How Nepal’s provinces have become ‘factories’ for ministers

Nepal’s provinces have become “factories” for ministers because Cabinets are repeatedly expanded and reshuffled. More lawmakers receive ministerial jobs, not necessarily because portfolios match urgent public needs, but because parties need to preserve alliances. This matters because political bargaining can displace governing and development work.

Since the assemblies began their current terms in January 2023, 301 of 550 provincial lawmakers have served as ministers or state ministers. In Sudurpaschim, 41 of 53 lawmakers have held office. Santosh Kumar Pandey was appointed to his fourth portfolio in Lumbini after defying his party to support a government.

The system is driven by coalition arithmetic. New partners expect Cabinet seats, while excluded lawmakers demand their turn. Governments grow, collapse and reform as federal alliances shift. The article says the result is stalled budgets, disrupted services, medicine shortages and unfinished projects, damaging confidence in federalism.

Since Nepal’s current provincial assemblies began their terms in January 2023, 301 of the country’s 550 provincial lawmakers have served as ministers or state ministers. That is about 55 percent, or more than half of all provincial legislators. The figure shows how common ministerial appointments have become.

The provincial differences are striking. Sudurpaschim has seen 41 of 53 lawmakers hold ministerial office, more than three in four. Karnali has had 26 of 40 ministers, while Koshi has had 64 of 93. Gandaki has had 30 of 60, and Bagmati and Madhesh each stand at about 45 percent.

The number may rise before the assemblies finish their terms. Governments continue to form and collapse, creating pressure to bring more lawmakers into Cabinets. Coalition partners expect posts, and lawmakers left out often seek their turn, making ministerial office part of political survival.

Most of Nepal’s provinces lack a single-party majority. Their governments therefore depend on coalitions, and those coalitions are often held together by Cabinet positions. Ministerial posts become bargaining tools. Parties use them to attract partners, satisfy competing factions and prevent lawmakers from withdrawing support.

When a new ally joins, it expects a share of the ministry posts. Lawmakers who were previously excluded may also demand their turn. Governments are consequently enlarged, reshuffled and enlarged again. The article describes this cycle as a response to coalition compulsions rather than a planned approach to administration.

The political cost is substantial. Horse-trading can stall budgets, disrupt public services and leave development projects unfinished. The pressure is unlikely to ease while governments continue changing. More lawmakers may receive ministerial office before the current provincial assemblies complete their terms, deepening the provinces’ reputation as “factories” for ministers.

Nepal’s provincial coalitions often mirror the federal power balance in Kathmandu. When parties change sides or form a new alliance nationally, their provincial partners face pressure to follow. Provincial governments are therefore shaped not only by local election results, but also by decisions made in the federal capital.

Karnali provides a clear example. Yam Lal Kandel became chief minister in April 2024 with a UML and Maoist Centre coalition. After Kathmandu’s coalition changed about four months later, he agreed to share the post with the Nepali Congress for half a term and secured a second vote of confidence on August 5, 2024. Mangal Bahadur Shahi replaced him on July 28, 2026.

The mechanism is political alignment. A new alliance needs votes and rewards supporters with ministerial positions. Each federal shift can therefore trigger provincial Cabinet changes, expanded ministries and leadership deals. The article concludes that provincial governments often reflect Kathmandu’s balance of power more than distinct provincial mandates.

Repeated government changes make it harder for provinces to maintain steady administration. Political leaders spend time rebuilding coalitions and reallocating ministerial posts, while budgets and public programmes wait. The article reports that hospitals have been left short of medicine and ordinary public services have been disrupted.

Development projects suffer the same instability. Political horse-trading stalls budgets, and projects that have already started can remain half-built. Without consistent decisions, funding or oversight, unfinished work is left on the brink of decay. These effects are not abstract: they are costs paid by citizens who depend on provincial services.

The article links the disruption to frequent Cabinet expansion, reshuffling and government collapse. More ministerial bargaining is expected while coalitions remain unstable. If this continues, provinces may bring more lawmakers into government but deliver less consistent administration, further undermining public confidence in federalism and its promise of locally focused development.

Nepal’s provinces were created to bring government closer to the people. They were also meant to guide development according to local needs. This design gave provincial institutions a practical purpose: make decisions nearer to communities and respond more directly to their priorities.

The article says that purpose has been crowded out by ministerial bargaining. Because coalition partners expect Cabinet seats, provincial leaders repeatedly enlarge and reshuffle governments. Lawmakers move in and out of office as alliances change. Santosh Kumar Pandey, for example, received his fourth ministerial portfolio after helping keep a CPN-UML-led government afloat.

The result is a credibility problem. Budgets stall, services are disrupted, hospitals lack medicine and projects remain unfinished. Political analyst Khim Lal Devkota says this does not prove federalism itself has failed, but it has discredited the system by turning it into a “factory for producing ministers.”

Federalism is a system in which governmental powers are divided between a national authority and regional or provincial governments. This can improve local representation because provincial leaders are closer to communities and can shape development around local needs. Nepal’s provinces were created with that purpose.

The same division can produce instability when no party wins a provincial majority. Several parties must then cooperate to form a government. In Nepal, coalition partners often demand ministerial posts in exchange for support. Changes in Kathmandu can also reshape provincial alliances, as seen when Karnali’s coalition changed and Yam Lal Kandel agreed to share the chief minister’s post.

The current problem is not necessarily federalism itself, the article says. Political analyst Khim Lal Devkota argues that implementation and political use have discredited it. If Cabinets keep changing and services suffer, local representation may exist formally while citizens experience stalled budgets, medicine shortages and unfinished projects.