Norwegian defence firm Kongsberg to build anti-drone factory in Poland

Kongsberg, a Norwegian defence company, plans to build a factory in northern Poland near the Tricity area. The site will produce counter-drone systems, which are designed to detect and defeat unmanned aircraft. The project matters because Poland is expanding its protection against Russian drone threats.

The factory’s exact location has not been disclosed. Construction is scheduled to begin this year, while production should start during the first half of 2028. Kongsberg says the facility will support Polish industry and defence capabilities, while increasing its presence in the country.

The investment follows a January agreement between Kongsberg and Poland’s state defence group PGZ to supply a new anti-drone system. The plant is also part of wider Polish-Norwegian cooperation, including joint defence production and stronger security ties around NATO’s northern and eastern flanks.

A counter-drone system is a set of tools used to find, identify, track, and stop unmanned aircraft. It matters because small drones can be hard to spot and may threaten military sites, borders, or civilian targets. The source does not describe Kongsberg’s exact system, so the following explains standard counter-drone methods.

Detection commonly uses radar, cameras, radio-frequency sensors, or several of these together. After tracking a drone, operators may use electronic disruption to interfere with its control link or navigation. Some systems can take control of a drone, while others use guns, missiles, or directed energy to destroy it.

Modern systems often combine these methods rather than relying on one response. Electronic measures can be cheaper and avoid physical debris, but may not work against every drone. Physical interception is more direct, yet uses ammunition and can cost more than the drone being stopped.

Kongsberg plans to invest over 200 million zloty, or €46 million, in the Polish facility. The factory is expected to create more than 100 long-term jobs. These figures show a substantial industrial commitment, although the article does not give the factory’s exact workforce breakdown or annual output.

The investment is small compared with Poland’s wider spending on drones and counter-drone systems. Deputy defence minister Cezary Tomczyk said combined spending rose from 100 million zloty in 2023 to 26 billion zloty in 2026. The 2026 figure is about 130 times the announced factory investment of 200 million zloty, using the minimum stated investment.

The comparison is not like-for-like. The 26 billion zloty covers national spending on both drones and counter-drone systems, while Kongsberg’s figure covers one factory. Still, it shows the plant is part of a much larger Polish defence modernisation effort.

Poland has made counter-drone protection a higher priority because Russian drones have already violated its airspace. Around 20 drones crossed into Polish airspace during one night in September last year, described as an unprecedented incursion. Such events create risks for national security and pressure Poland to detect threats earlier.

The concern extends beyond accidental or deliberate crossings. The article notes that Moscow is increasingly using jet-powered drones against targets in Ukraine close to Poland’s border. One recently struck a passenger train travelling between Kyiv and Warsaw, showing how drone warfare can affect infrastructure and travel near Poland.

Poland is responding with new systems, spending, and industrial partnerships. It signed an agreement with Kongsberg and PGZ for an anti-drone network intended to protect eastern borders. Poland also reported that drone and counter-drone spending rose to 26 billion zloty in 2026, indicating a major shift in defence priorities.

Kongsberg’s factory could strengthen Poland’s defence industry by bringing production of counter-drone systems inside the country. The company says the facility will support Polish industry and defence capabilities. More than 100 long-term jobs would add a lasting economic benefit, while local production could support Poland’s expanding counter-drone requirements.

The project is linked to Kongsberg’s January agreement with Polish state defence group PGZ. That partnership is intended to supply Poland with a new anti-drone system. Producing equipment locally can connect foreign technology with Polish industrial capacity, although the article does not specify the factory’s exact products, suppliers, or production volume.

The plant also fits a broader strategic relationship. Poland and Norway have pledged deeper security ties, including joint defence production and stronger NATO northern and eastern flanks. Their cooperation already includes Norwegian purchases of Polish Piorun systems and Polish missile production for rocket artillery systems Norway is buying from South Korea.

The Suwałki Gap is strategically important because it lies along the Polish-Lithuanian border between Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave and Belarus, an ally of Russia. The article describes it as a strategically important choke point. Its position makes security there a priority for Poland and NATO’s eastern flank.

The Warsaw Security Forum’s summary report suggested using counter-drone systems to create a “controlled fly-zone” over the gap. Such a network could detect and track unmanned aircraft entering the area. It could then help authorities identify permitted flights and respond to drones considered threatening.

The article does not explain the proposed system’s exact design or rules of operation. Its broader context is clear, however: Poland is strengthening eastern-border protection after Russian drone violations. A counter-drone network could therefore add another layer of surveillance and defence around this sensitive corridor.

Drones are difficult and costly to defend against because many are small, low-flying, and inexpensive compared with traditional air-defence missiles. An attacker can also send several drones at once, forcing defenders to detect and classify multiple objects quickly. The article highlights why this matters for Poland after Russian airspace violations and expanding drone use near its border.

A modern network usually begins with detection from radar, cameras, or radio sensors. Operators then assess the target and choose a response. Electronic disruption may block control signals or navigation without firing a weapon. If that fails, guns, missiles, or other physical interceptors can destroy the aircraft.

Layering helps preserve expensive ammunition and improves resilience when one method fails. Electronic tools may be ineffective against autonomous or hardened drones, while physical weapons consume supplies and can cost more. The best balance depends on the drone, location, rules, and available technology; the article does not describe Kongsberg’s exact mix.