After oil increasingly left the Gulf, Iran is trying to regain its stranglehold on shipping

A stranglehold means gaining enough control over shipping that vessels hesitate, reroute, or need permission to pass. Iran is trying to restore leverage over the Strait of Hormuz, which it calls a strategic red line. This matters because disruption can pressure neighboring oil exporters and challenge US demands for free navigation.

The article describes more than a dozen shipping strikes since the end of September. Iran's IRGC also claimed that a supertanker exploded after hitting a naval mine on an unauthorized route. Iranian forces reportedly warned vessels near Ras al Khaimah to leave their anchorages and move toward Dubai.

This does not mean Iran has completely closed the strait. Tankers are still moving, but traffic has fallen sharply. Only seven tankers crossed on one Tuesday, below the seven-day average. The pattern gives Tehran influence, while raising the risk of higher prices and a wider confrontation with the United States and Gulf states.

The article reports more than a dozen strikes on shipping since the end of September. These attacks have reduced oil movements through the Strait of Hormuz and helped keep crude prices above $100 a barrel. The number shows that the danger is repeated rather than isolated.

Before the war, about 17.1 million barrels traveled through the strait each day. By the end of September, the average had fallen to about 13.1 million barrels daily, according to Kpler. That was just under 80% of the earlier level. The figure measures oil and petroleum products passing through the waterway.

Traffic later weakened further. Kpler recorded just seven tankers crossing on Tuesday, less than half the seven-day average and the lowest figure since July 23. The data can later be revised upward because ships sometimes switch off identification systems to avoid detection.

The Strait of Hormuz matters because enormous volumes of oil and petroleum products pass through it. Gulf states depend on the waterway for much of their trade, while countries elsewhere depend on those shipments for energy. Iran sees control over the strait as essential leverage while its economy faces US pressure.

The scale explains the stakes. Before the war, about 17.1 million barrels crossed the strait each day. By late September, flows still averaged about 13.1 million barrels daily. Iran has insisted that if it cannot export its own oil, neighboring countries should not be able to export theirs either.

The United States says free navigation in international waters is inviolable. Gulf states share that position because their trade depends heavily on the route. Any sustained disruption could reduce available oil, lift prices, increase shipping risks, and intensify the confrontation among Iran, Washington, and regional governments.

Fewer safe crossings mean fewer barrels reach buyers on schedule. That can tighten the market because traders must compete for a smaller available supply. Even before a physical shortage appears, the risk of delayed cargoes can raise prices as buyers and sellers prepare for disruption.

The article links more than a dozen shipping strikes with reduced oil traffic and crude prices above $100 a barrel. Flows averaged about 13.1 million barrels per day at the end of September, down from 17.1 million before the war. On one Tuesday, only seven tankers crossed the strait.

The effect depends on how long the disruption lasts and whether ships can use other routes. Identification systems being switched off also make the figures uncertain. If attacks continue, supplies could become less reliable and prices could remain elevated. If traffic recovers, some of that pressure could ease, though the article does not provide a forecast.

Iran can disrupt shipping without permanently closing Hormuz. It can threaten vessels, fire projectiles, lay or claim mines, issue radio orders, or use naval forces to control routes. These methods create uncertainty. Ship operators may delay voyages, leave anchorages, switch routes, or turn off identification systems to avoid detection.

The article gives several examples. An outbound tanker reported being hit by an unknown projectile and catching fire. The IRGC said a supertanker suffered a massive explosion after striking a naval mine. Iranian forces also warned six vessels near Ras al Khaimah to raise anchor, leave immediately, and move toward Dubai anchorage.

Mines matter because they can remain dangerous after being placed. Missiles or projectiles can damage ships directly. Radio warnings can move vessels without a physical attack, while proving Iran's ability to influence nearby waters. Together, these tools reduce confidence in safe passage and help Tehran regain leverage without necessarily declaring a total closure.

Alternative routes could reduce dependence on Hormuz, but they would not automatically replace it. Some Gulf producers have pipelines leading to ports on the Red Sea or Mediterranean, and some can use export terminals outside the strait. Others might store oil, slow production, or arrange different shipping schedules. These are general energy-market options, not alternatives identified in the article.

The key mechanism is rerouting. Oil would travel overland through a pipeline or leave from a different port rather than crossing Hormuz. That avoids the maritime chokepoint, but pipelines and outside terminals have fixed capacities. They may also require suitable connections, tankers, storage, and secure routes.

The article gives no capacity figures or named alternative pipelines. Therefore, it does not show how much oil could bypass the strait. If restrictions became severe, available bypass capacity would likely be tested, leaving some exports exposed and keeping pressure on supplies and prices.

Crude oil is petroleum in its natural, unrefined form. Refineries process it into fuels and other petroleum products. It is central to modern economies, so interruptions can affect transport, industry, electricity generation, and household costs. The article focuses on crude moving by tanker through Hormuz.

The vulnerability comes from concentration. Before the war, about 17.1 million barrels crossed the strait every day. When attacks reduced that flow to about 13.1 million barrels at the end of September, crude prices stayed above $100 a barrel. A narrow route gives attackers a single place where threats can affect many shipments.

The danger is not only a complete closure. Fires, mines, warnings, or suspected attacks can make ships wait or avoid the route. On one Tuesday, only seven tankers crossed. Identification systems were also switched off by some ships, making the true traffic level uncertain. Continued disruption could therefore raise prices and unsettle global markets.