Iran sets crosshairs on ‘US-UAE’ oil shuttle out of Strait of Hormuz

The oil shuttle is a maritime workaround for moving Gulf crude while Iran restricts normal traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. It links smaller vessels with very large crude carriers, or VLCCs, and uses routes near Oman to reach the Gulf of Oman. The system matters because it keeps some exports moving during a blockade and regional energy crisis.

According to the article, ships load crude at Arab ports, then travel through southern corridors near Oman. Smaller vessels transfer oil to larger tankers in ship-to-ship operations. The vessels often switch off transponders and move at night to reduce the risk of Iranian attacks. Some return afterward to load more crude.

Iran claims the US Central Command and UAE military assist the operation. Iranian security chief Mohsen Rezaei said the shuttle is now an explicit target. Attacks near Oman show the threat has spread beyond the strait itself, potentially making this emergency export route harder to sustain.

The main vessels are very large crude carriers and smaller ships used as shuttles. VLCCs carry large volumes, while smaller vessels can collect crude from Arab ports and move it through less exposed southern waters. Tankers and vessels anchored near Oman have also been targeted, showing that the operation extends beyond the strait itself.

The United States is described as providing military coordination through US Central Command. The UAE military allegedly assists that effort. Arab national oil companies use the system to move exports, loading crude at ports and sending vessels toward corridors near Oman. Ship-to-ship transfers then occur in the Gulf of Oman.

The article also says Iran accused Saudi Arabia of helping move oil around its restrictions, though it did not threaten a direct attack on Riyadh. Kuwait and Bahrain are mentioned as countries whose ports and anchorages faced Iranian threats because they host US forces, not as clearly identified shuttle operators.

The article reports that Iran had been striking five or six vessels each night for weeks, according to Mohsen Rezaei. It also describes multiple attacks overnight, including two outbound tankers and one vessel anchored near Oman’s Sohar. The IRGC separately said three tankers suffered major damage from mines over one weekend.

These figures describe reported attacks, not necessarily a confirmed total of unique ships. The article also says projectiles hit other vessels the previous week, suggesting that attacks reached the shuttle’s wider operating area. Iranian claims about mines remain part of the conflict narrative; released footage did not clearly show a mine exploding.

The waterway’s normal scale is enormous. Roughly one-fifth of global oil and gas flowed through the Strait of Hormuz before the war. That makes even a partial disruption significant for exporters, importers, shipping companies, and governments watching energy supplies. The article does not provide a daily barrel figure.

The Strait of Hormuz is important because it connects Gulf energy exporters with wider maritime markets. Before the war, roughly one-fifth of global oil and gas flowed through it. Its closure therefore affects far more than nearby countries. The article describes a worldwide energy crisis and says Tehran’s pressure in Hormuz has global impact.

For Gulf exporters, the strait is the normal maritime exit for crude and other commodities. The shuttle system offers a limited workaround through southern corridors near Oman. For Iran, restricting or managing passage creates leverage over the United States and regional governments. Tehran says reopening the strait depends on meeting its seven conditions.

The confrontation also raises security risks. Iran has attacked or threatened vessels, cited mines, and warned about US-linked cables, data centres, and artificial-intelligence facilities in the UAE and around Hormuz. Iran’s analysts question whether it can sustain this pressure as economic costs grow at home.

If attacks stop the shuttle, Gulf exporters could lose a route that currently helps move crude beyond the Strait of Hormuz. The article says the system has enabled more energy exports and that the US Navy reportedly opened the route amid an energy crisis. Losing it could reduce available seaborne supplies and make deliveries less reliable.

The article does not state a specific price forecast. As a matter of established energy-market behavior, a sudden threat to a route carrying a large share of global oil and gas can increase prices and volatility. Buyers may compete for fewer cargoes, while insurers and ship operators may demand greater compensation for risk.

Security risks could also spread. Iran has already targeted vessels near Oman and threatened cables, data centres, and artificial-intelligence facilities in the UAE. Further attacks could draw in the US, Gulf states, and more naval forces, while increasing economic pressure on Iran itself.

The clearest alternative described is the southern maritime corridor near Oman. Gulf exporters use it to move crude toward the Gulf of Oman, avoiding the most exposed central passage through Hormuz. The shuttle system combines this route with transfers between smaller vessels and large tankers, keeping some exports moving despite attacks.

The article also describes ship-to-ship transfers as a method rather than a separate route. Smaller vessels collect crude at Arab ports, transfer it offshore, and then return for more cargo. Ships travel at night and often disable transponders. These tactics reduce visibility but do not remove the dangers of projectiles, mines, or surveillance.

Beyond the article, established alternatives include overland pipelines, land routes, storage, and delaying shipments until conditions improve. Their usefulness depends on available capacity and geography. The article does not identify specific pipelines or quantify their capacity, so it cannot establish how much they could replace.

Seaborne oil transport begins when crude is loaded at a port onto a tanker. In this system, smaller vessels collect crude from Arab ports because they can use the southern corridor near Oman. Their job is to move oil through a threatened area and deliver it to larger carriers.

The key mechanism is ship-to-ship transfer. In the Gulf of Oman, a smaller vessel meets a very large crude carrier, or VLCC, and pumps the crude across. The VLCC can then carry the combined cargo onward. Some shuttle vessels return to port after transferring their oil and load again. The article says ships often operate at night with transponders off.

This arrangement increases flexibility but creates extra movements and exposure. Tankers can be attacked while outbound or anchored near Oman’s Sohar. Mines and projectiles add danger. The system therefore depends on coordination, concealment, and access to safe transfer areas, reportedly with US and UAE military assistance.