National Security: CDS urges journalists to combat AI-generated fake news

Chief of Defence Staff Olufemi Oluyede urged defence correspondents to work closely with the armed forces against AI-generated fake videos and misinformation. He described this partnership as necessary because deceptive content can threaten national security, frighten communities and weaken confidence in troops.

He asked journalists to verify sensitive operational information with Defence Headquarters before publication. He also encouraged them to use their professional platforms to explain how people can identify synthetic media and to quickly debunk fake videos wrongly attributed to the Armed Forces of Nigeria.

Oluyede further called for intelligence-led journalism rather than sensational reporting. In practice, that means accurate, technology-aware coverage that strengthens civil-military trust and counters extremist propaganda. He said the military cannot succeed alone, making responsible reporting part of the wider security effort.

A deepfake is a realistic-looking or realistic-sounding piece of synthetic media that falsely represents a person, event or statement. The report identifies AI-generated fake videos, manipulated images and cloned voices as examples of deceptive content. They matter because audiences may mistake artificial material for authentic evidence.

In general, artificial intelligence can study patterns in genuine video, images or speech, then generate or alter material to imitate them. It may reproduce a person’s appearance, facial movements or voice, making false words or actions seem credible. This explanation uses established knowledge beyond the article’s brief description.

The report links such material to psychological warfare. It says deepfakes can mislead the public, discredit troops and incite fear. That is why the CDS wants journalists to verify claims, expose fabricated content and help people recognise synthetic media before sharing it.

The report identifies three specific forms of deceptive media: AI-generated fake videos, manipulated images and cloned voices. These forms can make false events, statements or identities appear authentic. Their shared danger is that they exploit trust in familiar people, visual evidence and recorded sound.

The CDS also mentions false operational claims being circulated to mislead the public. Unlike the three media forms, an operational claim is a false assertion about military activity or events. It may be spread alongside synthetic video, altered images or copied voices to give a misleading story greater apparent credibility.

The article presents all of these materials as part of a wider security problem. They can incite fear, discredit troops and undermine national security efforts. The military therefore wants journalists to verify sensitive information, debunk false content promptly and teach the public how to identify synthetic media.

A fake video can create immediate confusion about what is happening during a security operation. If people believe it shows real military actions, casualties or threats, they may panic or make decisions based on false information. The report says such content can also endanger troops and undo months of operational gains.

The key mechanism is the rapid spread of a convincing false narrative. A fabricated video can be presented as evidence, then repeated through professional or public channels before it is checked. The CDS says these videos are deliberately circulated to incite fear, discredit troops and undermine security efforts.

Trust is the broader casualty. Deepfakes can erode confidence in the Armed Forces and rupture the bond between the military and citizens. Once that bond weakens, cooperation becomes harder. The CDS therefore treats fake videos as weapons of psychological warfare, not merely harmless misinformation.

Journalists can reduce the harm from synthetic media by checking sensitive military claims with Defence Headquarters before publication. Verification helps prevent false operational information from being repeated as fact. It also gives the public a clearer, more reliable account during moments of uncertainty.

The CDS asked defence correspondents to lend their professional platforms to public education. They can explain warning signs of synthetic media, identify content falsely attributed to the Armed Forces and promptly publish corrections or debunks. Their role is not only to report events, but also to help audiences judge information responsibly.

The article connects this work to intelligence-led journalism. Reporting should move beyond sensational headlines and become informed and technology-aware. That approach can strengthen civil-military trust, counter extremist propaganda and protect national security. The military’s open-door policy is intended to support timely and accurate information sharing with correspondents.

The CDS said modern battles are no longer won by firepower alone. They also depend on superior information, real-time intelligence, technological dominance, cyber resilience and control of the narrative space. This reflects warfare that operates across physical, digital and informational domains.

The Armed Forces of Nigeria is investing in space-based surveillance, geospatial intelligence, AI-enabled decision support and joint intelligence fusion. The article also cites modular earth observation outposts, a Defence Space School and advanced surveillance systems. These tools help commanders understand events, share information and support decisions across operations.

The shift means a force must be combat-ready, intelligence-driven and technology-enabled. It must protect citizens while countering adversaries in several arenas. The CDS’s warning about deepfakes shows that information itself can become a security target. Future operations will therefore require both military capability and stronger control of reliable information.

Information warfare is conflict conducted through information, narratives and communication rather than physical force alone. Psychological warfare specifically seeks to affect people’s confidence, emotions or behaviour. The CDS described deepfakes as weapons designed to erode trust, incite fear, discredit troops and disrupt the relationship between the military and citizens.

A convincing fake video can make a false claim look like evidence. It can spread a story that troops have failed, an operation has changed or a community faces danger. When people accept that story, they may panic or lose confidence in official security efforts. The article says such content can also endanger troops and reverse operational gains.

Public trust is therefore a security resource. Citizens who trust reliable information are more able to cooperate with authorities and resist extremist propaganda. Oluyede said the military cannot succeed alone. He identified responsible journalism, cooperation and civil-military synergy as indispensable to defending Nigeria.