Dispatch from the Gulf: Kuwait still wants Washington but is preparing for less

Preparing for a reduced US role means Kuwait is strengthening its own capabilities and seeking broader security relationships. It does not mean Kuwait wants Washington to leave. Kuwaiti officials still want the United States to treat regional security as a major priority, especially after Iran’s willingness to strike Gulf countries became more apparent.

The key example is Kuwait’s reaction to the US withdrawal from Iraq. The withdrawal was expected, but officials found it jarring because it removed part of the US presence that had helped deter threats. Kuwait is also listening to calls for diversified military suppliers and partnerships rather than depending on one country.

Kuwait therefore faces a difficult balancing act. It wants stronger American protection, but it is preparing for less dependable US involvement. Gulf states are also resisting pressure to choose between American security ties and Chinese commercial ties. Kuwait may increasingly accept whichever security or economic deal it considers best.

Kuwait has historically relied on the United States because Iraq’s aggression showed how exposed the small Gulf country could be. Saddam Hussein’s invasion in the early 1990s prompted the First Gulf War. The United States helped liberate Kuwait, creating a powerful historical link between American military involvement and Kuwait’s survival.

That experience still shapes Kuwait’s expectations. Kuwaiti officials now say their country needs the United States more than at any time since the First Gulf War. They view the American presence in the region as a deterrent against threats from Iran and Iranian-backed groups. The US withdrawal from Iraq was therefore unsettling, even though officials knew it was coming.

Kuwait’s concern is not only about past gratitude. Its location makes it vulnerable, while its economy depends heavily on Gulf shipping. Officials fear that a contracting US presence could leave Kuwait less protected than neighboring states. They still want Washington to prioritize Gulf security, even while building stronger national defenses.

Kuwait’s government depends overwhelmingly on oil revenue. Oil accounts for about 90 percent of state revenue before investment income. This concentration matters because Kuwait’s oil earnings depend on the safe movement of energy through Gulf waterways and maritime chokepoints.

If fighting or a blockade disrupts shipping, Kuwait could struggle to export oil normally. The immediate mechanism is simple: less secure shipping can delay or reduce exports, cutting the revenue that funds the state. The article identifies Kuwait’s position at the northwestern head of the Persian Gulf as an added danger, because threats can affect access to surrounding waterways.

This dependence makes security and economics inseparable. Kuwait is therefore watching Iran’s willingness to strike Gulf countries, along with fighting near other chokepoints. The country is strengthening defenses and diversifying suppliers, but every Gulf state is doing the same. Kuwait remains particularly exposed because oil dominates its public income.

If Iran or other armed groups disrupt Gulf shipping, Kuwait could face interruptions to the oil trade that supports most state revenue. The danger is not limited to damaged vessels. Uncertainty around routes can restrict movement, raise risks for commercial operators, and make it harder for Kuwait to sustain exports.

The mechanism is Kuwait’s dependence on Gulf waterways. Oil accounts for about 90 percent of state revenue before investment income, so a prolonged shipping problem could weaken public finances. Kuwait sits at the northwestern head of the Persian Gulf, placing it in persistent danger from Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. Fighting around other chokepoints adds wider pressure.

The article presents Iran’s willingness to strike Gulf countries as its sharpest leverage. Kuwait is improving its defenses and seeking multiple suppliers, but it cannot quickly remove its geographic or economic exposure. Continued conflict could therefore deepen Kuwait’s concern about declining US deterrence and accelerate its search for alternatives.

The main threats identified are Iran and Iraqi Shia militias backed by Tehran. Kuwait’s position at the northwestern head of the Persian Gulf leaves it exposed to pressure from both across the Gulf and from neighboring Iraq. The article describes this danger as persistent rather than temporary.

Iran presents the clearest direct threat. Its willingness to strike Gulf countries is described as a new and important source of leverage. Iraqi Shia militias create a different risk. They are armed groups operating from Iraq and backed by Tehran, so Kuwait must also consider threats connected to its northern neighbor rather than only attacks launched directly by Iran.

These risks reinforce Kuwait’s concern about the US withdrawal from Iraq. American forces had provided a deterrent effect, and that presence is now gone. Kuwait is improving its defenses, but it faces threats from multiple directions. That makes security planning more complicated than responding to a single state adversary.

Kuwait and other Gulf states are reducing dependence by building their own capabilities and working with more than one external partner. Diversifying military suppliers has become a necessity, according to officials in Kuwait City. The goal is greater freedom to respond if one partner reduces support or imposes limits.

The UAE provides the clearest example. It has spent years professionalizing its military and is moving to diversify its security and defense partnerships. Kuwait is also strengthening its defenses and choosing deals based on what it considers the best offer. In January, it signed a $4.1 billion deal with China to complete the Mubarak Al-Kabeer port.

This approach separates security decisions from commercial decisions. Gulf leaders reject being forced to choose between US security ties and Chinese trade. Kuwait still wants American protection, but it is preparing for a less certain US role. The war may accelerate this broader diversification, including in security.

A maritime chokepoint is a narrow or strategically important sea passage that concentrates ship traffic. The Strait of Hormuz is one example discussed in the article. Because many vessels use such routes, keeping them open is essential to freedom of navigation and to the movement of energy and goods.

The key mechanism is dependence. If a country can block, threaten, or complicate passage, ships may be delayed or rerouted. That can disrupt exports, increase commercial risk, and raise prices. A state does not need to control every surrounding sea to create pressure; threatening one critical passage can affect many countries at once.

The article says the United States and its allies are focused on sustaining freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and other chokepoints. It also says Iran sees its willingness to strike Gulf countries as leverage. For Kuwait, that matters because oil provides about 90 percent of state revenue before investment income.