France is on the precipice of a far-right landslide

The National Rally is the French political movement led by Marine Le Pen. The article presents it as a far-right party campaigning around immigration and Islam. Le Pen is its leading candidate because she has regained control after a major internal and judicial crisis. Her conviction in a corruption scandal almost prevented her from seeking office.

Before the final ruling, her second-in-command, Jordan Bardella, tried to position himself as the strongest presidential candidate. He believed Le Pen’s legal problems could become an electoral weakness. Instead, she fired his closest associates inside the party. Bardella is now described as being fully at her mercy and possibly losing the party presidency to Le Pen’s nephew, Marion Marechal.

Le Pen’s restored authority matters because polls identify her as the likely first-round leader and the second-round favourite. The article says she has launched her 2027 campaign around immigration and Islam. It also says she plans referendums on immigration restrictions and banning the hijab in public spaces.

In this article, “far-right” refers to movements that combine supremacist ideas with authoritarian intent and aggressive opposition to immigration and Islam. The National Rally is presented as part of a broader Western movement shaped by Islamophobic culture wars. Its proposed policies would use state power to impose majoritarian restrictions on Muslims and migrants.

The article points to Le Pen’s planned referendums as concrete examples. One would ask voters to approve restrictions on immigration. The other would ask whether to ban the hijab in public spaces. The author argues that these votes could turn structural racism and Islamophobia into officially approved law.

“Landslide” is not a polling figure supplied in the article. It is the headline’s description of the possible scale of a National Rally victory. The text says Le Pen is expected to lead the first round and is currently favoured in the second, while comparing France with recent advances by Trump, Meloni, and Germany’s AfD.

According to the article, Le Pen’s polling position is unusually strong. Polls identify her as the expected first-round leader and the favourite for the second round, regardless of who reaches it with her. The text therefore presents the 2027 race as hers to lose.

The two-round structure explains why both findings matter. In the first round, several candidates compete, so Le Pen can lead without winning a majority. The leading candidates then proceed to a second vote. In that contest, voters choose between the finalists, and Le Pen’s reported advantage suggests she could defeat whichever rival emerges.

This does not make victory certain. Polls measure current expectations, not final results. Still, the article argues that Le Pen’s position is stronger than in earlier campaigns because she has re-established control over the National Rally and is benefiting from a political climate focused on immigration, Islam, and the wider rise of far-right movements.

France’s presidential election uses a two-round system. In the first round, multiple candidates compete. If no candidate wins the required majority, the leading candidates move to a second round. The second vote decides the presidency between those finalists. The article assumes this structure but does not explain its mechanics.

That means a candidate can lead the first round without becoming president. Le Pen might receive more votes than every other candidate while still falling short of the majority needed to win outright. Her first-round result would secure a place in the runoff, not the presidency itself.

The second round is therefore decisive. Le Pen’s reported strength is especially significant because polls also favour her in that final contest, regardless of the opponent. The article frames this as a sign of an unusually durable advantage. However, a projected lead is not the same as a completed victory, since voters, campaigns, and alliances can change before the final vote.

Le Pen plans two referendums. One would ask whether French voters support her plan to restrict immigration. The other would ask whether the hijab should be banned in public spaces. These votes would seek popular approval for policies the article describes as structurally racist and Islamophobic.

The proposed hijab referendum is especially significant for Muslims. If approved and implemented, it could limit when and where Muslim women may wear the hijab. The article connects this proposal to France’s existing restrictions and describes it as a possible final blow to Muslims’ freedom of religion. It also presents the measure as linked to nostalgia for France’s colonial past.

The consequences would extend beyond one clothing rule. A successful referendum could give majoritarian legitimacy to broader restrictions on Muslims and migrants. The article therefore treats the proposal as part of a wider political shift, in which Islamophobic measures are adopted faster and backed by entire societies. It does not specify the exact legal process or penalties that would follow.

Jean-Luc Mélenchon may appear to some Muslim voters as an alternative because his France Unbowed party has taken a strongly pro-Palestinian position. During Israel’s actions in Gaza, the article says it was the only party to firmly oppose them. It also backed Palestinian candidate Rima Hassan for the European Parliament.

That position contrasts sharply with Mélenchon’s earlier record. He endorsed the 2004 ban on the hijab in French public schools and later supported the niqab ban. He referred to veiled Muslim women as “ghosts.” He was also a strong supporter of Bashar al-Assad during the Syrian civil war. These positions explain why his apparent change is surprising.

From 2023 onward, his pro-Palestinian stance gave his party renewed momentum and revived his presidential ambitions. He later called his former opposition to the hijab a “terrible mistake.” Yet the article reports that he promised not to repeal the 2004 ban, suggesting that his new position may remain limited and politically cautious.

The article describes a long shift in what French politics can openly discuss. It links today’s movements to the post-9/11 “war on terror,” whose forces are portrayed as mature political offspring. It also connects proposed restrictions to France’s colonial past and to nostalgia for that past. Together, these histories help frame Muslims as a permanent political problem.

Media repetition is presented as the key mechanism. When mainstream outlets repeatedly push one narrative, even a false one, the Overton window can expand. Ideas once treated as unacceptable then become normal subjects for campaigns, referendums, and legislation. Le Pen’s focus on immigration and Islam is offered as a clear example of this process.

The article places France within a wider Western pattern involving Trump, Meloni, and Germany’s AfD. It argues that Islamophobic culture wars have helped far-right movements gain confidence and public space. If this trend continues, measures such as a hijab referendum could move from fringe demands to policies backed by broad majorities.