links Saudi Arabia with Turkey and Pakistan. Signed in August, it is intended to provide collective-defense support and agreed military capabilities for rapid deployment in Saudi Arabia. Its purpose is to strengthen protection of the kingdom as Houthi attacks threaten airports and other infrastructure.

On October 5, the agreement’s joint committee said implementation would begin. The public statement did not identify the forces involved or provide a timetable. Turkey has described the pact as defensive, and Reuters reported that Turkish support would mainly be technical and defensive. The size and command structure of any deployment remain unanswered.

That distinction matters because defending Saudi territory is not the same as joining an offensive campaign in Yemen. A collective-defense promise can cover protection, equipment, or technical help without requiring partners to attack the Houthis. It is therefore too early to know whether either partner will enter the fighting.

Red Sea shipping is especially important to Israel’s Eilat port because Eilat depends on access through the Red Sea. Houthi attacks have prevented international shipping lines from returning to regular direct sailings there. That makes the port’s recovery a security and economic issue, not merely a local transport problem.

Some activity has resumed through cargo unloaded in Aqaba, Jordan. However, the direct route to Eilat has not returned. Houthi advances near Bab el-Mandeb have renewed concern about the port’s future. The mechanism is straightforward: threats near a key maritime passage make shipping companies avoid the route or use alternate ports.

This shows how conflict in Yemen can affect economies elsewhere. Israel faces pressure on Eilat’s trade and security. Jordan’s Aqaba port becomes part of the alternative route. More broadly, threats near Bab el-Mandeb can disrupt international shipping even when the Houthis do not control all traffic.