China’s Liaoning carrier heads to the Pacific as US, Japan prepare for missile drills

The Liaoning carrier group is carrying out a planned naval drill in the western Pacific. China’s defence ministry says the exercise is designed to test and improve the troops’ combat-oriented training level. It is not officially aimed at a particular country or objective.

The exact location has not been disclosed. The ministry described only the “relevant waters” of the western Pacific and said the activity follows international law and practice. The group’s first western Pacific training session this year lasted 35 days, from May to June.

The timing matters because the drill could overlap with Keen Sword 27, a large US-Japan exercise scheduled for October 19 to 29. The article does not give a precise end date for the Liaoning drill, but says carrier exercises generally last weeks. That creates a period of increased military activity around Japan and waters near Taiwan.

An aircraft carrier is a large warship built to carry, launch, recover, and support military aircraft. It acts as a mobile airfield, allowing aircraft operations far from a country’s mainland. A carrier usually operates with other ships, forming a carrier group that provides support and protection.

The Liaoning’s western Pacific drill matters because it tests that group in distant waters. The exercise is intended to improve combat-oriented training, according to China’s defence ministry. The article does not identify a specific mission or target, and it gives no exact position for the drill.

Its timing could increase attention around Japan and Taiwan. The Liaoning’s training may overlap with Keen Sword 27, a large US-Japan exercise running from October 19 to 29. That exercise includes Japan’s southwestern islands, while the Liaoning has previously trained east of the Miyako Strait. Together, these activities create more opportunities for nearby military forces to monitor one another.

Keen Sword 27 is a biennial military exercise involving the United States and Japan. It will run from October 19 to 29 across Japan and surrounding waters, including the southwestern island chain near Taiwan. Its scale makes it a major test of coordination between the two allies.

Japan plans to involve about 45,000 personnel, 6,100 vehicles, 40 ships, and 260 aircraft. About 12,000 US troops are also reportedly expected to participate. The exercise will include an activity on Yonaguni Island, just over 100km from Taiwan, linking it directly to possible Taiwan contingency planning.

The 2024 exercise involved about 33,000 personnel, 30 ships, and 250 aircraft. Keen Sword 27 therefore adds about 12,000 Japanese personnel, 10 ships, and 10 aircraft, based on the figures given. The article does not provide a 2024 vehicle total, so that comparison cannot be made.

The United States plans to deploy two newer missile systems to Yonaguni during Keen Sword 27. NMESIS, or the Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System, is an anti-ship missile platform. MADIS, the Marine Air Defence Integrated System, is designed for air defence. The article identifies their roles but gives no performance ranges.

Japan will temporarily deploy Type 88 surface-to-ship missiles and Type 03 medium-range air-defence systems alongside the US systems. In simple terms, the anti-ship systems are intended to threaten vessels, while air-defence systems are intended to counter threats from the air. These roles follow the descriptions provided in the article.

Their deployment is significant because it is the first time the US will send these two systems to Yonaguni. The island is close to Taiwan and sits in Japan’s southwestern chain. Their presence makes the exercise more closely connected to planning for a possible Taiwan contingency, although the article does not say the systems will be used in combat.

Yonaguni Island is strategically important because it is just over 100km from Taiwan. It belongs to Japan’s southwestern island chain, an area included in Keen Sword 27. Its location places the exercise close to waters and airspace connected with a possible Taiwan contingency.

The exercise will feature new deployments there. The United States will send NMESIS anti-ship missile platforms and MADIS air-defence systems to Yonaguni for the first time. Japan will temporarily place Type 88 surface-to-ship missiles and Type 03 medium-range air-defence systems alongside them.

These deployments give the island a prominent role in the exercise. The article calls the Yonaguni activity the clearest link to a potential Taiwan contingency. It does not say that combat is planned. Instead, the island’s proximity and the systems being trained there show why activity around Yonaguni is receiving particular attention from China, Japan, and the United States.

If the Liaoning’s drill overlaps with Keen Sword 27, Chinese, Japanese, and US forces could operate or monitor activity in nearby waters and airspace at the same time. The article does not predict a specific incident, but the overlap would increase the number of military forces operating in a tense region.

A recent example shows the mechanism. In December, Liaoning training east of the Miyako Strait led to a stand-off between Chinese warplanes and Japanese fighter jets that had approached to monitor the activity. More simultaneous exercises could create additional encounters involving ships, aircraft, and missile systems.

The immediate concern would be miscalculation or a dangerous escalation during monitoring and manoeuvres. Tensions have grown since Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi made remarks about Taiwan, drawing criticism from Beijing. The article does not say conflict will occur, but the combination of overlapping drills and political tension makes careful military conduct especially important.

Taiwan is a security flashpoint because China regards it as part of China and has not ruled out using force to reunify it with the mainland. Japan, like most countries, does not recognise Taiwan as independent, but it opposes any attempt to take the island by force.

The United States has committed to supplying Taiwan with weapons. That commitment places Washington’s security relationship with Taiwan alongside Japan’s opposition to coercion. Military exercises near Japan’s southwestern islands therefore carry significance beyond routine training, especially when they occur close to Taiwan.

Political remarks have added tension. Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi made comments about Taiwan in November last year, prompting criticism from Beijing. The Liaoning’s December training east of the Miyako Strait then preceded a stand-off between Chinese warplanes and Japanese fighters. These events show how Taiwan’s status can connect diplomacy, military planning, and encounters at sea and in the air.