Russia funnels nearly half its budget into defence, cutting social spending

Russia’s draft 2027 budget assigns 44% of federal spending to defence and security. That is the highest share on record and roughly double the allocation for social programmes. The contrast shows how strongly the continuing war shapes national priorities.

Social policy spending is planned to fall from 7.1 trillion roubles to 6.65 trillion, a 7% decrease. It covers pensions, veterans’ payments, maternity benefits and other support. By contrast, the national defence section, which includes payments to servicemen and their families, will rise by about a quarter.

The shift comes as military expenditure has already reached 17 trillion roubles this year, well above the 12.1 trillion originally budgeted. Parliament is due to examine the draft on 22 October. United Russia’s constitutional majority makes major changes unlikely before approval.

The two categories represent different kinds of government responsibility. Defence and security is the war-related side of the budget. The article says federal payments to servicemen and their families are recorded under the “national defence” section, whose spending will rise by roughly a quarter.

Social policy is the civilian support category. It includes pensions, payments to veterans, maternity benefits and other social assistance. Regional civilian programmes also include foster-parent payments, support for large families, low-income households, families with disabled children, orphan housing repairs and labour veterans’ support.

The article does not provide a complete list of everything inside either broad federal heading. It does show the priorities clearly: defence and security takes 44% of planned federal spending, while social policy falls to 6.65 trillion roubles. Healthcare is discussed separately and is also projected to decline.

Redirecting money to war payments leaves less for ordinary public support. The federal budget plans a 7% cut in social policy spending, while healthcare is projected by independent Russian media to fall 6.8%, although the Finance Ministry disputes that calculation. These reductions affect the funds available for civilian needs.

The regional examples are direct. Arkhangelsk moved more than 63 million roubles from foster-parent payments and large-family support. Tula shifted 54 million from foster children, low-income households, families with disabled children, orphan housing repairs and labour veterans’ support to servicemen and death compensation.

The effects are uneven but tangible. St Petersburg has prepared cuts to education, transport repairs and medical projects while increasing servicemen’s payments. Healthcare is due to receive 28.6 trillion roubles over three years, compared with 50 trillion for the military, showing the wider trade-off.

Russia’s regions are not only carrying out federal policy; they also help fund war-related payments. Many regional budgets are already running deficits. The article describes this pressure as forcing local authorities to reduce civilian spending and redirect available money toward soldiers and their families.

In Arkhangelsk, more than 63 million roubles earmarked for social support was moved to one-off war payments and death compensation. Tula shifted 54 million roubles from support for foster children, poor households, disabled children’s families, orphan housing and labour veterans. St Petersburg has prepared similar changes.

The immediate reason is the cost of regional war obligations. Regions sharply increased death payments and recruitment-related benefits earlier in the war, and these schemes now require funding. As budgets tighten, civilian programmes become a source of money. The article shows no sign that this pressure is easing before the 2027 budget takes effect.

The federal government sets the national direction through the Finance Ministry’s draft budget. It proposes the 2027–2029 spending plan, including the record 44% allocation for defence and security. Federal payments to servicemen and their families are recorded within the national defence section.

Parliament must approve the federal budget. The State Duma is due to begin examining it on 22 October. President Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party won an absolute constitutional majority in September’s elections, so the article expects major amendments to be unlikely before passage.

Regional authorities control separate decisions over regional funds. They have redirected money from foster care, family support, orphan housing and other programmes to servicemen’s payments and compensation for the dead. Thus, Moscow sets the federal framework, parliament votes, and regions make additional local choices under financial pressure.

Regional death payments rose sharply in 2022 and 2023 because regions competed to attract recruits for the war. These payments were supplements to the federal compensation given to families of troops killed in action. Recruitment incentives therefore became a regional financial commitment, not only a federal one.

The article gives striking reductions. Ulyanovsk’s payment fell from 1 million roubles to 50,000. Bashkortostan’s dropped from 2 million to no more than 100,000. Kirov and Omsk halved payments from 1 million to 500,000, while Saratov cut its payment to one tenth of the previous amount.

The article links the cuts to mounting budget pressure. Regional governments are diverting funds from civilian programmes, and many regions already run deficits. Some families also receive nothing when soldiers are classified as missing or deserters rather than confirmed dead, making eligibility another way compensation is withheld.

Inflation reduces the purchasing power of money. If prices rise faster than a benefit, recipients can afford fewer goods and services with the same payment. An official increase therefore does not automatically mean families are better off in real terms.

Russia’s government has pledged to index pensions and other payments against inflation. But the article says the official inflation rate has exceeded 8% for much of the past two years. Independent economists put the real figure higher, so an increase based on the official rate may still lag behind households’ actual costs.

This matters alongside the budget cuts. Social policy spending is falling 7%, while healthcare is also projected to receive less. The planned 10 trillion rouble children’s budget offers support, but its ratio to defence spending is one to five. Families may therefore face both weaker purchasing power and tighter services.