Four go on trial in Warsaw over arson attacks carried out on Russian orders

Four men are on trial in Warsaw over an alleged Russian-directed campaign of arson and sabotage. Polish prosecutors say the group was tasked with committing sabotage and terrorism for Russia’s foreign intelligence service in April and May 2024. The trial is closed for security reasons.

The alleged attacks crossed national borders. Fires were reported at Warsaw’s Marywilska 44 shopping centre, a Warsaw OBI store, and an IKEA store in Vilnius, Lithuania. Prosecutors also say the group planned an arson attack at an IKEA store in Riga, Latvia.

The defendants are three Ukrainians and one Belarusian. They are identified as Oleksandr H., Stepan K., Vitalii K. and Pavlo T. under Polish privacy law. Their cases form part of a wider investigation involving other alleged members, including a Ukrainian suspect jailed in Lithuania and two people still wanted.

Arson means deliberately setting fire to property. It focuses on the method and the damage caused by fire. In this case, prosecutors describe fires at shopping centres and stores as alleged arson attacks. The article does not provide a formal legal definition of arson.

Sabotage is a wider idea. It means intentionally damaging, disrupting or disabling property, systems or activities. A fire can be sabotage when it is meant to disrupt a country or organisation. Terrorism is broader still. It generally involves violence or threats designed to frighten the public or pressure authorities for a political purpose.

The article uses all three terms in connection with the case. Prosecutors accuse the group of arson as part of acts of “sabotage and terrorism” allegedly ordered by Russian intelligence. The exact legal meaning depends on Polish law and the charges filed against each defendant.

The article identifies three alleged attacks that were carried out. They include fires at Warsaw’s Marywilska 44 shopping centre, a Warsaw OBI store, and an IKEA store in Vilnius. Prosecutors say the Marywilska perpetrators have not been identified, although Russian intelligence allegedly ordered the attack.

One further attack is described specifically as planned: an arson attack on an IKEA store in Riga. Oleksandr H. is also accused of preparing additional attacks, but the article gives no number. It therefore supports a count of three named attacks and one specifically named planned attack.

Nine alleged group members are named or described: the four men on trial, Daniil B., Serhii R., Vladyslav Y., Serhii Chalyi and Oleksandr Varyvoda. This count includes convicted and wanted suspects, not just the four current defendants. The article gives no complete membership list.

Polish prosecutors connect the suspects to Russian intelligence through alleged orders, communications and assignments. They say the group was tasked with acts of sabotage and terrorism on behalf of Russia’s foreign intelligence service during April and May 2024. The alleged purpose was not simply criminal profit, but carrying out operations for a foreign power.

The indictment gives a concrete example. Prosecutors say Daniil B. received an order from a handler in Russia to go to Marywilska, record the fire and film the emergency response. They also accuse Stepan K. of setting the OBI fire and Oleksandr H. of involvement in the Vilnius IKEA attack and preparations for more attacks.

Prosecutors further say evidence showed Moscow was behind the Marywilska fire, although they could not identify its direct perpetrators. The article also reports that other alleged members coordinated sabotage activities. The defendants deny nothing in the supplied text because their responses are not reported.

The most serious charge concerns Poland’s espionage law. Stepan K. and Oleksandr H. are accused of carrying out sabotage and terrorism on behalf of foreign intelligence. The article states that this offence carries at least 10 years in prison and can result in a life sentence.

Stepan K., Oleksandr H. and Vitalii K. also face charges of participating in an organised criminal group intended to commit terrorist offences. That offence carries up to 10 years in prison. Vitalii K. and Pavlo T. are additionally indicted over an assault in Wólka Kosowska, but the article does not state the possible punishment for that charge.

Daniil B. faces the same espionage charge but is not currently in the Warsaw trial because he is imprisoned in Lithuania. Pavlo T. was previously convicted in a related case and received a sentence within a range of 16 months to five and a half years, alongside two other Ukrainian men.

The alleged sabotage has directly damaged Poland’s diplomatic relationship with Russia. After evidence that Moscow was behind the Marywilska fire, Poland ordered Russia’s consulate in Kraków to close. The decision turned a criminal investigation into a wider diplomatic confrontation.

Poland later closed all Russian consulates in its territory, citing Moscow’s continuing campaign of sabotage. Russia retaliated by shutting down all Polish consulates on Russian territory. The article presents these closures as reciprocal measures rather than isolated local decisions.

The consequences extend beyond consular buildings. The article says an international counter-terrorism report identified Poland as the primary focus of Russian sabotage in Europe. Poland has also accused Moscow of responsibility for a fire at a drone factory and reported an attempt to derail a train using explosives. These accusations suggest tensions may continue.

An intelligence service can use intermediaries to create distance between its officers and a covert operation. A handler may recruit, instruct and pay people who already live near the target. Those intermediaries can then carry out practical tasks, such as setting fires, filming damage or scouting locations.

The article gives a reported example involving Daniil B. Prosecutors say a handler in Russia ordered him to go to Marywilska, record the fire and document the emergency response. The article also says suspects were linked to attacks in Poland and Lithuania, while a further attack was planned in Latvia.

This method can make operations harder to trace directly to the sponsoring service. Polish prosecutors say most Russian-ordered sabotage in Poland was carried out by Ukrainians and Belarusians, not Russians. The article does not describe recruitment methods, payment systems or communications in detail, so those mechanisms cannot be specified here.