Cheap weapons, growing fears: Inside the Taliban’s drone campaign against Pakistan

Armed FPV drones are small quadcopters guided through a first-person-view system. They can carry munitions, including mortar shells, and attack nearby positions. Fixed-wing suicide drones resemble small aircraft. They are designed to fly toward a target and explode. The distinction matters because the two types offer different ranges, payloads, and tactics.

The Taliban have used FPV drones against Pakistani positions near the border. They have also used fixed-wing drones roughly two metres in size. Those aircraft may carry between half a kilogram and one kilogram of explosives. Their engines and simple radio-navigation systems help them travel toward targets, but they remain slow and fly low.

The fixed-wing drones may potentially fly hundreds of kilometres, unlike the short-range battlefield role described for FPV quadcopters. Both are relatively cheap, but they create different threats. FPVs support attacks close to the front line, while fixed-wing drones can threaten targets deeper inside Pakistan and create wider fear.

Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry said 23 drones had been launched from Afghanistan into Pakistani airspace since the beginning of September. On September 23, the army said it had shot down at least eight fixed-wing drones in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, less than 1,000 metres from the Afghan border. These figures show repeated incursions rather than a single isolated attack.

The fixed-wing drones are roughly two metres in size. They can carry between half a kilogram and one kilogram of explosives. Their 55cc DLE55 engines are commercially available, according to the examination described in the article. The drones use simple radio navigation and fly slowly at low altitude.

Their military effectiveness is limited, and they are easy to shoot down after detection. However, some larger fixed-wing models are potentially capable of flying hundreds of kilometres. That range allows relatively basic drones to threaten targets beyond the immediate border area and keeps Pakistani authorities on alert.

Inexpensive drones make security harder because defenders must watch for repeated attacks across a wide area. The threat is not limited to military positions. The article warns that a drone striking a school or fuel facility could have catastrophic consequences. Even when drones are intercepted, they can force Pakistan to spend resources on detection, air defence, and constant readiness.

Mark Grozel says these fixed-wing drones are slow and easy to shoot down once detected. Their real advantage is that they are difficult to spot. A cheap aircraft can therefore create uncertainty about when and where the next attack might come. The Taliban can signal that infrastructure may be threatened at any moment.

This produces a security effect larger than the drone’s small explosive payload. Pakistan has reported 23 launches in September alone, showing sustained pressure. As more groups gain access to similar equipment, authorities may face more frequent alerts and a wider area to protect, even when many drones have limited military effectiveness.

Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban were once close allies, but the relationship became open conflict about eight months before the article’s September 2026 reporting. Pakistan began targeting positions of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP, inside Afghanistan. The TTP is a Pakistani militant group that has attacked Pakistan for nearly two decades and is recognised as a terrorist organisation by several governments and bodies.

The TTP has longstanding ties with the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan accuses the Taliban of sheltering and supporting the group. After Pakistani air strikes against suspected TTP positions, the Taliban retaliated with ground attacks and drones. Pakistan has aerial military superiority, so the Taliban’s drones offer another way to strike Pakistani forces near and beyond the border.

The wider conflict has intensified. TTP-related incidents rose from 98 in 2021 to 470 in 2024. Regular border clashes during 2025 reportedly caused approximately 4,000 deaths. A September 18, 2026 TTP suicide bombing at a mosque killed 21 people in Kohat.

The article only says Pakistan and the Taliban were once close allies. It does not describe how that partnership began during the Soviet-Afghan war. Established historical accounts explain that Pakistan supported Afghan resistance groups fighting Soviet forces and later backed the Taliban as it emerged and took power in Afghanistan. That cooperation reflected shared security and political interests, but the article does not provide those details.

The relationship later deteriorated mainly over the TTP. The TTP has longstanding ties with the Afghan Taliban and has attacked Pakistan for nearly two decades. Pakistan accuses the Afghan Taliban of sheltering and supporting the group. Pakistan then began striking suspected TTP positions inside Afghanistan, while the Taliban answered with ground attacks and drones.

The result was an open war by 2026, according to Pakistan’s defence minister. The article reports rising TTP violence, regular border clashes, and repeated drone incursions. It does not identify a separate single event that ended the earlier alliance.

Detection and interception are different problems. Small fixed-wing drones can blend into the background because they present a limited visual and radar signature. Flying at low altitude can also make them harder to notice, especially near the border. Their slow speed does not help defenders find them before they reach a target.

Mark Grozel describes the drones as roughly two metres long, slow, and low-flying. He says they are hard to spot but easy to shoot down once detected. Their simple radio-navigation systems and small engines provide limited military capability, yet they are enough to guide an explosive payload toward a position.

This creates a dangerous gap in Pakistan’s defences. A drone may be relatively harmless if identified early, but detection is the crucial step. The September reports show the problem: Pakistan said it intercepted 23 launches, while the Taliban continued using both FPV quadcopters and larger fixed-wing drones. Cheap attacks can therefore demand expensive vigilance.

Commercial technology has made basic drone construction accessible to groups without advanced military industries. Autopilot software is widely available. Engines and batteries can be bought online, while bodies can be made from 3D-printed parts, polystyrene, or balsa wood. These materials are cheap, light, and sufficient for a simple aircraft.

The article cites fixed-wing drones using DLE55 engines. These 55cc single-piston engines are commercially available online. A basic radio-navigation system can guide the aircraft, while a lightweight body carries between half a kilogram and one kilogram of explosives. The result is a simple weapon assembled from civilian components.

This lowers the cost of entering drone warfare. UAV expert Mark Grozel says any group with the resources, including the Taliban, can now produce such drones. Their small payload limits military effectiveness, but low cost allows repeated attacks. Their psychological impact can still be substantial, especially when infrastructure may be threatened at any moment.