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Defence & Security13 Oct 2026 · about 6 min

The Gulf has entered a new era of instability. If its leaders think they can rely on old alliances, they are wrong | Nesrine Malik

The brief

The Houthis launched a deadly attack on Saudi Arabia’s capital, Riyadh. Their missile strike hit King Khalid International Airport, killing at least 13 people and injuring 300. The article calls it a turning point because Gulf states had long expected their territory and civilian populations to remain relatively protected. That expectation had already weakened. Iran had struck an airbase in Qatar, Israel had attacked targets in Doha, and Iran later targeted Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman. The Riyadh attack added a particularly severe blow. It also showed that Yemen’s conflict was spreading directly into Saudi Arabia. The consequences reach beyond casualties. Gulf rulers fear attacks could interrupt airports, energy systems, schools and daily life. They could also damage the region’s new identity as a destination for tourism, sports, entertainment and investment. The article suggests a bloody Saudi response and deeper instability ahead.

01

What happened in Riyadh, and why does the article describe the Houthi attack as a turning point for Gulf security?

The Houthis launched a deadly attack on Saudi Arabia’s capital, Riyadh. Their missile strike hit King Khalid International Airport, killing at least 13 people and injuring 300. The article calls it a turning point because Gulf states had long expected their territory and civilian populations to remain relatively protected.

That expectation had already weakened. Iran had struck an airbase in Qatar, Israel had attacked targets in Doha, and Iran later targeted Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman. The Riyadh attack added a particularly severe blow. It also showed that Yemen’s conflict was spreading directly into Saudi Arabia.

The consequences reach beyond casualties. Gulf rulers fear attacks could interrupt airports, energy systems, schools and daily life. They could also damage the region’s new identity as a destination for tourism, sports, entertainment and investment. The article suggests a bloody Saudi response and deeper instability ahead.

02

What are the Houthis, and what do they want in Yemen?

The Houthis are a Yemeni rebel movement that emerged from a civil war beginning in 2014. They took Sana’a, Yemen’s capital, while seeking greater autonomy in minority Shia homelands. The article presents them as both an Iranian-backed force and a movement with its own domestic ambitions.

Their goals include expanding their position inside Yemen and resisting the Saudi-backed government. When the closure of the Strait of Hormuz redirected commercial traffic along Yemen’s coast, the Houthis advanced and seized territory. They wanted influence over the now crucial Bab al-Mandab strait in the Red Sea.

Their conflict with Saudi Arabia is also deeply political. Houthi leaders view the House of Saud as an imperious master they will never accept. Their attack on Riyadh was framed as retaliation for Saudi strikes on Yemeni civilian infrastructure, making local grievances central to their aims.

03

How wide has the conflict become, in terms of the Gulf countries attacked and the kinds of infrastructure targeted?

The conflict has spread across much of the Gulf. In retaliation for what Tehran viewed as support for the war against Iran struck Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman. This was not a narrowly contained exchange between armies. It reached countries that had tried to manage relations with Iran and rely on American protection.

The targets covered the systems that sustain modern life. Iran attacked military sites, energy facilities and desalination plants. Other attacks affected airports and airspace. The article also describes missiles at a Qatari airbase hosting American troops and a Houthi strike on Riyadh’s international airport.

The breadth of the attacks makes the conflict more dangerous. Damage is measured not only in destroyed facilities or deaths, but also in suspended services and disrupted trade. Schools closed for months, airports shut and normal economic activity was interrupted across the Gulf.

04

What happens to Gulf countries when attacks disrupt airports, schools, energy facilities, desalination plants and tourism?

Attacks on infrastructure disrupt the systems Gulf societies depend on every day. Energy facilities and desalination plants support economies and basic services. Airports and airspace connect residents, workers, businesses and visitors. When those systems are hit or closed, normal life can stop even without extensive physical destruction.

The article gives concrete examples. Schools were shuttered for months, airports and airspace closed, and ordinary routines were suspended. The attacks also threatened the Gulf’s effort to become a cosmopolitan international hub. Saudi Arabia and its neighbours had invested heavily in tourism, sports, entertainment and major events.

That investment now carries greater risk. Formula One, golf and boxing tournaments helped attract global attention, but cheap drones could put those projects in jeopardy. Continued attacks could reduce confidence among tourists, entrepreneurs and investors, while encouraging Gulf rulers to respond more forcefully and deepening regional instability.

05

How did Yemen’s civil war, the Saudi-led intervention in 2015 and the informal 2022 ceasefire shape the conflict now?

Yemen’s civil war began in 2014 when Iran-backed Houthi rebels took Sana’a while seeking greater autonomy in minority Shia homelands. Their advance challenged the internationally recognised government. Yemen then became a major arena for Saudi Arabia’s rivalry with the Houthis and Iran.

In 2015, a Saudi-led coalition launched a brutal campaign to remove the Houthis from captured territory. The intervention intensified the war, which killed hundreds of thousands and caused a humanitarian catastrophe. By 2022, fighting had de-escalated into an informal division: the Houthis held one side, while a Saudi-backed government represented the other.

The ceasefire was followed by rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, but the settlement remained unformalised. War against Iran in 2026 reopened strategic opportunities for the Houthis. They advanced in Yemen, sought the Bab al-Mandab strait and ultimately helped reignite direct confrontation with Saudi Arabia.

06

To what extent are the Houthis acting on Iran’s behalf, and what local goals and grievances do they pursue independently?

Iran supports the Houthis, and that support connects Yemen’s conflict to the wider confrontation between Tehran and the West. The Houthis used the 2026 war against Iran to advance their position in Yemen. This makes them an important part of Iran’s regional contest, but not simply an organisation taking orders from Tehran.

The article stresses their independent motives. They seek greater autonomy in Yemen’s minority Shia homelands and have domestic political ambitions. They also want strategic territory, including influence over the Bab al-Mandab strait after commercial traffic shifted toward Yemen’s coastline. Their hostility toward the House of Saud is especially sharp.

A senior Houthi official said the Riyadh attack was meant to show that Saudi Arabia had targeted Yemeni civilian infrastructure. That statement reveals the group’s own grievance: it portrays the Saudi-backed war as proof that Riyadh treats Yemeni lives as cheap. Iran’s backing therefore amplifies local aims rather than replacing them.

07

What is a US security umbrella, and why might an alliance deter some attacks without guaranteeing a country’s sovereignty or safety?

A US security umbrella is a general term for protection created by American military alliances, forces, commitments and deterrence. The source does not define the term, so this explanation uses established international-relations knowledge. Its purpose is to make potential attackers fear that aggression could bring an American response.

The article shows why that protection is incomplete. Qatar hosted American troops, yet Iran still fired missiles at an airbase there. Gulf countries also faced strikes on military sites, energy facilities, desalination plants and airports. Alliances may reduce risks, but they cannot physically shield every site or prevent every hostile decision.

Sovereignty is therefore not automatically secure under an alliance. Protection depends on political choices, warning systems, military capacity and how far an ally will act. The article describes an older expectation that Gulf lives and sovereignty were safeguarded through US alliances and managed relations with Iran. That expectation has now been badly weakened.

This brief was written by AI from the original reporting and checked by other models. Names, figures and quotes come from the source; read it for full context.

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