Trump's 'Shield of the Americas' is more fragile than it seems

The Shield of the Americas is a security coalition launched by Washington in March. Its 11 members are El Salvador, Costa Rica, Honduras, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, Chile, Guatemala, Paraguay, and the Dominican Republic. Washington presents it as evidence of regional support.

Its approach emphasizes stronger security forces, military operations, prisons, and emergency powers. Ecuador declared an “internal armed conflict” and imposed another 60-day emergency across eight provinces in September. Yet only 14% of 5,023 people arrested during May’s curfew had organized-crime ties, according to Ecuador’s interior minister.

The coalition’s political support is weaker than Washington’s scorecard suggests. In eight of eleven countries, more people preferred opposition parties than the president’s side. Seven gaps reached 20 points, while only 17% of Ecuadorians backed President Daniel Noboa’s side.

The coalition’s governments have weaker voter support than their leaders claim. In eight of 11 measured countries, more people favored opposition parties than the president’s party or candidate. In seven countries, opposition leads reached at least 20 percentage points.

These numbers show a broad political warning: voters are judging governments mainly on crime and living costs. Ecuador offers the clearest example. Only 17% backed President Daniel Noboa’s side, while 35% reported crime victimization and 63% felt unsafe. Emergency rule has expanded, but it has not restored security or support.

El Salvador and Costa Rica were notable exceptions, as voters rewarded hard-line security policies. Honduras also stood apart, although it was surveyed during President Nasry Asfura’s first months. Overall, opposition strength suggests many incumbents are responding with prisons, military deployments, and emergency powers rather than winning back trust. The next test is whether these measures improve daily safety before voters choose successors.

Many voters are abandoning incumbents because governments have not convinced them they can control crime or rising living costs. The article says voters once willing to stick with incumbents are now switching, even as leaders expand security powers.

Ecuador shows the problem clearly. Daniel Noboa’s government has used emergency rule, curfews, and military operations, yet 35% reported crime victimization and 63% felt unsafe. Only 17% backed Noboa’s side, suggesting tougher measures have not produced visible security gains or political loyalty.

This pattern is broad: in eight of 11 coalition countries, more people preferred an opposition party than the president’s side. In seven, the gap was at least 20 points. El Salvador and Costa Rica were exceptions, while Honduras was surveyed early in President Nasry Asfura’s term. Leaders may leave stronger security institutions behind, but voters’ impatience can still reshape governments.

As voters pull away, governments are answering with tougher security rather than changing course. They are expanding military operations, prisons, and emergency powers, often copying El Salvador’s hard-line model. This matters because emergency measures can weaken rights while failing to restore public confidence.

Costa Rica illustrates the approach. It is opening a maximum-security prison for 5,100 inmates on October 14, costing $35 million and modeled on Bukele’s CECOT. Honduras approved similar prison measures, while Ecuador extended emergency rule across eight provinces, suspending home protections and imposing another curfew.

The results remain mixed or poor. In Ecuador, 35% reported crime victimization, and 63% felt unsafe, despite two years of emergency rule. Only 17% supported President Daniel Noboa’s side. Across the coalition, five leaders cannot seek consecutive terms, so these policies may outlast them and shape institutions inherited by successors.

El Salvador’s model combines mass arrests, large prisons, and emergency powers that weaken normal safeguards. It became attractive because voters demanded tougher policing, while governments facing crime and falling support could present forceful action as an immediate solution.

Other countries copied pieces of it. Costa Rica built a maximum-security prison for 5,100 inmates, costing $35 million and modeled on Bukele’s CECOT. Honduras approved similar prison measures in September, including isolation for high-risk prisoners. Chile proposed emergency powers allowing military deployments and separate prison regimes, then withdrew the reform after failing to secure enough Senate votes.

The approach expands state power, but the article shows limited security or political payoff. In Ecuador, after two years of emergency rule, 35% reported crime victimization and 63% felt unsafe. El Salvador’s state of exception produced about 92,000 arrests without judicial warrants since 2022. Other governments may inherit stronger security institutions, but also weaker legal protections and uncertain results.

The United States supports the Shield of the Americas through military funding and operational help. Washington says this strengthens regional governments fighting organized crime and “narcoterrorism.”

On September 15, the State Department told Congress it would redirect $52 million in foreign military financing. The money, originally budgeted for allies in Europe and the Middle East, went to Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, and Peru. U.S. forces also began supporting Ecuadorian military operations in March against groups Washington labels terrorist organizations.

Washington separately announced $1 billion in security assistance for Colombia in August. This support arrives as coalition governments expand military operations, prisons, and emergency powers. However, Ecuador’s experience shows the limits: only 17% supported President Daniel Noboa’s side, while 63% felt unsafe locally.

A state of exception is a temporary emergency arrangement that gives government extra powers during a serious crisis. It can limit ordinary safeguards, such as court review, protest rights, home privacy, or normal military restrictions. Those powers may help confront violence, but they can also weaken civil rights and make emergency rule easier to extend.

Ecuador shows the danger. President Daniel Noboa has governed under an “internal armed conflict” declaration since 2024, suspending home privacy and imposing curfews. During a May curfew, authorities arrested 5,023 people, but only 717, about 14%, had organized-crime ties. This suggests broad powers can sweep up people beyond their stated target.

Such measures can outlast the president who creates them. Five flagging presidents cannot seek consecutive terms, yet their emergency laws and security institutions will pass to successors. Guatemala’s 30-day siege allowed detention without judicial orders, while Bukele’s exception produced about 92,000 warrantless arrests since 2022. Expanded powers therefore risk normalizing weaker oversight, inherited military roles, and fewer checks on future presidents.