‘Not middle power, but power in the middle’: EAM S Jaishankar on India's global position

Jaishankar is rejecting a ranking that places India among countries with limited influence. “Power in the middle” presents India as an important actor located within changing global relationships, not simply a country between stronger and weaker powers.

He links “middle power” to Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s phrase: countries “who have the power to empower.” India, however, is the world’s most populous country, has GDP of $4 trillion, give or take, and has substantial growth ahead. Those facts make the label feel too narrow.

This wording matters because Jaishankar wants India’s role understood through what it can contribute and shape. He also said middle powers may independently set interests and policies, then make arrangements with one another. India’s position, in his view, should not be reduced to a fixed category.

India considers “middle power” limiting because the phrase can suggest a fixed, intermediate position. Jaishankar points instead to India’s size, economic base, and future possibilities. He argues that a country with immense scale should not be defined mainly by what it lacks compared with the strongest powers.

The article identifies three reasons. India is the most populous country in the world. Its GDP is $4 trillion, give or take. It also has “a lot of growth ahead,” meaning its current economic position is not the endpoint. Together, these features make the label feel too narrow.

The debate is about influence, not only status. Jaishankar’s alternative suggests India can contribute to deals, shape choices, and pursue its own interests. He also expects middle powers to develop independent policies and arrangements. India therefore wants its present weight and future potential considered together.

The article presents India as exceptionally large in population and already substantial in economic output. Jaishankar calls it the most populous country in the world. He also places its GDP at $4 trillion, give or take. These are the article’s main measures of India’s scale.

The population statement gives India the highest position globally, but no exact number is provided. The economic figure gives a broad output estimate, not a detailed ranking. The article also says India has significant growth ahead, so its future scale may exceed its present economic position.

A precise comparison with other countries cannot be made from this text alone. It names no rival countries and supplies no population total or comparative GDP table. Its central point is qualitative: India’s population, economy, and growth prospects make “middle power” seem an incomplete description.

In this article, “middle powers” is a broad category, not a list of named countries. Jaishankar quotes Narendra Modi’s definition: they are countries “who have the power to empower.” That means they possess enough influence or capability to help other countries act, grow, negotiate, or pursue their interests.

The article gives no specific examples of countries or groups in this category. It instead describes how these powers may behave. Each would apply its own judgment, identify its interests, develop its policies, and then reach arrangements with other countries. Their influence would come through what they can contribute.

The phrase therefore focuses on practical agency rather than a formal alliance. A middle power can matter by bringing something valuable to negotiations and forming useful arrangements. Jaishankar says this description is not comfortable for India, because he sees India’s population, GDP, and growth prospects as too significant for that label.

A geopolitical choke point is a place, system, resource, or decision point through which others must pass or depend. Control over it can create bargaining power. Jaishankar says the world is not only one of middle powers; it is also a world of choke points, where access can become strategically important.

He mentions rare earths as an obvious example, because control of essential supplies can affect industries and negotiations. He adds that finance and sanctions can also act as choke points. Financial access can influence transactions, while sanctions can restrict a country’s ability to trade or operate. The article does not identify specific systems or suppliers.

This creates a risk of “weaponization,” meaning ordinary economic tools can be used for political pressure. Countries may therefore pay closer attention to who controls key resources, financial channels, or restrictions. Such leverage can change bargaining power well beyond traditional military competition.

Turning finance, sanctions, or critical resources into leverage changes international dealings. Trade is no longer only about buying and selling. Access, restrictions, and supply can become tools for pressure. Jaishankar describes this broader pattern as the weaponization of choke points.

The mechanism is dependence. If one side controls an important financial channel, sanction, or resource, another side may need access to it. That control can shape negotiations and encourage countries to seek alternative partners or make reciprocal deals. Jaishankar describes arrangements in which one side says, “You do this, I do this.”

He expects competition to focus increasingly on who has what to bring to the table. The table will remain, but behavior around it will change. Countries may speak with different influence and build new arrangements. Jaishankar says this process should not be viewed pessimistically, even though its direction has surprised some observers.

In international relations, power is the ability to influence choices and outcomes. Population can provide scale and capability. Economic strength can support production, trade, and investment. Resources and technology can create useful advantages. Strategic partnerships can expand reach by connecting countries’ strengths. These links are established principles, while the article emphasizes India’s scale and potential.

Jaishankar points to India’s world-leading population, $4 trillion GDP, and substantial growth ahead. He also describes a world where countries compete over what they can bring to the table. That could include resources, finance, technology, markets, or political cooperation. Arrangements then form around mutual exchange.

The article does not list India’s technologies, resources, or partnerships. It does show the broader mechanism: countries apply their own judgment, protect their interests, and make deals based on capabilities. Power therefore depends not only on size, but on how effectively a country turns its assets into influence.