India's US oil and gas imports plunged 43% in September as West Asia supplies recovered despite Trump’s push: Report

India sharply reduced its purchases of three major fuels from the United States in September. Combined imports of crude oil, LNG and LPG fell 43% from August. They dropped from 2.13 million tonnes to 1.22 million tonnes. This was the lowest level since April. The shift matters because it shows that commercial conditions, rather than political pressure, are driving refinery buying decisions.

West Asian supplies recovered during the same month. Imports from the region rose 67% month-on-month to 13.56 million tonnes. Producers including the UAE, Iraq and Saudi Arabia restored exports despite wartime disruptions. Their recovery gave Indian refiners more nearby options than American cargoes.

US supplies remained weak in October. American crude imports fell about 30% from September to 91,000 barrels per day. High freight costs, long journeys and limited medium-sour crude availability continued to reduce the appeal of US energy. The Gulf is therefore likely to remain central to India’s energy procurement.

The decline in Indian imports from the US was substantial. Combined crude oil, LNG and LPG shipments fell from 2.13 million tonnes in August to 1.22 million tonnes in September. That is a reduction of 910,000 tonnes, or 43%. September’s total was the lowest since April and more than 50% below the two-year high of 2.86 million tonnes recorded in October 2025.

West Asia moved in the opposite direction. Indian imports from the region rose 67% month-on-month to 13.56 million tonnes in September. This was about eleven times the volume purchased from the US. Gulf producers restored exports by adapting routes and using pipelines, alternative ports and ship-to-ship transfers.

The comparison highlights the Gulf’s stronger position in India’s energy supply. American shipments were also marginally lower than a year earlier. US crude imports fell again in October, reaching around 91,000 barrels per day, showing that the September decline continued.

West Asian supplies became more attractive because they offered Indian refiners a better commercial deal. Gulf producers were recovering exports, so refiners had alternatives to expensive American cargoes. Senior officials said economics, not political pressure, remained the main factor in purchasing decisions. The government had not ordered refiners to buy from any particular country.

American shipments can take more than 45 days to reach India. Some vessels reroute around the Cape of Good Hope to avoid security risks near the Suez Canal route during Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. The longer trip raises freight and transportation costs. It also makes delivery less convenient.

Crude quality mattered too. Indian refiners had improved access to medium-sour crude from West Asia. That grade was described as more economical and better suited to refinery requirements. Together, lower regional supply costs, shorter practical routes and suitable crude grades weakened the commercial appeal of US barrels, despite Washington’s calls for larger American energy purchases.

Crude oil is naturally occurring petroleum in an unrefined form. Refineries process it into fuels such as petrol, diesel and other products. LNG means liquefied natural gas. It is natural gas cooled to an extremely low temperature so it becomes a liquid and can be transported by ship. LPG means liquefied petroleum gas, a fuel made mainly from propane and butane and stored as a liquid under pressure.

These fuels differ in composition and handling. Crude oil is a mixture of hydrocarbons that must be refined. LNG is primarily methane and needs cryogenic storage. LPG contains lighter gases and can be stored in pressurised containers. Their infrastructure, shipping systems and buyers are therefore not identical.

The article groups them because India imported all three from the US. However, they are not interchangeable. A refinery mainly processes crude oil, while LNG and LPG serve separate energy and industrial markets. Their prices, transport costs and availability can influence India’s overall energy sourcing decisions differently.

The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow sea passage connecting the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the wider ocean. It is a major route for energy tankers leaving Gulf producers. Because Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iraq and other exporters ship oil through or around this region, disruption there can threaten supply flows and raise transport risks.

The article shows that Gulf exports continued despite reduced use of the strait. About 60% of Gulf oil exports crossed it in September, compared with 83% before the war. Total Gulf exports still recovered to around 16.5 million barrels per day, approaching pre-war levels.

This resilience came from alternative arrangements. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Iraq used pipelines, different export ports and ship-to-ship transfers. These methods helped maintain exports and reduced Iran’s ability to disrupt regional oil flows. The strait remains important, but Gulf producers are less dependent on it than before the conflict.

The Gulf producers did not rely entirely on the Strait of Hormuz after disruptions reduced its use. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Iraq adjusted their export systems to keep oil moving. Their response mattered because it protected supplies for customers such as India and reduced the impact of regional conflict on global energy flows.

They used pipelines to move oil toward alternative destinations. They also loaded cargoes at different export ports and transferred oil between ships. These methods allowed tankers to avoid some affected routes or continue shipments with less dependence on the strait. As a result, Gulf oil exports recovered to around 16.5 million barrels per day in September.

The share crossing Hormuz fell to about 60%, from 83% before the war. Yet exports approached pre-war levels. The adjustments also weakened Iran’s ability to disrupt regional oil flows. For India, this recovery restored access to nearby Gulf supplies and reduced the need to rely on costlier American cargoes.

Indian refiners compare the full cost and usefulness of an energy shipment. Freight charges add directly to the purchase price. Longer journeys also tie up ships for more time and increase exposure to route disruptions. A cargo that looks affordable at the source can become expensive after transport, insurance and delays are included.

Crude quality is equally important. Refineries are built to process particular grades and mixtures. The article notes that medium-sour crude from West Asia became more available and was better suited to Indian refiners’ requirements. American supplies had limited availability of these grades. Shipping from the US could take more than 45 days, sometimes through the Cape of Good Hope.

These factors explain why West Asian and Russian supplies competed effectively with US barrels. Gulf producers were geographically closer and had restored exports through alternative routes. India’s refiners therefore followed economics and operational fit. Political requests to buy more US energy could not overcome higher delivered costs or less suitable crude.