Europe must switch to 'war-mode' defence production, Polish defence minister says

A “war-mode” defence industry is a defence sector organized to produce weapons and ammunition quickly and in large quantities. It treats production capacity as an urgent security need, not simply as a normal industrial activity. Kosiniak-Kamysz says Europe must adopt this mentality to prepare to defend itself.

Russia provides the clearest example. It shifted toward wartime defence production before its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In 2025, it produced roughly seven million artillery, mortar, tank and rocket rounds. Russian forces use about 10,000 to 15,000 rounds each day in Ukraine.

Europe has increased defence spending, but its industry remains shaped by decades of underinvestment and fragmentation. The European minister argues that production must be multiplied. Without a faster, larger industrial effort, Europe could struggle to replace ammunition, support defence operations and protect future generations.

Kosiniak-Kamysz is asking European countries to multiply defence production, especially the output of ammunition and weapons. He wants Europe to adopt a “war-mode” mentality in its defence sector. His concern is that Europe must be able to defend itself rather than depend on production that cannot match a major military power’s pace.

The urgency comes from Russia’s existing production and battlefield use. Russia produced roughly seven million artillery, mortar, tank and rocket rounds in 2025. Its forces use about 10,000 to 15,000 rounds each day in their continued aggression against Ukraine. These figures show why stockpiles and factories matter.

The EU and Norway are expected to produce only two million 150mm shells this year. European countries are spending more on defence, but output still lags. Kosiniak-Kamysz warns that delaying further could become costly and negatively affect future generations.

Russia produced roughly seven million artillery, mortar, tank and rocket rounds in 2025, according to an Estonian intelligence report. The figure covers several types of ammunition. It reflects the scale of Russia’s wartime production as its forces continue their aggression against Ukraine.

By comparison, the 27 EU member states and Norway are expected to produce just two million 150mm ammunition shells this year. These figures are not perfectly identical categories: Russia’s number covers several kinds of rounds, while the European estimate concerns 150mm shells. Even so, the article uses them to show Russia’s production advantage.

The gap matters because ammunition is consumed continuously. Russian forces currently use roughly 10,000 to 15,000 rounds per day. Europe has increased defence spending, but its industry remains fragmented and marked by decades of underinvestment. The minister says production must accelerate.

Russia shifted toward wartime defence production before its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. That meant its defence sector was already moving toward higher output before the war began. The article also says Russia is projected to spend 7.5% of its gross domestic product on its armed forces in 2026.

Europe followed a different path. Its defence industry was shaped by decades of underinvestment and fragmentation. This left production capacity divided and less prepared to expand quickly. The contrast helps explain why Russia is now outpacing the EU in ammunition production.

Europe has started rearming. EU member states’ defence spending reached an estimated €418 billion in 2025, equal to 2.2% of the EU’s total GDP. Yet spending increases do not immediately create factories or ammunition. Kosiniak-Kamysz says Europe must accelerate production to prepare for self-defence.

If Europe cannot produce enough weapons and ammunition, it may struggle to prepare for or sustain its own defence. Kosiniak-Kamysz says Europe must be ready to defend itself. He describes failure to build production capacity as a costly mistake for Europeans.

The article links this risk to Russia’s faster output. Russia produced roughly seven million artillery, mortar, tank and rocket rounds in 2025. Russian forces use 10,000 to 15,000 rounds each day in Ukraine. Meanwhile, the EU and Norway are expected to produce two million 150mm shells this year. A production gap can weaken readiness.

The minister says the consequences would extend beyond the present. Failure to act would “impact” and “affect” Europeans negatively in future generations. Europe has raised defence spending, but its industry still carries the effects of underinvestment and fragmentation. Increasing production is therefore presented as urgent.

Defence spending measures how much money governments allocate, while ammunition production depends on industrial capacity. A country can increase its budget without immediately having enough factories, equipment, workers or coordinated production to make shells. The article identifies decades of underinvestment and fragmentation as major problems for Europe’s defence industry.

The figures show this difference. EU member states’ total defence spending was estimated at €418 billion in 2025, or 2.2% of the EU’s total GDP. Yet the EU’s 27 members and Norway are expected to produce only two million 150mm shells this year. Russia, by contrast, produced roughly seven million varied rounds in 2025.

Rearmament has driven the strongest annual increase in defence spending since the Cold War. However, money must translate into expanded production. Kosiniak-Kamysz says Europe must multiply defence output, not merely increase budgets, to prepare for self-defence.

Gross domestic product, or GDP, is the total value of goods and services produced within an economy over a period. It is a broad measure of economic size. Governments use it to compare defence spending across countries and across years, even when their economies differ in absolute money terms.

A defence figure expressed as a percentage of GDP shows how large the military effort is relative to the economy supporting it. For example, the article estimates EU member states’ defence spending at €418 billion in 2025, equal to 2.2% of EU GDP. Poland spent 4.7% on core defence capabilities, according to the US envoy to NATO.

This measure helps show national priority and economic burden. It does not, by itself, reveal how much ammunition factories produce. Europe can spend a larger share of GDP while still facing industrial limits caused by underinvestment and fragmentation.