Who are the Ukrainian 'volunteers' under Russian command?

The “Ukrainian volunteers” are combat units under Russian control whose members are mostly Ukrainian POWs or former Ukrainian service members. Reports about these formations began appearing in late 2022. Their name suggests willing cooperation, but the article shows that recruitment often happened inside Russian captivity, where prisoners faced intense pressure.

The Maksym Kryvonis battalion is the best-known example. Pavlo Oliynyk, formerly a senior lieutenant in Ukraine’s armed forces, says he was electrocuted, beaten and psychologically tortured after capture. He accepted a fourth recruitment offer, he says, because it gave him a chance to reach the front and escape to Ukrainian-controlled territory.

Several detachments were merged in August 2026 into the Ukrainian Volunteer Special Forces Brigade. The battalion’s actual size remains unclear, and the available evidence suggests only several dozen fighters. The label “volunteers” therefore remains disputed, especially when captivity and coercion shaped the choices of recruits.

There is no reliable public total for these Russian-controlled Ukrainian units. Russian media reports put the Maksym Kryvonis battalion at about 200 fighters, but available footage appears to show only several dozen. That gap matters because the units’ public image may be larger than their demonstrable fighting strength.

An investigative team from Ukraine’s public broadcaster Suspilne identified more than 30 members. It confirmed that all those people were former Ukrainian servicemen captured by Russian forces between 2023 and 2024. This is the clearest documented membership figure in the article, but it does not establish the battalion’s full size.

The formations expanded from several detachments into the so-called Ukrainian Volunteer Special Forces Brigade in August 2026. Its overall strength is not given. The article therefore supports a confirmed minimum of over 30 identified former Ukrainian servicemen, alongside unverified claims of about 200 fighters in one battalion.

Ukrainian prisoners accepted recruitment offers for different reported reasons. Some hoped to escape Russian custody by reaching the front and crossing into Ukrainian-controlled territory. Others faced repeated offers after severe mistreatment, making refusal difficult. The article says POWs were interrogated, pressured and sometimes pushed toward confessions or intelligence work.

Pavlo Oliynyk initially refused three offers. He accepted the fourth because he believed joining would let him flee. Maksym Butkevych said prisoners were shown that guards could do anything to them, creating pressure to agree. He and Yevhen Shybalov described recruitment as forced psychological compliance rather than a free decision.

The line is not absolute. Mykhailo Savva pointed to criminal cases suggesting some fighters switched sides voluntarily, while Butkevych said ideological defection was possible. Yet the reported captivity conditions make genuine consent hard to establish, especially when violence and fear precede recruitment.

The supplied article describes control beginning before combat service. Former prisoners reported electrocution, beatings, psychological torture, interrogation and pressure to confess to war crimes. They also described recruitment attempts for Russia’s intelligence services. These methods could make later agreement appear voluntary while operating under fear.

Oliynyk said he was taken to a room after signing a private contract with an individual. There, he heard lectures and watched videos and photographs. He was later asked to retell what he had seen. Butkevych and Shybalov described a broader system in which prisoners were first interrogated and then given propositions under duress.

The supplied text ends during a section titled “Control and mistre...” and does not provide further details about surveillance, threats inside combat units or treatment after deployment. It therefore supports reports of torture, psychological pressure, indoctrination and information control, but not a complete account of internal monitoring.

Pavel Luzin describes the Ukrainian units under Russian command as an “imitation” of the Russian Volunteer Corps and the Freedom of Russia Legion. Those formations operate in Ukraine’s armed forces and consist of Russian citizens fighting against Russia. Moscow’s Ukrainian units therefore serve as a counter-image.

Yevhen Shybalov said Russian forces were troubled that Russians would fight on Ukraine’s side while Ukrainians would not fight on Russia’s side. He reported that Russian troops never hid this imbalance as a reason for creating Ukrainian units. Their existence could present captured Ukrainians as willing supporters of Russia.

The units also help Moscow shift attention from Russian citizens fighting for Ukraine, according to Luzin and Ukrainian intelligence services. Their actual military size remains uncertain, however. The article presents them primarily as a political and propaganda response, even though the Maksym Kryvonis battalion has apparently taken part in combat.

Using former POWs in combat creates serious personal and legal risks. Fighters may be sent against Ukraine, exposed to renewed danger and later accused of treason or voluntarily switching sides. The article also raises questions about whether their recruitment was genuinely voluntary, which could affect how their conduct is judged after release or capture.

Mykhailo Savva pointed to criminal procedures against several battalion members. That suggests some fighters are already facing legal consequences. At the same time, Bill Wiley said the physical and psychological condition of returned combatants raises doubts about voluntary recruitment. Families may therefore face uncertainty, but the supplied article gives no specific examples of family treatment.

The wider war could gain a propaganda tool and additional combatants, while Russia presents these formations as evidence of Ukrainian support. The article does not establish their battlefield impact or describe broader consequences. It does show that disputed recruitment can deepen legal, political and humanitarian tensions.

Under international humanitarian law, prisoners of war must be treated humanely. They are protected from torture, cruel treatment, intimidation, humiliation and coercion. They generally cannot be compelled to serve in the armed forces of the detaining power. These protections exist because captivity removes a prisoner’s normal freedom and creates a power imbalance.

The article describes conditions that directly threaten genuine consent. Oliynyk reported electrocution, beatings and psychological torture. Butkevych said prisoners were shown that guards could do anything to them before being asked to agree. Shybalov described interrogation followed by propositions under duress. A contract signed after such treatment may not reflect free choice.

International law therefore makes recruitment from captivity highly suspect when force or pressure is involved. The article also notes that some prisoners may have switched sides voluntarily, so each case requires careful examination. The central issue is whether consent was informed and freely given, rather than simply recorded on paper.