Trial without accused: Supreme Court quashes murder conviction over violation of mandatory safeguard

The Supreme Court cancelled both Mandavi’s conviction and the Chhattisgarh High Court judgment that upheld it. The reason was procedural, not a finding that the allegations were disproved. The court held that recording evidence without the accused violated a mandatory safeguard and invalidated the entire trial.

Mandavi had been convicted of murder under Section 302 of the IPC and a Chhattisgarh law concerning witchcraft-related harassment. The trial court relied partly on two witnesses who said he attacked Somaru with an axe. Their evidence was recorded while Mandavi was absent, although he was in custody.

The Supreme Court ordered a de novo trial. Every witness must be examined again in Mandavi’s presence under the prescribed procedure. Because he had spent nine years in custody, the court also ordered his immediate release on bail, with conditions set by the trial court.

Section 273 of the Code of Criminal Procedure sets a basic rule for recording evidence during a criminal trial or other proceeding. Evidence must be taken in the presence of the accused. This allows the accused to hear the testimony being used against him during the case.

The provision recognizes one exception. If the court has dispensed with the accused’s personal attendance, evidence may be recorded in the presence of his lawyer. The exception did not apply to Mandavi because he was in custody, and the court found no order dispensing with his personal attendance.

The Supreme Court therefore held that the witnesses’ evidence should have been recorded while Mandavi was present. The article describes this requirement as mandatory. Because it was not followed, the court declared the entire trial vitiated and ordered all witnesses to testify afresh.

A criminal trial must follow the procedure that protects the accused while evidence is collected and tested. Section 273 requires evidence to be recorded in the accused’s presence unless the court has formally dispensed with personal attendance. The safeguard matters because testimony can directly support a conviction.

In Mandavi’s case, two prosecution witnesses attributed the axe assault to him. Their statements were recorded without him present. The Supreme Court noted that Mandavi was in custody, so there was no question of his personal attendance having been dispensed with. The district jail was also only about three kilometres from the court.

The court therefore placed responsibility on the prosecution and rejected the idea that this was a minor omission. Since evidence was taken contrary to the mandatory procedure, the entire trial stood vitiated. The conviction and appeal judgment were set aside, and every witness must now be examined afresh.

The case involved a lengthy period of custody and a short physical distance between the jail and the courtroom. Mandavi had spent nine years in custody by the time the Supreme Court considered his challenge. This made the court’s concern about the missed safeguard especially serious.

The district jail was barely three kilometres from the trial court. Mandavi was not a person whose location made production unusually difficult. The Supreme Court emphasized that the prosecution could have produced him when the witnesses’ statements were recorded, particularly because he was being held in custody.

These facts shaped the court’s response. It rejected the suggestion that the absence could be overlooked because his lawyer had not objected. The court ordered a fresh trial, with all witnesses examined in Mandavi’s presence. It also directed his immediate release on bail, subject to conditions imposed by the trial court.

A de novo trial means starting the trial afresh rather than simply correcting one defective step. Earlier evidence cannot serve as the final basis in the same way when the original proceedings were legally vitiated. The fresh process must follow the required safeguards.

For Mandavi, the Supreme Court directed the trial court to examine all witnesses afresh in his presence. This includes the prosecution witnesses whose earlier testimony attributed the axe assault to him. The order concerns the whole trial, not only selected statements or one witness.

The new trial will take place after the Supreme Court set aside the trial court’s conviction and the High Court judgment. The court also ordered Mandavi’s immediate release on bail, subject to conditions imposed by the trial court. The prosecution will therefore have to present its evidence again under the prescribed procedure.

The Supreme Court treated the accused’s presence as a responsibility shared by the prosecution and the court process, not as something the defence had to secure alone. Mandavi was in custody, and the district jail was barely three kilometres from the trial court. The prosecution could therefore have arranged his production when evidence was recorded.

The state relied on Atma Ram v State of Rajasthan, where the defence lawyer had objected to witnesses being examined without the accused. In Mandavi’s case, no similar objection was raised. The state argued that this difference mattered.

The bench rejected that reasoning. It said nothing prevented the prosecution from producing Mandavi, especially when witnesses were being heard behind his back. His lack of legal awareness and limited resources also mattered to the court’s understanding of the case. A mandatory safeguard could not be bypassed simply because counsel failed to object.

An accused person’s presence during testimony is a basic fair-trial safeguard because the evidence may determine whether he is convicted. In Mandavi’s case, the Supreme Court stressed that he had to be present to hear the evidence against him. The rule also recognizes his position as someone facing serious criminal allegations.

The practical example was direct. Two prosecution witnesses said Mandavi had attacked Somaru with an axe, but their evidence was recorded while Mandavi was absent. He was in custody, and no order had dispensed with his personal attendance. His lawyer’s failure to object did not change those facts.

The court’s response shows the safeguard’s force. It declared the entire trial vitiated, cancelled the conviction, and ordered all witnesses to be examined again in Mandavi’s presence. The fresh trial must use the prescribed procedure, while Mandavi was ordered released on bail subject to conditions.