Machete-wielding men at IRGC-backed rally revive scrutiny of crackdowns

On October 1, an IRGC-backed gathering called "Jan-Fadayan" took place in Isfahan. The name means "Those Willing to Sacrifice Their Lives." Iranian state media said Basij members, religious organizations and others attended. Organizers presented it as a demonstration of public readiness and mobilization capabilities.

Images showed men carrying machetes and swords. Lawyer Ali Mojtahedzadeh called this a "show of force with weapons" and asked local security authorities to explain why it was allowed. The weapons made the event appear more threatening than a normal political or religious gathering.

The images also recalled earlier accounts of unofficial armed groups confronting protesters. Former officials and IRGC commanders have described recruiting criminals, thugs and other civilians during crackdowns. Those accounts included the 1999 student protests, the 2009 unrest and demonstrations in 2017, 2018 and 2019. The article does not establish who every man in Isfahan was or whether they attacked anyone.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC, is Iran's Revolutionary Guards organization. The Basij is a paramilitary force associated with the IRGC. In this article, the IRGC appears as the senior security and political institution behind the Isfahan rally, while Basij members are among the people mobilized there.

The distinction matters because the article describes different layers of force. IRGC commanders directed security operations and organized units during past unrest. The Basij supplied large numbers of members. In December 2009, Hossein Hamedani said about 45,000 Basij members were deployed during preparations for Ashura.

The article does not provide a full legal or organizational description of either body. It does show their practical roles in the events discussed. The Isfahan gathering included Basij members, religious organizations and others, and was described by organizers as a display of readiness. Earlier accounts connect IRGC commanders to recruiting and organizing unofficial groups.

The reported figures show several layers of mobilization, not one confirmed total. Ali Hashemi said approximately 250 people described as "thugs and hooligans" were organized during the 1999 student protests. Hossein Hamedani later said the IRGC identified about 5,000 people who had taken part in disturbances.

Hamedani said those 5,000 people were initially kept home during planned protests, then some were recruited into three battalions. He said these battalions confronted unrest during Ashura in December 2009. He also said about 45,000 Basij members were deployed at the same time. The figures describe different groups and should not be added automatically.

Other reported numbers provide further scale. About 30 religious groups were mobilized in Tehran during the Ashura preparations. Former IRGC commander Mohammad Ali Jafari later credited Hamedani with organizing approximately 100,000 local fighters in Syria. The article gives no single total for all forces involved in every crackdown.

During the July 1999 student protests, Ali Hashemi said about 250 people described as "thugs and hooligans" were organized after attacks on Tehran University dormitories. He said that experience later became a model for using similar groups during the mass demonstrations after Iran's disputed 2009 presidential election.

Hossein Hamedani gave the clearest account of the mechanism. He said the IRGC identified about 5,000 people who were not tied to political parties or movements, then recruited some into three battalions. He said they were trained to handle blades and machetes and deployed alongside roughly 45,000 Basij members during the 2009 Ashura unrest.

Ali Hashemi also said people with criminal records were used to beat detainees at Kahrizak detention center, with judicial authorization. He said similar individuals were deployed during protests in 2017, 2018 and November 2019. These accounts come from former officials and commanders, while some claims remain allegations rather than independently verified findings.

Formal security forces are publicly identifiable, but unofficial or semi-official groups can operate with less visible institutional responsibility. The article describes a long-running pattern in which people called criminals, thugs or religious participants were allegedly used alongside Iran's formal forces. That makes the Isfahan images politically significant.

The October 1 rally included Basij members, religious organizations and other participants. Men carrying machetes and swords appeared in footage and images. Lawyer Ali Mojtahedzadeh called it a "show of force with weapons" and asked local security authorities why the display had been permitted. The event was presented as public readiness and mobilization.

Earlier statements make the concern broader than one rally. Hamedani described recruiting people into battalions during the 2009 unrest. Hashemi described similar deployments later. The article does not prove the Isfahan men were part of those earlier structures, but the images renew questions about armed mobilization, command relationships and official accountability during future protests.

For the Isfahan rally, Iranian state media identified participants broadly as Basij members, religious organizations and others. The article does not name the men shown carrying machetes and swords. It also does not establish whether they belonged to a formal unit, a religious group, an unofficial network or another organization.

Earlier groups had different reported descriptions. Ali Hashemi referred to about 250 "thugs and hooligans" in 1999 and later to people with criminal records. Hossein Hamedani described approximately 5,000 people who had participated in disturbances but were not members of political parties or movements. He said some were recruited into three battalions under IRGC direction.

Claims about clerics during the 2022 protests are less certain. Former lawmaker Mohammad Ashrafi Esfahani accused men linked to Alireza Panahian of attacking protesters with knives and machetes in civilian clothes. The allegations arose during a dispute and have not been independently verified. The article therefore shows reported links, not proven identities.

A state's formal security forces are recognized institutions such as the IRGC, with established commanders and official duties. Unofficial or semi-official armed groups are less clearly presented as state units. They may include civilians, religious groups or people described as criminals. The article focuses on how these categories can appear together during unrest.

In 2009, IRGC commander Hossein Hamedani said about 5,000 people were identified, and some were recruited into three battalions. He described training fighters accustomed to handling blades and machetes. About 45,000 Basij members were also deployed. This illustrates formal commanders organizing additional forces around a protest response.

Using both types can increase the people available for mobilization and make the boundary of responsibility harder to read. However, the article does not explicitly state the government's reasons in those terms. It documents reported recruitment, coordination and deployment, while leaving the wider question of accountability open. The Isfahan rally renewed that question because armed men appeared publicly.