Pakistan Is Treating Every Grievance as Terrorism, and It’s Failing

Treating a grievance as terrorism means responding to a political complaint as if it were an armed security threat. The state then prioritizes surveillance, arrests, bans, and force instead of negotiation, representation, or legal remedy. This matters because peaceful dissent can become criminalized, while the original grievance remains unresolved.

Pakistan’s authorities have applied this logic to several movements. The Baloch Yakjehti Committee opposed enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings, yet its leader Mahrang Baloch received a life sentence from an anti-terrorism court. The Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee was designated a proscribed organization after economic and political protests. These actions use security laws to narrow legitimate political space.

The article links this approach to worsening alienation, especially among Baloch, Pashtuns, and Kashmiris. When institutions appear unsafe or inaccessible, citizens may stop taking complaints to courts, Parliament, or media. The article warns that such pressure can push youths toward violent insurgency rather than resolving the causes of conflict.

Pakistan has recently used exceptional security measures against opposition figures and grassroots movements across three regions. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, President Asif Ali Zardari declared an emergency, suspended the government led by Sohail Afridi, and media reports said Afridi was arrested and became untraceable. Security forces also blocked roads with shipping containers to stop Imran Khan supporters reaching Islamabad.

In Balochistan, Mahrang Baloch and activist Sibghatullah received life sentences from an anti-terrorism court over an alleged protest-related killing. Authorities also confronted the Baloch Yakjehti Committee. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the government targeted the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement and tried to ban its leadership, including Manzoor Pashteen.

In Pakistan-administered Kashmir, authorities designated the Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee a proscribed organization. The article presents these cases as different disputes handled through a common security approach. It says this has weakened political channels for ethnic minorities and intensified concerns about disappearances, due process, and representation.

The article describes Pakistan’s security crisis as both widespread and severe. The Global Terrorism Index ranked Pakistan the country most affected by terrorism in 2025. It recorded 1,045 terrorist incidents and 1,139 deaths. Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa suffered the greatest impact, according to the figures cited.

The article also cites the Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies, an Islamabad-based think tank. It documented 606 deaths and 232 injuries from militant attacks and counter-militancy operations in July 2026 alone. That was described as the deadliest month of the year to date. Most of those killed were militants, with 401 deaths identified in the text.

These figures show that security operations have not ended the violence. The crisis combines militant attacks, counter-militancy operations, and political conflict. The article argues that repression can deepen grievances in affected regions, particularly among Baloch and Pashtun communities, making lasting stability harder to achieve.

When peaceful complaints meet arrests, disappearances, or force, people may lose faith in courts, elections, Parliament, and the media. That weakens the rule of law because citizens no longer expect institutions to hear them fairly. It can also make governments appear to be protecting power rather than addressing poverty, discrimination, or abuse.

Balochistan provides the article’s clearest example. The state responded to dissent and social, economic, and political grievances through arrests, enforced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings. The article says these policies pushed thousands of youths toward a violent insurgency. Similar pressure now appears in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Pakistan-administered Kashmir.

The immediate effect may be blocked roads, banned organizations, or fewer public protests. The longer-term effect can be deeper alienation and more violence. The article says citizens on the periphery have little reason to take complaints to national institutions. Without credible political channels, security crises can become harder to resolve.

The Fourth Schedule was intended for terrorism, but the article says authorities also use it against lawyers, journalists, and political opponents. The controversial Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, or PECA, is frequently used against activists and journalists. This expands security law into speech and political activity, making criticism carry serious legal risks.

The article gives the case of human rights lawyers Imaan Zainab Mazari-Hazir and Hadi Ali Chattha. An Islamabad court sentenced them over social media posts the state called anti-state. Their sentences totaled 17 years and were to run concurrently, meaning they were expected to serve 10 years. The Supreme Court later suspended the sentences and granted bail.

Their release did not end the pressure. Authorities rearrested them within hours in an earlier protest case. The example shows how legal processes can continue restricting people even after a court grants relief. The article connects these practices with pressure on Parliament, the judiciary, and media after the 2024 elections.

The article does not specifically assess border fencing, military operations, or airstrikes, so it cannot establish which of those measures failed or why. It does show a broader problem: Pakistan repeatedly treats political and social grievances mainly through a security lens. That approach may disrupt violence temporarily, but it does not automatically address the causes of conflict.

The article points to Balochistan, where arrests, enforced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings accompanied responses to political and economic grievances. It says these policies pushed thousands of youths toward violent insurgency. It also describes pressure on movements in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Kashmir, where demands included ethnic rights and economic and political change.

From these facts, the article’s central implication is clear: force without representation can deepen alienation. A complete strategy would need credible political channels and lawful treatment, alongside security efforts. The article does not provide separate evidence about fencing or airstrikes, so their specific effectiveness cannot be judged from the supplied text.

The rule of law means government power is limited by publicly known laws, fair procedures, and accountable courts. It requires authorities to protect rights even when dealing with unpopular opponents. Independent courts matter because they can test arrests, sentences, and bans without simply following the government’s security claims.

The article shows why this matters through the disappearance of Sohail Afridi, who had been Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s chief minister. It also describes lawyers calling Mahrang Baloch’s prison proceedings a faceless trial after boycotting them. In another case, the Supreme Court suspended sentences against Imaan Mazari-Hazir and Hadi Chattha, but authorities soon rearrested them.

Civil rights and political representation create peaceful routes for resolving disputes. Parliament, courts, media, and elected governments can expose abuses and negotiate solutions. The article says those institutions have faced intense pressure since the 2024 elections. If citizens lose access to them, especially minorities in peripheral regions, conflict and militancy may intensify.